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PREFACE 
Lesslie Newbigin is an impressive writer and thinker.  His analysis of western culture 
is clear and readable.  He writes with a passion for his topic and with a clear sense of mission 
to encourage the church to defend the lordship of Jesus Christ boldly before the world.  My 
interest in Newbigin was piqued by the opportunity to write a paper on his understanding of 
the uniqueness of Christ and the mission of the church for Dr. John Newport’s seminar on 
contemporary philosophical issues.  I was intrigued by Newbigin’s insistence on the gospel 
as truth for all of humanity and on Jesus Christ as Lord of all of life, especially as there were 
areas where his defense did not seem to support the full breadth of orthodox faith.  This 
dissertation is the result of my investigation into why Newbigin’s defense of Christian truth 
claims stops short of affirming all of those truths that have been so important for Christians 
historically. 
I would like to acknowledge those who encouraged my intellectual and spiritual 
formation.  My mother stimulated in me from early childhood a love for reading and 
enthusiasm for intellectual pursuits.  My professors at Mid-America Baptist Theological 
Seminary and at Southwestern Seminary encouraged me to love and understand the word of 
God and to refine my doctrinal commitments. 
Thanks are in order to many whose help made this dissertation possible.  Dr. John 
Newport gave me the opportunity to study seriously Newbigin’s thought during the seminar, 
“Contemporary Philosophical Issues.”  Dr. Douglas Blount pointed me to Alvin Plantinga’s 
defense of reformed epistemology which helped refine and strengthen my convictions 
regarding the essential role of presuppositionalism as a method of defending Christian truth 
claims.  Dr. James Leo Garrett, Jr. provided background and encouragement.  The staff of the 
A. Webb Roberts Library have always be ready and able to assist, and for this I am grateful.  
My wife, Laverne, has been a continual source of encouragement and insight as well as a 
sounding board for ideas.  She is my friend, companion, sweetheart, and a dedicated servant 
of Jesus Christ.  Finally, Dr. Keith Putt, the dissertation supervisor, has more than once 
helped me refine my thinking.  He has encouraged me to write about those aspects of 
Newbigin’s thought that I believed were really important, and has kept me from chasing 
numerous interesting but irrelevant “rabbits.”  
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INTRODUCTION 
The western world is in a time of transition.  Modernity is giving way to post-modern 
understandings of reality. Western dominance is being challenged as third world countries 
develop. The baby-boom generation has matured and American culture is increasingly driven 
by Generation X. An industrial society is giving way to an information-based society, and 
traditional understandings of morality, truth and value are being challenged. 
Evangelicalism is in a period of transition as well, marked by numerical growth and a 
deeper examination of its relationship to the larger world.  Alister McGrath has spoken of an 
“Evangelical Renaissance,”1 pointing to Evangelicalism’s growth, numerically and in terms 
of influence.  The body of solid evangelical scholarship has grown and evangelical scholars 
are examining Evangelicalism’s doctrinal, cultural, and practical commitments at many 
levels.  In addition, evangelical scholars recognize that the gospel must be defended before a 
western world that is far different from the world of the previous three centuries.  They have 
attempted to analyze the philosophical and cultural changes that confronts the church today 
in order that the Christian faith might be better defended.2  There is general agreement 
among evangelical scholars that the Enlightenment program has failed and the crisis this 
precipitates must be understood if Christians are to defend the gospel knowledgeably and 
effectively in the coming decades. 
The church must carefully examine every serious proposal for defending the gospel.  
                                                 
1Alister McGrath, Evangelicalism and the Future of Christianity (Downers Grove, 
IL: InterVarsity, 1995), 17-51. 
2Typical efforts in this direction include: Francis Schaeffer, The God Who Is There: 
Speaking Historic Christianity into the Twentieth Century (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 
1968); Os Guiness, The Dust of Death: A Critique of the Establishment and the Counter 
Culture--and a Proposal for a Third Way (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1973); Stanley 
Grenz and Roger E. Olson, Twentieth Century Theology: God and the World in a 
Transitional Age (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1992); William Lane Craig, Reasonable 
Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, rev. ed. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1994); 
Richard J. Middleton and Brian J. Walsh, Truth Is Stranger Than It Used to Be: Biblical 
Faith in a Postmodern Age (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1995); Rodney Clapp, A 
Peculiar People: The Church as Culture in a Post-Christian Society (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity, 1996). 
 
 
 
Recently, Lesslie Newbigin, a prominent figure in the mainline ecumenical movement, has 
sought to call the attention of the western church to the realities of the cultural crisis.  He 
defends Christianity against pluralism insisting that the biblical worldview and the gospel are 
true for all and everyone.3  Newbigin wants the church to understand the cultural milieu in 
which it finds itself, how the Bible functions as authoritative in that situation, and how the 
church may effectively bring the gospel to bear on the larger world.  The concerns that 
Newbigin raises, and the defense he offers is worthy of careful and critical hearing within 
Evangelical circles. 
Newbigin’s analysis of these matters is important because he presents an approach 
that looks plausible on the surface, and which is similar to approaches taken by some 
evangelical scholars in recent years.  At first, one is eager to embrace Newbigin’s words 
about confidence in Scripture and in the historicity of the life, death, and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ.  His thought, however, requires a careful evaluation to discover exactly what he 
means by these things and their implications for the self understanding of Christianity as it 
confronts a changing world.  Such an evaluation will be enhanced by an understanding of his 
life, and of the forces which shaped his thought. 
Lesslie Newbigin’s Life 
Newbigin was born on December 8, 19094 “in Northumbria, the son of a Presbyterian 
businessman in shipping and a Scottish mother.”5  His was a home that encouraged 
education, appreciation for the arts, and the courage to defend convictions that may not 
always be popular.6  By the time he reached college, he had abandoned Christian beliefs 
                                                 
3Lesslie Newbigin, “Certain Faith: What Kind of Certainty?” Tyndale Bulletin 44:2 
(November 1993): 339-50. 
 
4Bernard G. Thorogood, “Apostolic Faith: An Appreciation of Lesslie Newbigin, 
Born 8 December 1909,” International Review of Mission 79, no. 313 (January 1990): 66. 
5Martin Conway, “God-Open, World-Wide, and Jesus-True: Lesslie Newbigin’s Faith 
Pilgrimage,” Midstream: An Ecumenical Journal 34 (January 1995): 22. 
6Lesslie Newbigin, Unfinished Agenda: An Autobiography (London: SPCK, 1985; 
reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), 1-4. 
 
 
 
though he was open to the fact that “Christian faith was not irrational.”7 
While a student at Queens College, Cambridge, he came to faith in Christ through the 
ministry of the Student Christian Movement and later became a secretary for SCM.8  A few 
years later, he sailed for India “as a missionary of the Church of Scotland,”9 and became 
involved in the efforts which led to the formation of the Church of South India, a union of 
three denominations.10  This experience must have had a profound influence on Newbigin, as 
the union of these churches must have seemed like a harbinger of the hopes that drove the 
World Council of Churches.  Ecumenism, and a general concern for bringing various 
Christian groups together around the gospel to some extent drove his apologetic.11 
In 1959, he became General Secretary of the International Missions Council, which 
was even then on its way to becoming the World Council of Churches.  After the 
International Missions Council’s formal incorporation into the World Council of Churches, 
he became director of that body’s Commission on World Missions and Evangelism.12  A 
missionary at heart, Newbigin could not resist the opportunity to return to the field, which he 
did in 1965 as Bishop of Madras for the Church of South India.13 
At age 65, in 1974, Newbigin retired from mission service and returned to England.  
It is a testimony to his vigor at that age that he and his wife chose to make the trip overland 
                                                 
7Ibid., 6. 
8Ibid., 8-21. 
9Conway, 22. 
10Ibid. 
11Lesslie Newbigin, Truth and Authority in Modernity, Christian Mission and 
Culture, ed. Alan Neely,  H. Wayne Pipkin and Wilbert R. Shenk (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity 
Press International, 1996), 32-34.  Newbigin believed that a proper understanding of the 
gospel would unite the liberal and conservative wings of the church, and that a united 
Christianity would more effectively defend the gospel. 
12Conway, 23. 
13Thorogood, 70. 
 
 
 
through Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey, and on into Europe.14  In addition, he could not remain 
“retired” for long.  He taught missions at Selly Oaks Colleges, Birmingham, and, in order to 
prevent its being closed down, took the pastorate of an inner city church in Birmingham.15  
Many of his most important books and articles were written after he was 70 years old. 
Newbigin’s experience with the Birmingham church brought home to him how deep the 
crisis in the west had really become.  In the community surrounding the church, Newbigin 
encountered a situation more difficult than he had faced in India.  As he described it at the 
time, he discovered 
a cold contempt for the gospel which is harder to face than opposition.  As I visit the 
Asian homes in the district, most of them Sikhs or Hindus, I find a welcome which is 
often denied on the doorstep of the natives.  I have been forced to recognize that the 
most difficult missionary frontier in the contemporary world is the one of which the 
churches have been--on the whole--so little conscious, the frontier that divides the 
world of biblical faith from the world whose values and beliefs are ceaselessly fed 
into every home on the television screen.16 
Having been confronted with the harsh realities of the post-Christian west, Newbigin was 
eager to begin the work which would make him known to a much wider audience--defending 
the gospel to a post-Enlightenment culture.  He remained a vigorous advocate of a bold 
defense of the gospel until his death on January 30, 1998.17 
Lesslie Newbigin as Apologist 
 Newbigin’s experience as a pastor in Birmingham turned his attention to the realities 
of the post-Christian west.  As he wrote, “England is a pagan society and the development of 
a truly missionary encounter with this very tough form of paganism is the greatest 
                                                 
14Newbigin, Unfinished Agenda, 224-39. 
15Thorogood, 72. 
16Newbigin, Unfinished Agenda, 249. 
17Obituary of Bishop Lesslie Newbigin; available from http://churchnet.ucsm.ac.uk/ 
news/files2/newbigin.htm; Internet. 
 
 
 
intellectual and practical task facing the Church.”18  His concerns, therefore, turned more 
philosophical, and to defending a specific perspective on the gospel, one which he believes 
the church should adopt if it is to be effective in decades to come. 
 Three key elements are found in Newbigin’s apologetic, and they form the substance 
of this dissertation.  These elements are very important to Newbigin and to Evangelicals as 
well.  The elements are his conception of how truth is understood in western culture and its 
relationship to the gospel, biblical authority, and the uniqueness of Jesus Christ. 
 The Enlightenment has shaped how the modern world perceives truth, and is thus a 
matter of genuine concern for a defense of Christian faith.  Evangelicals contend that the 
gospel is historically and doctrinally true.  Newbigin critiques the Enlightenment’s 
understanding of truth as grounded solely in the scientific method and mathematics.  This, he 
believes, restricts truth to a range too narrow for the truth claims of the gospel to be accepted. 
 Like Evangelicals, Newbigin believes that the truthfulness of the gospel is essential.  It 
cannot be merely a story; it must be something which actually happened and which touches 
the real world. 
 The second element considered in this dissertation is Newbigin’s understanding of 
biblical authority.  The Bible, Newbigin believes, derives its authority from its historical 
situatedness.  Far from being an argument against Scripture’s claim to universal validity, this 
for Newbigin actually undergirds it.  Since the events recorded in the gospels actually 
happened in history, they are part of public facts, and everyone must reckon with them.  The 
third element is the uniqueness of Jesus Christ and his role in the church and in the world.  
Newbigin defends the lordship of Christ and his essential role in human history and destiny.  
These matters are essential, and Newbigin defends his views on them with passion, clarity 
and a sincere desire to see the church fulfill its role as a sign of the presence of the kingdom 
of God in the world.  Evangelicals share this passion even as they may disagree with 
Newbigin’s approach to these questions.  Newbigin gives all Christians a call to boldness and 
conviction, and to personal and intentional understanding of the issues as they seek to live 
out and proclaim the truth of Christianity at the cusp of a new century.
                                                 
18Ibid. 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
NEWBIGIN’S UNDERSTANDING OF MODERN 
WESTERN CULTURE AND THE GOSPEL 
 
Lesslie Newbigin encouraged Christians in the west to look at their world as if they 
were missionaries to an alien culture.  The western church, which has sought to challenge 
other cultures from a biblical perspective, has failed to realize the extent to which its own 
culture is “foreign” to the biblical worldview.  The western church has been too much a part 
of its own culture and looks at the gospel from that perspective.  It must begin to critique the 
larger culture from the point of view of the gospel if it is to communicate the gospel 
effectively in the church’s own setting.1  Without understanding this culture from an 
outsider’s perspective, the church will have no basis for challenging the “post-Christian 
paganism” that pervades modernity.2 
Newbigin contends that the church must commend the gospel to the western world as 
truth, as the way reality functions, not as just another religious option.  It will not do merely 
to be an enclave, he says, for the very nature of the gospel will not allow that.  The gospel 
asserts that God has done certain things in history, and that all of reality is to be understood 
in the light of God’s actions and purposes. 
Newbigin’s critique of the west focuses on the matter of epistemological method, 
how modern people believe that truth is discovered and verified.3  He “questions whether the 
whole thrust of modernization is not philosophically and theologically wrong, a contradiction 
of the gospel.”4  He recognizes that the modern enterprise rests on a rationalist and empirist 
                                                 
1Lesslie Newbigin, Foolishness to the Greeks (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans), 22. 
2Charles C. West, “Mission to the West: A Dialogue with Stowe and Newbigin,” 
International Bulletin of Missionary Research 12, no. 4 (October 1988): 154. 
3John Williams, “The Gospel as Public Truth: A Critical Appreciation of the 
Theological Programe of Lesslie Newbigin,” Anvil: An Anglican Evangelical Journal for 
Theology and Mission 10, no. 1 (1993): 14. 
4David M. Stowe, “Modernization and Resistance: Theological Implications,” 
 
 
foundation, which leaves no room for religious truth.  He wants to replace the western 
rational and empiricist conception of truth with one in which the gospel may be seen as true. 
Modern Western Culture 
Its Source: The Enlightenment 
Western culture stands captive to “a false faith derived from the humanist confidence 
of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment”5  The Enlightenment, Newbigin believes, was “ a 
shift in the location of reliable truth from the story told in the Bible to the eternal truths of 
reason.”6  This that has had ramifications, not only for technology, but also for political, 
social, and religious life.  The western world of the late twentieth century is the western 
world produced by the Enlightenment and its method of discovering truth.  While he is aware 
that the Enlightenment has not been entirely evil,7 he believes that it was an epistemological 
turn in the wrong direction. 
The Enlightenment was not so much one movement as “a family of philosophies.”8  
Its key lies more in “how men thought than in what they thought.”9  Newbigin properly 
focuses his critique on Enlightenment epistemology.  The problem which the west faces 
today, he believes, began when truth was established on the wrong foundation. 
                                                                                                                                                       
International Bulletin of Missionary Research 12, no. 4 (October 1988): 147. 
5West, “Mission,” 154. 
6Lesslie Newbigin, Proper Confidence: Faith, Doubt, and Certainty in Christian 
Discipleship (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 73. 
7In fact, he says “we must gratefully acknowledge the imminent achievements of 
these past two centuries.”   The Enlightenment has, in fact, “been the most brilliant period in 
human history thus far . . .” (Lesslie Newbigin, “Can the West Be Converted?” International 
Bulletin of Missionary Research 11, no. 1 [January 1987]: 5). 
8Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation--The Rise of Modern Paganism 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), x. 
9Lester G. Crocker, “Introduction,” in Blackwell’s Companion to the Enlightenment,  
ed. John W. Yolton et al. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 1. 
 
 
Newbigin recognizes that the Enlightenment was a conversion, a turning point in history.  
There was at that time an “exhilarating feeling that light has come into the world and 
banished the darkness.”10  New ways to understand reality came into play, and older ones 
were scrapped.  Europe emerged from a dark hole into the sunshine of reason and truth.11  
This “volatile mixture of classicism, impiety, and science”12 was led by men who were aware 
they were recreating the world along new lines. 
Specifically, the Enlightenment attempted to replace ancient authorities as the locus 
of truth with pure reason and empiricism.13  Enlightenment thinkers established the principle 
that “reliable knowledge is to be had by the relentless exercise of the critical method.  
Dogma can no longer be accepted on its own terms.”14  Appeal to ancient authority, “the iron 
grip of dogma,”15 was replaced by the “promise of the universal reign of reason over all 
peoples and cultures.”16  Old ideas were submitted to rigorous scrutiny “using the tools of 
critical thought to dissolve what had hitherto been taken for granted.”17  Every previously 
accepted idea was reexamined and, in the main, discarded, since “the human mind is 
equipped with a power of reason which is capable of discovering the real facts and so 
                                                 
10Newbigin, Foolishness, 23. 
11Ibid. 
12Gay, Interpretation, 8. 
13Newbigin, Truth and Authority in Modernity, 11. 
14Lesslie Newbigin, Truth to Tell: The Gospel as Public Truth (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1991), 29. 
15Newbigin, Foolishness, 23. 
16Lesslie Newbigin, “Gospel and Culture--but Which Culture?” Missionalia 17, no. 3 
(November 1989): 214. 
17Newbigin, “Certain Faith,” 347-48. 
 
 
liberating us from mere tradition and superstition.”18  The result, its leaders were certain, 
would be “a single civilization moving progressively toward universality.”19 
Newbigin is aware that such a startling change did not come about suddenly and 
without warning.  There were certainly antecedents to the Enlightenment, situations which 
broke up the intellectual soil and prepared it for new paradigms.  Any  movement as complex 
as this one can have no simple explanation, and this is certainly true of the Enlightenment.20  
Recognizing this, Newbigin identifies several precursors of the Enlightenment.21  The 
earliest of these was the translation of texts from the ancient world into Latin.22  These had 
survived in Arabic translations, and their translation grew out of greater interaction between 
the Muslim and Christian worlds of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.  These texts and the 
commentaries on them produced by Muslim philosophers such as Alfarabi and Avicinna led 
to the incorporation of Aristotelian philosophy into Christian thought.23  Thomas Aquinas 
was probably the most significant medieval thinker to be influenced by these newly available 
texts. Reacting to Muslim work on Aristotle, he formulated his proofs of the existence of 
God.  To some extent he derived his proofs from Muslim, Jewish and other sources,24 but his 
God was the God of Aristotle’s unmoved mover.  His proofs came to be seen as too fragile to 
work and “the centuries following Aquinas saw the shadow of skepticism spreading across 
the mind of Christendom.”25  By the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, skepticism was 
                                                 
18Newbigin, Truth to Tell, 21. 
19Ibid., 4. 
20Crocker, 2. 
21Newbigin, Foolishness, 23. 
22Ibid. 
23Newbigin, “Certain Faith,” 341. 
24Norman L. Geisler and Winfred Corduan, Philosophy of Religion, 2nd ed. (Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 1988), 158. 
25Newbigin, “Certain Faith,” 342. 
 
 
“almost overwhelming.”26  While Newbigin may be overstating his case, certainly the work 
of Aquinas and others who interacted with classical authors and their Muslim commentators 
encouraged the development of the western commitment to rationalism.27 
This intellectual ferment led to “the founding of the great Medieval Universities,”28  further 
contributing to an environment conducive to the Enlightenment.  In addition, the Renaissance 
with its emphasis on humanistic ideals, and the Reformation which contributed to the 
breakdown of religious consensus and a critique of the value of tradition also helped set the 
stage for the Enlightenment.29 
He finds two focal centers of Enlightenment epistemology: the new way of seeing 
reality that resulted from the rise of modern science and the “new method in philosophy 
opened up by Descartes.”30  Both rested on empiricism, the idea that one discovers truth 
through personal investigation.  “The new development in science associated with the names 
of Bacon, Galileo and Newton”31 opened up new methods of gaining knowledge and 
demonstrated that the world is not always as it seems.32  Bacon sought to replace 
metaphysical speculation with hard facts.33  He rejected Aristotelian teleology, the idea that 
all things have a proper end or purpose.34  The early astronomers, including Galileo, 
“shattered the world in which the inhabitants of western Europe had felt themselves at home 
                                                 
26Ibid. 
27Ibid., 341. 
28Ibid. 
29Newbigin, Foolishness, 23. 
30Ibid. 
31Ibid. 
32Newbigin, Truth to Tell, 25. 
33Ibid., 21; idem, Foolishness, 76. 
34Newbigin, Foolishness, 76. 
 
 
for 1000 years,”35 by demonstrating that the planets looked different through his telescope 
than they appeared to the unaided eye.36 
Equally important for the future development of science was “the vision of the nature 
of reality opened up . . . by the work of Isaac Newton.”37  Newton’s “brilliant vision” of a 
world governed “not by purpose but by natural laws of causes and effect”38 created the 
modern scientific worldview.  Newton sought to formulate these laws mathematically.  His 
work was a complement to Bacon’s method which focused on rigorous empiricism to 
discover the facts regarding the natural world.  Newton’s mechanistic laws and Bacon’s 
insistence on “facts” led to efforts to explain the universe “in natural terms”39 rather than in 
terms of divine purpose.  Causality, not purpose, drove the efforts of seventeenth century 
scientists who laid the foundations for modern science.40  Newton and others replaced the 
Greek and Medieval concept of purpose at work in nature with a new understanding of a 
world moved by natural laws of cause and effect.41  For example, the rotation of the planets 
is no longer explained in terms of  “the perfection of the divine will, but the uniform 
operation of the laws of inertia and gravitation.”42  Everything could be “explained by the 
causes that produced them.”43 
                                                 
35Newbigin, Truth to Tell, 25. 
36It was Galileo who discovered the rings of Saturn, dispelling the idea that all the 
planets looked essentially alike. 
37Newbigin, Foolishness, 23-24. 
38Ibid., 24. 
39Crocker, 4. 
40Newbigin, “Can the West,” 6. 
41Newbigin, Foolishness, 24. 
42Ibid. 
43Ibid. 
 
 
It is on the matter of purpose that Newbigin is most critical of science.44  It eliminates 
an entire area of truth.  When purpose is excluded from questions regarding truth, the 
universe is explained in impersonal mathematical terms leaving no place for One who has 
designed it with intent in mind.  Science, because of its method, cannot discover purpose, 
having already eliminated it as a category.  Purpose is discovered, not by investigating and 
describing processes and states of being, but “by listening to the person whose purpose it 
is.”45  An understanding of the universe, which excludes the concept of purpose, is one in 
which religious truth claims have no place. 
This revolution in science did not take place in an intellectual vacuum.  Behind it lay 
Descartes’ philosophical method.46  This occupies a key place in the development of western 
thought and, as Newbigin describes it, “we in our particular culture are all heirs of 
Descartes.”47  Descartes “exalted the ‘critical principle’ to a position of priority in the search 
for reliable knowledge.”48 He lived in a time when skepticism was growing, largely, 
Newbigin believes, as a result of the failure of Thomist thought to provide a rational basis for 
truth and for the existence of God.  Efforts were being made at that time to overcome 
skepticism and to reestablish a sure basis for knowing.49  Descartes himself sought “to find a 
fresh starting point for thought,”50 to clear away tradition and dogma and establish truth on 
indubitable foundations. 
                                                 
44Cause and effect, having replace teleology as a concern under the scientific method 
(Ibid., 23), did produce some positive results.  It “gave unlimited scope for probing, 
dissecting, exploring and experimenting” (idem, “Can the West,” 6). 
45Ibid. 
46Newbigin, Foolishness, 23. 
47Newbigin, Truth to Tell, 27. 
48Lesslie Newbigin, “Religious Pluralism: A Missiological Approach,” Studia 
Missionalia 42 (1993): 231. 
49Newbigin, Proper Confidence, 20. 
50Newbigin, Truth to Tell, 25. 
 
 
Descartes’ method begins with doubt.51  At this point Descartes’ thinking reversed 
Augustine’s which had begun with faith (credo ut intelligam).  For Descartes, “the way to 
certain knowledge is not faith, but doubt.”52  He believed that one should doubt anything that 
is not established as certain by the individual knower.  Nothing, he believed, should be 
accepted on authority originating outside the self.  From this beginning, Descartes engaged in 
a process “involving three steps.”53  The first was to “begin with something which is self 
evident and indubitable.”54  For Descartes, this was his own existence as a thinking mind55 
which was proven to him by the fact that he could not doubt his own thought processes.56  
The second step for Descartes was to continue “by deductive reasoning”57 seeking to develop 
“propositions which can be demonstrated with the precision, clarity and certainty of 
mathematics.”58  Starting from himself, Descartes believed that he could reason his way to 
any number of propositions that would be indubitably true.  He determined that he would 
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hold to no conclusions that could be doubted in any way.59  Third, he determined to test his 
conclusions by the critical method.  Descartes used the “critical principle to filter out all that 
is dubitable.”60  Whatever did not rise to the level of certainty was not knowledge but belief.  
The critical principle guaranteed certainty on all matters of knowledge. 
This method of thinking fit in well with the empirical scientific method developed by 
Bacon and the concept of natural law established on mathematical principles which Newton 
helped engender.  Descartes influenced the next generation of thinkers and scientists, and his 
methods dominated “the development of thought in Europe for three centuries.”61 
Descartes’ influence, Newbigin believes, led to three dualisms which have damaged 
the ability of the western world to understand and appreciate biblical truth.62  The first of 
these dualisms exists between the world of the mind and the external or physical world, the 
world of matter.  Descartes established here a physical-mental dualism similar to the Platonic 
dualism of sensible world and world of ideal forms.63   The mind does not have extension in 
the world, but “looks in on the cosmos from outside.”64  According to Newbigin, this leads to 
the conclusion that God, as part of the non-material world, cannot interact with the physical 
world, “the world of material things and historical happenings.”65  This begins the process of 
removing God as a factor in the physical world.  The second dualism is the “divorce between 
the objective and the subjective poles in human knowing.”66  This led to science becoming 
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the arena of “Truth” while other areas of knowledge were dismissed as less valid.67  Thus, 
“in the 19th Century, popularizers of science as an alternative to religion propagated the idea 
that ‘scientific knowledge’ was ‘objective’ and that other claims to knowledge . . . were 
subjective.”68  The west has “been dominated by the ideal of a kind of knowledge that is 
objective in the sense that it involves no personal commitment on the part of the knower.”69  
The third dualism is “the dichotomy . . . between theory and practice.”70   Newbigin believes 
that this contradicts Scripture’s claim that believing and acting are one.  His example of this 
is Jesus’ words to Peter, “Follow me.”71  Peter’s action of leaving his nets and following 
Jesus is an act of faith.  What is popularly called “head knowledge,” Newbigin contends, is a 
product of this dualism and forms no part of the Bible’s understanding of truth. 
Newbigin concludes that the Cartesian project failed.  Descartes’ “fatal flaw” was 
that “he sought a basis of certainty in his own mind and not in the faithfulness of God.”72  In 
addition, Descartes, by reversing Augustine’s approach, elevated doubt “to a principle of 
honour” while dogma was “reduced to a rude word.”73  Descartes’ “false ideal of a kind of 
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knowledge which is immune to doubt”74 is ultimately unattainable.  Doubt is the beginning 
point and every concept “must be open to criticism.”75   The result has been “a prejudice in 
favor of doubt over belief.”76  The skepticism that Descartes sought to eradicate has instead 
become the reigning factor in the western approach to truth.  This “shadow of skepticism” 
has been “most pervasively present in the affirmation of Kant that we cannot know the 
realities with which we have to deal but only their appearances.”77   This, Newbigin points 
out, is a contradiction in itself--the claim to “know” that ultimate reality is “unknowable.”78 
The Enlightenment has been called the “Age of Reason”79 because the leaders of the 
movement were committed to reason as the final arbiter of truth.  They defined reason as 
“those analytical and mathematical powers by which human beings could attain (at least in 
principle) to a complete understanding of and, thus a full mastery of, nature.”80   The 
reasoning mind, guided by Descartes’ method, “cannot bow before any arbiter other than 
what it calls the facts.”81 
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Its Result: The Fact/Values Distinction 
The results of the Enlightenment program have been profound especially in 
emphasizing and defining the realms of fact and values.  Descartes’ method and the dualisms 
it set up led to a distinction between two worlds, one public and the other private.82   These 
are “a world of what are called ‘facts,’ which is the world of public life, politics, business, 
education; and a world of values which are matters of personal choice.”83   Science is the 
realm of facts; all other fields are “merely subjective.”84  As a result, Europe became a place 
where “reason” and “facts” ruled the public sphere while “religion” was confined to the 
private sphere.85  Facts can be shown to be true or they are not facts at all.  Values, having no 
relation to truth, cannot be true or false in any way.86  Facts are what is known; values are 
“what some people believe.”87  Everyone agrees to what the facts are because they are 
verified by reason and the scientific method.  Facts form the “public world” of modern life.88 
 The private world is a world of opinions and personal preferences on matters related to 
religious values and ethical and lifestyle choices.89 
These two realms, completely separate in the minds of westerners, offer the key to 
modern culture.90  No value, no moral or religious truth claim may be absolutized, for these 
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“are a matter of personal opinion and everyone is free to have his own opinions.”91  Facts, 
the conclusions reached by empirical science, are, conversely, something on which “we must 
all agree.”92 
This distinction between facts and values, Newbigin believes, has its source in the 
Enlightenment’s commitment to reason and to the “inductive method” of science which “has 
been basic to the whole development of the modern scientific worldview.”93 has led to this 
problem.  Again, the abandonment of purpose or end as a concern for science becomes a 
factor.94  The Enlightenment abandoned Aristotelian teleology as relevant to truth, and 
matters of “fact” have now become “value-free, because value is a concept related to the 
purpose for which a thing either is or is not well fitted.”95 
Newbigin cites an example from MacIntyre of a watch.  If the watch keeps 
exceptionally good time, this may be measured and empirically verified.  One may conclude 
that it is a “good watch” on this basis only if one understands that the purpose of the watch is 
to keep time.  If one understands the watch only as a collection of parts, “bits of metal which 
can be used according to the personal preferences of its owner,” then it is only a matter of 
individual opinion whether “it is a good watch or not.”96  From a scientific perspective, one 
can only describe the watch, measure it, delineate the various parts and functions.  This 
illustrates how the scientific method, while providing much information, actually excludes 
the most important facts.  This, Newbigin says, is precisely what modern culture has done in 
excluding religious  and moral truth claims from serious consideration. 
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Facts, Newbigin believes, have become “the centerpiece of the plausibility structure 
by which our culture seeks to sustain itself.”97  The sociologist Peter Berger coined the term 
“plausibility structure” to describe the set of assumptions and ideas which are foundational to 
the way a culture sees reality.  It determines what ideas and beliefs may be accepted within 
that culture.98  Berger “argued that the distinctive feature of this culture is that there is no 
generally acknowledged ‘plausibility structure’.”99  Newbigin contends, however, that there 
is a plausibility structure in the west; one where “facts” are what is true and indisputable, 
verifiable according to the scientific method, but “values” are wholly private, unverifiable, 
and neither true nor false in any transcendent sense.100  This plausibility structure “is the 
belief that the scientific method--which has been so enormously fruitful for human life--is the 
only reliable way to understanding the total human situation.”101  This shapes the way reality 
may be described.  Certainty ascribes to facts which all must accept, but on matters of value, 
one incurs “the charge of bigotry” if one treats them in the same way.102 
This fact/values distinction shows up in modern culture in a variety of ways.  For 
example, morality and ethics have become arenas where “there are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ 
styles of life.  Perhaps the only thing that is really wrong is condemning as wrong the 
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lifestyle of another.”103  This manifests itself in the “politically correct” movement in the 
United States, and in the “Gay Rights” movement.  Newbigin cites Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
book After Virtue which claims “that all attempts to ground ethical precepts in the ‘facts’ as 
science understands them have failed.”104  Newbigin points out that “no ‘factual’ statement 
can be made about what kinds of behavior are good or bad.”105  As a result, “we do not talk 
of right and wrong; we speak of values.”106 
Religious claims are omitted from the realm of facts as well.  Newbigin points out 
that for modern westerners the purpose of human life expressed in the Westminster 
Catechism, “that human beings exist to glorify God and enjoy him forever, is not a fact.  It is 
an opinion held by some people.  It belongs to the private sector, not the public.”107  This 
applies to all assertions regarding the purpose of human life.108  Newbigin cites the debate 
between science and religion as an area where this division operates.  In court cases which 
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challenged laws requiring the teaching of creation along with evolution in public schools, 
these laws have been struck down, not because creation is “false,” but because it is a 
“religious” idea rather than a “scientific” truth claim.109 Science is part of the plausibility 
structure of the modern world; religion is not. 
This fact/values distinction has led to deep problems in modern culture, because it has 
divided the realm of knowledge in ways that are foreign to the biblical worldview.  Danger is 
inherent in this division.  “Values” become “a matter of the will.  They are what some people 
want.”110  Values “can be asserted only with the strength of someone’s desire; they cannot be 
grounded in a perception of reality.”111  The door thus opens for a tyranny of the majority, 
for a world in which the will to power obliterates transcendent truth claims. 
“It will no longer do,” Newbigin says, “to accept the dichotomy between a public 
world of so-called ‘facts’ and a private world of so-called ‘values’.”112  He insists on 
“removing the wall and recovering the unity of human knowledge, of the endless and 
enchanting enterprise of discovering how things really are.”113 
Its Problem: A Restricted Arena for Truth 
Newbigin asserts that the fact/values distinction and indeed the entire Enlightenment 
program has led to serious restrictions on what may be regarded as “Truth” in western 
culture.  A plausibility structure which excludes any truth claims that are not founded on 
empirical and mathematical data must inevitably exclude important areas of concern.  It was 
Nietzsche, Newbigin claims, who first saw “that the operation of the modern critical 
scientific method must make it strictly impossible to assert of any course of conduct ‘That is 
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right’.”114   It may be possible to call it pleasing, or sensible, but to call it “right” without a 
transcendent concept of rightness is impossible.  This leads to restrictions in how facts may 
be conceived.  
The scientific worldview inevitably makes implicit assertions about ultimate reality 
and seeks to explain it fully.  Mechanistic models of reality, derived from Newton, dominate 
in the sciences,115 and thus determine how science describes ultimate reality.  For example, 
“the enormous advances in our knowledge of the structure and functioning of the brain have 
been used to disseminate the idea that the objects we call minds have no real existence.”116  
Mental events are explained entirely in terms of neurons firing in the brain.  No room is left 
for an immaterial “soul” that might actually cause a mental event and somehow affect the 
brain.117   Whole areas of truth are left out, because science, despite its intentions, cannot 
cover all areas of reality.118 
This exclusion of certain areas of concern from the realm of truth shows up readily in 
matters of religion.  The claim that God has revealed himself in history at some point is not 
considered by moderns as something which might be “true” or “false.”  “It has been silenced 
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by co-option into the modern scientific world view;” it is a “fact” about the beliefs of one 
faith that may be studied under the heading of religious experience.119  In this the church has 
too often acquiesced, says Newbigin.  It has been “conned by the assumptions of our culture, 
which regards Christianity as one among a body of things called religions which are about 
personal opinions and personal experiences, not about public facts.”120 
Trends in education demonstrate this restriction on truth claims most clearly.  All 
education, Newbigin asserts, involves making claims about what “reality” is.  The exclusion 
of religious truth claims from reality affects the way subjects are taught in public schools.  
Newbigin cites a survey commissioned by the National Institute of Education, which 
examined elementary school textbooks issued by thirty-one publishers.  The researchers 
reported “‘a pattern of censorship’ which has eliminated almost all references to the role of 
religion in American history and in the human story generally.”121  Publishers, wanting to 
stick to “verifiable facts” and without seeming to advocate “merely subjective” religious 
truth claims, erred in eliminating religion completely.  In addition, researchers found “not a 
single reference to marriage, husbands or wives.”122  These cultural assumptions have also 
affected other course material.  Newbigin cites a high school teacher in England who said 
“that he now found it impossible to teach Milton to any of his pupils except the Muslims.  
For them there were still the concepts of right and wrong, truth and falsehood, heaven and 
hell; for the native English, no more.  Milton was incomprehensible.”123  Students who had 
never encountered these ideas were unable to comprehend them.  Newbigin is well aware of 
just how difficult this makes not only the process of liberal arts education but also the 
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presentation of the gospel.  Enlightenment abandonment of teleology leaves no room for 
value judgements to be matters of fact and thus matters for educational curricula. 
Unfortunately, this restriction on what may be seen as truth has influenced the way churches 
have pressed the truth claims of the gospel.  Churches have allowed religion to be made 
trivial in modern life by not boldly proclaiming the gospel as “public truth, the most 
important fact and value of existence.”124   The church has instead timidly almost apologized 
for holding the claims of the gospel to be “true” at all. 
Its Failure: Postmodernity 
Newbigin believes that the Enlightenment failed to achieve its goals.125  “Descartes’ 
method,” he claims, “has been found to have in itself the seeds of its own destruction.  For 
the critical principle turns upon itself and eventually destroys itself.”126  This has led to 
“postmodernism, a breakdown of the self confidence of modernity and the widespread 
acceptance of a total fragmentation in human perception.”127  The Enlightenment, while it 
has done so much for human life in terms of technological and material advances, “has now 
left us in the lurch,”128 unable to achieve the very certainty that Descartes so confidently 
predicted his method would offer. 
Newbigin is extremely critical of the resulting postmodern paradigm because it 
replaces “timeless truths” with “metanarratives which falsely claim to explain the human 
story as a whole, but which are in fact themselves simply products of particular human 
histories.”129   What is left is a “vapid subjectivism”130 that offers no hope of validating any 
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truth claims whatever.  Newbigin sees postmodernism as a direct result of the Enlightenment 
effort to achieve total certainty and of the fact/values distinction.  The values side has been 
so subjectivized, he believes, that any statement that cannot be verified empirically or 
mathematically must be only a matter of opinion, or worse yet, a result of  “the will . . . 
asserted only with the strength of someone’s desire.”131 
Postmodernism has its roots in the work of Frederich Nietzsche who “saw the 
inevitable outcome of the program of Enlightenment.”132  Truth claims, being divorced from 
transcendent moral or religious values, have been reduced to no more than assertions of the 
“will to power.”  Newbigin points to Foucault as one who has developed the idea that history 
has been a process by which different “regimes of truth” have followed one after the other, 
each seeking to “displace their predecessors and impose their own ‘truth’ upon society, but 
there is no ‘metanarrative’ which provides an over-arching truth by which they might all be 
judged.”133  The end of this, according to Newbigin, “is nihilism into which our society is 
visibly sinking around us.”134  Newbigin fears that Postmodernism’s insistence on “the 
culturally conditioned character of all truth-claims could lead to the abandonment of all 
belief in the possibility of knowing the truth; that is what is happening in contemporary 
Western Culture.”135  In place of truth are merely competing worldviews, useful for 
utilitarian purposes, and easily exchanged for others as the need dictates. 
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A society that sees truth in this way cannot long “sustain its integrity in the face of 
the claims of those who have a firm commitment to some vision of truth.”136  In other words, 
western society could become captive to whatever vision of reality is most forcefully 
championed, whether Islam, Marxism, or some other agenda.  Newbigin fears for the future 
of a society that cannot weigh and examine truth claims.  In addition, Newbigin fears that a 
society which cannot conceive of truth apart from mathematical certainty cannot hear and 
believe the gospel.  The gospel becomes nothing more than just another competing 
metanarrative, an idea which works for some but not for others.  It becomes one of many 
options an individual may choose, but which no one would ever claim was “true” in any 
universal sense.  This is the situation of the west which the church faces today.  Newbigin 
wants to defend the gospel as true for everyone in that situation.  In order to do that, he must 
redefine truth itself. 
Newbigin’s Defense of the Gospel as Public Truth 
Newbigin’s critique of modern western culture reveals a difficult situation in which to 
preach the gospel.  The fact/values distinction which is a product of the Enlightenment 
approach relegates all religious claims to the area of private personal preference.  
Postmodernism has seemingly validated the fact/values distinction as the only way to 
describe reality.  These things make pressing the truth claims of the gospel very difficult.  If 
one insists that everyone must acknowledge Jesus Christ as Lord, that person is either 
regarded as bigoted or ignored as eccentric. 
Yet, Newbigin insists that the church must proclaim the gospel as truth.  Its mission 
“is justified based on the truth found in Christ.”137  Newbigin wants to defend the truths of 
the gospel as facts--“public truth”--not merely private opinion or private preference.  In order 
to do this he must first establish a definition of truth that can encompass religious truth 
claims. 
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Newbigin believes that “the basic question is epistemological.  Can reality be 
known?”138  Is it possible to make assertions about reality, about the way the world works, 
that can be regarded as certain?  Newbigin asserts that a “yes answer to these questions is 
imperative.”139  Newbigin realizes that every statement, not just scientific ones, about “what 
is the case” is either true to the real world or it is not.  One cannot be content to simply 
regard all opinions as equal. 
Newbigin’s proposal to heal this split involves taking an epistemic step backwards 
from the Cartesian experiment.  This is not a backward step away from truth nor is it an 
effort to include subjective matters, but rather a step back to enlarge the field of what may be 
seen as objective truth.  It is as if one were so focused on a few leaves of a shrub that one 
cannot appreciate the whole landscape.  Both the shrub and the landscape of which it is a part 
are objectively real, but one must take a step backwards to see it all. 
Newbigin wants to establish truth on a foundation that will include both scientific and 
religious truth claims as equally objective.  Newbigin begins by attacking the foundation of 
Cartesian certainty on which science rests.  Newbigin points out that “every plausibility 
structure rests on faith commitments.”140  If this is true, then scientific certainty has no 
special place epistemologically.  Science rests on a faith commitment as do all truth 
systems.141  Those who accept scientific truth claims as valid have no ground for saying that 
truth claims arising out of other faith commitments are automatically invalid on that ground 
alone. 
Newbigin’s Understanding of Truth 
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Newbigin’s epistemic step backward involves two parts.  First, he wants to rob 
science of its pretention to objectivity, to having a monopoly on “truth.”  The second phase 
of Newbigin’s step backward is to put Christian truth claims on an equal footing with 
scientific truth claims.  He does not deny that scientific facts relate to an objective reality and 
that science describes that reality very well.  The gospel also relates to an objective reality 
which, from various points of view, is described accurately in Scripture.  The argument that 
the gospel is historically situated and involves religious value judgements is for Newbigin no 
argument against its factuality.  Since all knowledge is culturally situated and yet has an 
objective reference point in the real world “out there,” the gospel is no different from other 
truth claims. 
He begins his effort to refute science’s claims to absolute objectivity by seeking to 
demonstrate the role of the person in knowing the truth “aided by the epistemological 
insights of Michael Polanyi.”142  Newbigin, like Polanyi, believes that ultimately all facts are 
known from within the perspective of the knower, and that there is an inevitable unproven 
foundation for all of knowing.  Thus, scientific method has a strong subjective element in it, 
and scientific knowledge would be impossible without some concepts accepted “on faith” 
and as “culturally given.”  Polanyi challenged the idea that knowledge is “impersonal, 
universally established, objective.”143  He sought to show “that the objective/subjective 
dualism is false.”144  The knower participates in the act of understanding. 
Polanyi’s proposal relates to how knowledge is gained in general, especially as seen 
from Newbigin’s perspective.  Newbigin summarizes Polanyi’s effort in a series of 
propositions.  First is the reality that scientists work from within an “apprenticeship to a 
tradition of knowledge.”145  Major scientific advances are often made in areas of Europe 
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where the scientific method first began to be used.  There, scientists are most deeply 
immersed in the scientific mindset and tradition.  These gains are made despite more money, 
more laboratories, and better equipment elsewhere.  Had there been no migrations of 
European scientists to other parts of the world, as well as students coming to Europe to gain 
advanced education, “research centres overseas could hardly ever have made much 
headway.”146 
Second, “scientists work by ‘indwelling’ this tradition.”147  Science is not, Polanyi 
believes, something which can be demonstrated apart from its own tradition.  Its 
presuppositions cannot be verified from a stance that does not already presuppose them 
beforehand.148  The rules of science are affirmed by the body of knowledge which science 
has accumulated.  The scientist indwells a system and a tradition that encompasses a vast 
body of knowledge, and traditional presuppositions and methods that work together in a 
circular fashion.149  Acceptance of the system is a faith commitment.150  Thus, as Newbigin 
points out, “the whole scientific tradition is a ‘fiduciary framework’.”151 
Third, science advances because scientists recognize a problem and attempt to solve 
it.  This effort is naturally intuitive.152  Solving the problem involves “the personal 
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commitment of the scientist”153 whose insights and decisions are as much intuitive as 
rational.  All knowledge, therefore, involves the commitment and involvement of the 
knower.   Polanyi cites an example from astronomy.  The Copernican revolution was not a 
shift from an emphasis on subjective sense impressions to an objective description of facts, 
but rather a change in subjective perspective, from earth to sun centered.  This was done to 
satisfy an intellectual need for abstract theory over empiricism.  The shift met a human need. 
 Thus, “the new Copernican system was as anthropocentric as the Ptolemaic view.”154  Yet 
no one would claim that the heliocentric picture of the solar system is merely a subjective 
interpretation. 
The fourth proposition involves what Polanyi calls “the tacit coefficient of 
knowing,”155 the vast body of knowledge which human beings partake in, more or less.156  
Without this dimension of knowing, any significant knowledge at all would be impossible.  
Knowledge of all the facts about the atomic particles that make up physical reality would 
actually be knowledge of nothing at all.  Interest in atomic particles arises at all “only 
because of the part they play in the shaping of a world we know as human beings and before 
we know anything about physics.”157 
Fifth is the assertion that any idea that science will eventually develop laws that will 
explain everything “is an illusion.”158  Newbigin points out that reality shows levels of 
knowledge not always explainable in terms of more basic levels.  Physical laws set limits to 
the possibilities of chemical combinations but cannot in themselves explain chemistry.  
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Physical and chemical laws set limits to the behavior of biological tissue, but cannot explain 
biology.159  
Polanyi’s analysis leaves open the possibility that science is just as subjective as 
theology or literary criticism.  This Polanyi denies emphatically: 
[T]his does not make our understanding subjective. Comprehension is neither 
an arbitrary act nor a passive experience, but a responsible act claiming universal 
validity.  Such knowing is indeed objective in the sense of establishing contact with a 
hidden reality; contact that is defined as the condition for anticipating an 
indeterminate range of yet unknown (and perhaps inconceivable) true implications.160 
 The scientist makes truth claims with the intent of describing reality in ways that are 
universal.  In addition, “the truth of the claim will or will not be validated depending on 
whether or not it leads to further truth.”161 
 Polanyi likens scientific theory to a “map extended over space and time.”162  It serves 
as a guide through uncharted territory.  The map could be right or wrong, and if one makes a 
mistake, it will be attributed to problems with the map, not the individual.  The knowledge 
gained through the theory is objective knowledge “insofar as it is not I, but the theory, which 
is proved right or wrong when I use such knowledge.”163  Since the “map” provided by 
Copernicus’ theory serves better to guide astronomers (and spacecraft) through the solar 
system, it must therefore be better than Ptolemy’s.  In this sense, Copernicus’ subjective 
“personal” approach has led to objective truth. 
 Newbigin “argues that a concept of personal knowledge,” such as Polanyi advocates, 
“is a more appropriate for Christian theology than the certain knowledge beloved of western 
                                                 
159Ibid. 
160Polanyi, vii-viii. 
161Newbigin, Proper Confidence, 43. 
162Polanyi, 4. 
163Ibid. 
 
 
philosophy.”164  For Newbigin, the truth claims of the Christian faith offer a better “map” of 
reality and of the ultimate issues of life than any other “map” that has been offered.  
 The parallels between scientific and religious truth claims are, for Newbigin, obvious. 
Having shown from Polanyi’s work that science rests on faith commitments and on 
subjective factors, and yet claims to have objective knowledge, Newbigin believes he can 
now assert that religious knowing rests on an equally well grounded foundation.  Since all 
knowledge is “personal knowledge,” knowledge gained from within the faith commitments 
of the knower, then religious truth claims deserve equal consideration with other kinds of 
truth.  Since it is not possible to explain one level of scientific truth in terms of a lower level, 
then it may be that religious truth claims can be sustained without resting on any kind of 
Cartesian certainty. 
 The point of contact between scientific and Christian truth claims is the objectivity of 
the subject matter.  Objective facts serve as a check on what scientists may claim as true, and 
Newbigin wants to establish Christian truth claims on the objectivity of the facts surrounding 
Jesus Christ.  On this basis, Newbigin is ready to assert the truthfulness of the gospel.  The 
question of pluralism, however, must first be considered.  It logically follows from what 
Polanyi has said that since all religions claim to explain reality, and all rest on fiduciary 
bases, that all are equally valid.  This Newbigin explicitly denies this because pluralism 
undermines the whole concept of truth in religious explanations of reality. 
Newbigin’s Rejection of Pluralism 
 Newbigin rejects pluralism unequivocally.  It is unacceptable, he believes, “to live in 
a society where everything is subjective and relative, a society which has abandoned the 
belief that truth can be known and has settled for a purely subjective view of truth--‘truth for 
you’ but not truth for all.”165   “Wandering about in a twilight where all cats are grey”166 is 
not a workable option.  It runs counter to the basic religious concern to explain ultimate 
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truth, and spells danger for the culture as a whole.  Newbigin asserts that a culture may 
respond to different worldviews in any of four different ways.  A culture may adopt a fortress 
mentality which utterly rejects the new paradigm, or it may surrender, causing the old 
paradigm to collapse.  A third strategy involves reforming of the present worldview in light 
of insights gained from the new one.  The fourth option embraces pluralism, the rejection of 
any concept of an accepted structure of reality that is true for all.  The third reaction, which 
involves open-mindedness and a real belief in truth, “is what a living culture will choose; the 
fourth . . . is the sign of approaching death.”167  Such pluralism, Newbigin believes, “will 
simply crumble in the presence of a confident and vigorous claim to know the truth--such a 
claim as Islam is at present making with increasing vigour in the contemporary world.”168 
 Newbigin rejects the possibility that what “we affirm in the Christian creeds” is no 
more than “one among a number of different points of view.”169  To regard it as such 
threatens the survival of Christianity because it involves “the denial of what has from the 
beginning been its central affirmation.”170  He recognizes that every religion offers a way of 
salvation, but they can do this “only because they make truth claims, affirmations about what 
is the case, and these claims are in many cases mutually irreconcilable.”171  Since they cannot 
be affirming the same reality while saying completely different things, they cannot all be 
equally true. 
 Newbigin’s desire to treat religious truth claims as comparable to scientific ones 
gives impetus to his concern.  Science is not pluralistic.  Scientists “are in the habit of 
making confident claims about what is the case without apparently being troubled by the 
charge of arrogance.”172  In fact, scientists make no room for pluralism in their understanding 
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of their work.  Newbigin points out that “when two scientists, one in Chicago and the other 
in Tokyo, conduct the same experiment but come up with radically different results, they do 
not take it as an opportunity for celebrating the joy of living in a pluralist society.”173  
Newbigin cites the Copernican revolution as an example of what happens.  Ptolemy’s system 
had been around for centuries.  Copernicus’ proposal was hotly debated and eventually won 
out.  No one even considered the possibility “that the argument might be ended by agreeing 
that there is a common search for truth or that the different views should be ‘pooled’ . . . .   
[T]here was a common concern for truth and a belief that it could be known.”174   
 Religious truth claims should be regarded in the same way, and religious truth taken 
just as seriously.  Even though modern society is not pluralist at all on scientific matters, on 
the values side of the equation pluralism holds sway.175  The objective pole of knowledge is 
removed.  The subjective pole remains alone.176  This, Newbigin contends, is a tragic result 
of the fact/values distinction.  It is, he believes, imperative that the proposals for religious 
pluralism be examined and rejected. 
 Newbigin focuses much of his attention on John Hick’s proposal for a pluralist 
theology of religions, and rightly so as Hick has been the foremost influential advocate of it.  
Hick’s “Copernican Revolution” proposes that “God” not Jesus Christ should be the center 
of theological understanding.177  He insists that all major religions are in touch with the same 
spiritual reality.  As a younger man, Hick visited worship centers of various religious groups 
and found in them the same sorts of phenomena.178  He concluded that it was culturally 
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myopic to insist, as Christians do, that Jesus Christ is God’s only and ultimate revelation of 
himself.  Hick wants to normativize other religious claims to have divine revelation.  To do 
this he takes the incarnation to be metaphoric179 and assumes that the religious experiences of 
non-Christians have equal validity with Christian experience.180 
 Newbigin rejects Hick’s position on the grounds that it is too subjective and leaves no 
room for any overarching critique.  It places at the center one’s own subjective concept of 
God, rather than “God as revealed.”181  The idea that each religion somehow touches a 
common core of transcendent reality is not tenable because “transcendent” becomes an 
empty term into which one may place any content.  Hick has not so much helped the 
religious world understand their conceptions of God as he has offered his own concept in 
their place.  Hick’s god is his own creation to which he has given his own content.  Newbigin 
does not dispute the fact that the being of God is beyond human comprehension, but “this 
does not mean that we are free to make our own image of God.”182 
 Hick’s position cannot be critiqued from an objective standpoint other than from 
within the various religious traditions that Hick attempts to incorporate.  To accept Hick’s 
position would, for any of the other traditions, be to reject their own ultimate claims. This is 
certainly no less true for Christianity than for other religions. 
 Newbigin also rejects the pluralistic proposal of Paul Knitter, a student of Hick.  
Knitter, Newbigin says, wants to move beyond Hick’s God-centered approach to a salvation- 
centered approach.183  Newbigin sees this as focused too much on human need.  The center 
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for truth, Newbigin insists, “is not me and my need of salvation, it is God and his glory.”184  
Newbigin wants to treat the various truth claims of religions in a manner similar to scientific 
pronouncements and judge them on the basis of what makes the best sense of reality, in much 
the way that Copernicus’ proposal better explained the movements of the planets than did 
Ptolemy’s.  He contends that Christianity, more than any of the others, achieves this goal.  
Newbigin’s epistemic step backwards is an attempt to move the line of the fact/values 
distinction over so that religious truth claims can be heard and considered fairly, as facts, and 
not as mere opinion.  He insists that this is imperative since the gospel makes claims that 
involve “the entire public life of mankind and the whole created world.”185  If it is true that 
humans beings exist for God and in community with one another under God, then the church 
must proclaim this as fact, and call people to responsible life as his people, regardless of 
what majority opinion on the matter may be.186 
 Newbigin, having challenged the foundations of the Enlightenment with its starting 
point in human reason and scientific method, wants to begin at a new starting point--the 
lordship of Jesus Christ.  Such a starting point is “a personal commitment to a faith which 
cannot be demonstrated on grounds established from the point of view of another 
commitment.”187  Thus it serves as a new starting point for understanding reality. 
The Gospel as Truth 
 Newbigin is concerned about “a loss of confidence in the uniqueness and importance” 
of the gospel.188  He wants the church to defend the gospel, not as one of many possible ways 
to explain reality, but as the only way that reality can be rightly understood.  His term for this 
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is “public truth.”189  For Newbigin, “the gospel [is] truth, objective and to be received and 
proclaimed publicly as such, as real knowledge.”190  The center of the gospel is Christ and 
“belief in the uniqueness of Christ is absolutely necessary.”191  For this reason, Newbigin 
opposes “meaningless dialogue, and . . . a type of ecumenism without substance that would 
subvert the uniqueness of Christ.”192 
 Newbigin points out that this is how the gospel functioned foundationally for the 
early church.  The Greco-Roman world was challenged by “a new arche, a new starting point 
for all human understanding of the world.”193  The current situation in the west, in a post-
Christian world, is analogous to that earlier culture.  Religious truth claims have been 
relativized, and rationalism has run its course, as it had for the Greek philosophers.  In this 
situation, the gospel again has the opportunity to be defended as a new starting point. 
 Newbigin defends the gospel as truth on the grounds that it is historical.  It tells of 
events that happened in real history at a real place.194  Like all history, the story of Christ has 
a meaning; it has significance.  God’s action in Christ, because it happened in the real world, 
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“has to be the thing that controls everything else.”195  Some refute this claim on the grounds 
that God would not restrict his revelation to one place and one time, and that the historically 
conditioned nature of the biblical narrative counts against its having significance for other 
times and places.  Newbigin points out, however, that if God is at work in history--if he 
wants to redeem history, not just individuals--then “a single happening in a particular time 
and place can be of decisive significance to all.”196 
 Newbigin argues for the importance of the historicity of the New Testament by 
pointing out that what people do is as important as what they believe.  Faith is lived out in 
action as well as being a matter of the heart and mind.  In the same way, what people in the 
New Testament did is important, not merely what doctrines they believed.  Therefore, the 
historical account of what happened is as significant as the spiritual truths which underlay 
it.197  He contrasts this with the situation in Hinduism, where they “can speak of many 
avatars because none of them is a part of public history; they are all ideas in the mind.”198 
 The gospel is universally significant.199  Its claims to be a revelation of God.  If God 
has indeed revealed himself in Christ, “it has to be the thing that controls everything else.  It 
cannot be regarded as one of a series of interesting facts . . . but has to be that which shapes, 
determines, evaluates everything.”200  The gospel cannot make the claims that it makes and 
still be no more than just one of many different perspectives on reality, one more 
metanarrative.  It cannot be just something interesting, useful to those who find satisfaction 
in it, but no more than that.  By its very nature it claims to be more than just an option.  
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 In addition, Newbigin asserts that to be committed to the gospel is to be committed 
“to a belief about the meaning of the whole of human experience in its entirety.”201  The 
gospel is not just about what happens when someone dies, nor is it restricted to what one 
does on Sunday mornings.  The gospel message touches all of life, work, family 
relationships, matters of social justice, and ethical behavior toward neighbors.202  As 
Christian faith lived out touches every area of individual life, it touches every area of 
community life as well, and cannot be, in any sense, a “private opinion.”  
 Newbigin points out that the early church could have had the protection of the Roman 
government had they been willing to allow the gospel to be seen as just one more option for 
religious belief.  Rome was tolerant of religions generally and allowed them to flourish 
throughout the empire.  The early church did not avail itself of this protection because it did 
not see the gospel as a private faith.  Their message “concerned the destiny of the whole 
human race” and was of “vital concern to every human being.”203  The church today, 
Newbigin believes can do no less. 
 Newbigin sees several important implications to the gospel story being true.  It 
implies that belief in the gospel is not to be “ensured by the use of political power.”  It was 
the political and religious powers of Jesus’ day, along with “public opinion,” that put him on 
the cross.  In addition Jesus will be judge of all and cannot be identified with any one 
political power or system.204 
 Another implication is that since the gospel is universal in its import, then “all human 
beings wherever they are, are embraced in that love of God” which is proclaimed in what 
God did in Christ.205  Newbigin is not a universalist, but he does take seriously the fact that 
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God being at work in Christ must in some way be continuous with God being at work in the 
world. 
 Third, the universal nature of the gospel implies that it will be shown to be true in that 
“it proves itself more adequate to the totality of human experience than its rivals.”206  Any 
claim to ultimate truth, if it is to commend itself to the loyalty of humanity, must meet this 
test.  A gospel which cannot meet the demands of all of human life cannot claim significance 
for all of human life.  This is key in light of Newbigin’s epistemology.  The gospel is true in 
part because the gospel better explains reality than any other religious system.  Newbigin 
believes that final verification of the gospel comes in the eschaton,207 but again this relates to 
its universal significance.  If Jesus, as judge of all humanity, will verify the truth of the 
revelation which the church has lived out and proclaimed over the centuries. 
Newbigin asserts that the truth of the gospel story is essential to the ministry of the 
church.  If God has not really offered reconciliation in Christ, then the effect to present it to 
the world as true is meaningless.208  The church cannot offer a gospel that it does not believe, 
nor can it offer the gospel as it is presented in Scripture and accept the idea that it is merely 
one among many different views.  Either the gospel is true, or it is a waste of time to go on 
proclaiming and believing it.  Newbigin believes that, based on his epistemic step backwards, 
the church can proclaim the gospel as public truth and gain a hearing for it.  The church must 
do so.  It has no other alternative. Perhaps nothing is more characteristic of evangelical 
thought than its defense of biblical authority.  Evangelicals oppose doctrinal formulations 
that run counter to the teaching of Scripture, and they oppose destructive higher criticism 
because of its attack on the Bible’s authority.209  For Evangelicals, the authority of Scripture 
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is foundational to a proper understanding of the Christian faith.  Newbigin’s understanding of 
the authority of the Bible is thus an important matter to Evangelicals who wish to understand 
his defense of the gospel before the world. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
NEWBIGIN’S UNDERSTANDING OF BIBLICAL AUTHORITY 
 
Perhaps nothing is more characteristic of evangelical thought than its defense of 
biblical authority.  Evangelicals oppose doctrinal formulations that run counter to the 
teaching of Scripture, and they oppose destructive higher criticism because of its attack on 
the Bible’s authority.1  For Evangelicals, the authority of Scripture is foundational to a 
proper understanding of the Christian faith.  Newbigin’s understanding of the authority of the 
Bible is thus an important matter to Evangelicals who wish to understand his defense of the 
gospel before the world. 
Even a cursory reading of Newbigin’s work will indicate that he “accepts the 
essential authority of Scripture.”2  He devotes major sections of his works to defending the 
authority of Scripture and promoting a proper understanding of its function in the church.3  
Newbigin asserts that the Bible offers “a new starting point for thought,”4 a departure point 
that makes more sense of the real world than that offered by the Enlightenment.  This 
departure point has a divine origin, Newbigin believes.  While he recognizes that God is far 
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Introduction to the Bible, rev. and exp. ed. (Chicago: Moody, 1986) ; and Josh McDowell, 
More Evidence that Demands a Verdict, vol. 2 (San Bernardino, CA: Campus Crusade for 
Christ, 1975). 
2Arthur F. Glasser, “Reconciliation between Ecumenical and Evangelical Theologies 
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64-83; idem, Foolishness, 10, 42-64; idem, Proper Confidence, 79-102; idem, Truth to Tell, 
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beyond human comprehension, he finds no ground for saying that God himself could not 
reveal His purposes to His creatures.5  God’s revelation, disclosed in the pages of the Bible, 
is an integral part of the Christian commitment.  One cannot be committed to Christ without 
seeing the book that is the primary revelation of Christ as authoritative and unique.6  
Newbigin holds to an orthodox Protestant understanding of the extent of Scripture.  The 
closing of the canon implies a higher level of authority for what is included than for those 
documents which were excluded.  Those books which make up the canon are normative for 
all of the later tradition of the church and play a primary role in shaping it.7 
The Bible is not merely a textbook of eternal theological principles; it is more like a 
personal letter or testimony.  Newbigin disagrees with those who seek to describe the Bible 
as a body of objective truths in which human subjectivity is omitted.8  The Bible is not a set 
“of factually inerrant propositions.”9 
Newbigin is also critical of those who see in Scripture no more than a record of the 
subjective religious experiences of one people.10  This view seeks to relativize the world 
presented in Scripture and “absolutizes a certain twentieth century world view,”11 one which 
sees religious truth claims as no more than subjective, personal perceptions which are 
excluded from the realm of truth.  These two approaches, one which sees Scripture as 
objective propositions, and the other which sees Scripture as subjective experience, relate to 
the Cartesian duality between the objective and subjective poles of knowledge, Newbigin 
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believes.  In the way that the Bible challenged Greek dualism between the material and the 
mental, so also it may challenge the duality of objective and subjective poles of knowledge in 
the modern world.  Newbigin bases his understanding of the Scripture unites these poles on 
Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge.  Just as objective and subjective aspects come 
together in science, so also they come together in Scripture. 
Newbigin also rejects the approach that finds Scripture’s authority only in the moral 
principles it contains.  The fact that such principles are found in the Bible does not render 
them authoritative, as their authority comes from their “intrinsic rightness.”12  This approach 
renders the story told in Scripture trivial, and for Newbigin, the story is the main focus. 
Newbigin recognizes three roles that Scripture traditionally plays in its function as authority 
for believers.  Scripture provides a worldview for believers; it gives ethical rules for the 
conduct of one’s affairs; and it provides spiritual nourishment for individuals.  Scripture’s 
role in shaping the west’s worldview has been supplanted by the rise of science with its 
mechanistic cause and effect view of reality.  Scripture’s role in providing ethical rules lasted 
long after the scientific worldview arose, but has lately given ground to experiential and 
common sense based understandings of individual ethical relations.  The Bible’s third role, 
that of nurturing the faith of the church, has not been completely replaced but has been 
questioned since the rise of modern theology.13  Newbigin believes that it is essential for the 
church to affirm all of these roles if it is to live out and proclaim the message of the gospel in 
a meaningful way. 
Newbigin discerns a personal dimension to God’s revelation.14  God has revealed not 
just “Truth” but himself.  One recognizes the truth and authority of that revelation only as a 
result of a personal commitment to the one who has thus revealed himself.  Revelation is the 
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only way to disclose oneself to another person.15  When someone questions another person, 
personal disclosure, or revelation, is the only way those questions can be answered.  So also, 
when one seeks to know God, this must come through revelation. 
Scriptural authority is not only grounded in God’s revelation of himself, but also in 
the church’s experience as a community shaped by the Book.  Scripture is authoritative only 
within a community that believes and obeys what it teaches in all areas of life.16  The 
community carries out its internal relations, its external relations, and its relationship with 
God based on the story told in the Bible.  The church is “a community which remembers, 
rehearses and lives by the story which the Bible tells.”17  The Bible thus functions 
dynamically for the community of believers.18 
Newbigin’s epistemic step backwards shapes the way he sees the authority of 
Scripture.  Newbigin, wanting to defend the gospel as true, must defend the historical 
account of it given in the Bible as true.  It is natural that he should focus on defending those 
claims which have an objective reference point in historical events.  The Bible presents itself, 
in Newbigin’s view, as a historical account that is as true as any other historical account.  It 
functions to shape and give direction to the community that believes it.  Objectively, it is 
history--significant history; subjectively, it shapes the community’s worldview.19  These two 
aspects are the pivots around which Newbigin’s understanding of Scripture turns.  It is 
historical in nature, the story of God’s actions in the world, and it both produces and guides 
the community which is committed to that story.  An understanding of how these two aspects 
work in Newbigin’s thought is, therefore, essential. 
Biblical Authority Arises from within 
a Historical Situation 
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Newbigin rejects the overwrought emphasis in modern biblical criticism on the 
purely subjective side of Scripture.20  Such a tendency, to focus on the Bible’s purely 
subjective and personal significance to the exclusion of the matter of factual accuracy is to 
move in the wrong direction.21  There is no “Christ of faith” different from the “Jesus of 
history” in Newbigin’s thought.  These are one and the same.  Faith must lie in the 
truthfulness of the story, if its spiritual significance is to be relevant at all.  The Bible 
specifically addresses what God has done in history.22  Without the reality of the events, God 
has done no authoritative acts and Scripture’s authority is undermined. 
Newbigin’s Understanding of the Bible as a 
Historical Account of the Acts of God 
Newbigin rejects the idea that the Bible may be seen as merely a story that somehow 
illustrates general truths.23  He is critical of “all those theological ventures that dissolve the 
link between faith and the historically affirmed events of the Bible.”24  It is wrong, he 
believes, to use the Bible as a source book for moral or theological illustrations if such 
illustrations have no basis in history. 
While the Bible records human experience, and especially human religious 
experience, these experiences illuminate objective reality.25  As science is limited in what it 
can claim by what actually happens empirically, so also what has happened historically 
conditions and limits what sorts of experiences are recorded in Scripture.  Newbigin’s 
epistemic step backward allows the historical narrative of Scripture to be regarded as true in 
the same sense that scientific data are regarded as true.  The historical truth of the events is 
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essential since the subjective experiences recorded in Scripture are not necessarily unique in 
themselves.  Others, he asserts, have had similar religious experiences.26  It is not the 
experiences that are unique, but the story told in Scripture.27 
Newbigin rejects the idea that Scripture’s truth is unimportant because it is narrative 
in form.28  Faith in Christ implies accepting the Bible’s story as true in the same sense that 
any other historical narrative would be accepted.  If the story the Bible tells is nothing more 
than legend or illustrations of moral and spiritual principles, then it may be placed alongside 
such stories in every other religion.  It has nothing unique to offer.29  This is not the same 
seeing the Bible as inerrant.  Newbigin asserts that the Bible is not in every instance “a 
factually accurate account of creation and history.”30  The kind of historicity that he argues 
for is the same as the historicity of any other account of events.  It is subject to verification; it 
is a selection and interpretation of events which cannot be exhaustive.  It retains, however, 
the same level of truth value as any “secular” history that is true to the facts it records.  
Newbigin believes that the Scriptures, especially in the Old Testament, arise from 
“combining materials which in their original form represented quite different and even 
contradictory beliefs.”31  These have been brought together, he believes, in a way that offers 
a comprehensive understanding of God’s purposes.  Newbigin also finds discrepancies 
between the Gospels, but he contends that they are “varying accounts of the same events and 
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sayings.”32  The different Gospel writers gave their own account of something that “really 
happened.”33  
Historicity does not extend, however, to the creation and eschatological accounts.  
Newbigin recognizes that no one saw the creation of the world, and no one has yet seen its 
end.  These descriptions recorded in Scripture are the result of “imaginative interpretation” 
based on what the writers knew of God and of what he is doing to redeem the world.34  Thus, 
their authority rests on the same worldview as the interpretation of history offered elsewhere 
in Scripture. 
The Bible is, however, more than a record of historical events.  Newbigin recognizes 
the role of the writer who has selected and interpreted those facts in light of a theocentric 
worldview.  The facts which underlie the interpretation are essential if the interpretation is to 
have any real validity.  As a scientist interprets raw but factual data, so the biblical authors 
offer an interpretation of reality based on real events, not just on logical or philosophical 
propositions.  The Bible’s does not teach theology or philosophy in an abstract sense, 
divorced from any involvement in reality.  These theological and philosophical truths are tied 
to specific places and specific historical events and people.  The Bible offers an 
interpretation of the human story in the real world, based on what God has done to reveal 
himself and his purposes.35  It is the story of God acting in the world.36  If it did not make 
contact with the real world at some point, the Bible would not impact the real world nor have 
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significance for daily life.37  What God did in Christ, he did “on the public stage of world 
history.”  His acts, therefore, are open to verification, and interpretation.38  
Christians, Newbigin contends, must inevitably view history differently from the way 
it is viewed by the larger world.  Christians inhabit a different plausibility structure, one that 
is portrayed and advocated in the pages of Scripture.  This plausibility structure includes the 
supernatural, especially as it relates to God’s purposes for the world.  Christians are not 
thinking mythically when they speak of “God’s power acting in world history.”39 
Newbigin recognizes that while God has revealed himself in history, “not all history 
reveals God.”40  This is the “scandal of particularity.”41  God has acted willfully to reveal 
himself in a particular place, to a particular people at a particular time.  Newbigin draws an 
analogy to a human being who acts willfully.  Some of that person’s actions will be more 
important than others.  Likewise, when God acts to reveal himself, or to work in the world, 
the revelation may not always be received or recognized.  The people to whom God reveals 
himself may choose to act according to God’s purposes or to rebel against him.42  God 
chooses certain people to work through them to effect his purposes for the whole world.  The 
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Bible is selective in the history it presents in so far as God has been selective in where and 
how he has revealed himself. 
The fact that a basic form of revelation in the Bible is story or narrative is evidence 
that biblical authority arises from within a historical situation.  The Bible interprets history as 
the story of how God dealt with his people and established a relationship with them.43  The 
Bible is a story, a true story, which is to be received and accepted and which the hearer uses 
to interpret reality.  It should be read in the same ways as “secular history,” the story of what 
has really happened in the world.44  The history told in the Bible tells how God has acted in 
the world, thus revealing his nature. 
The history related in the Bible has universal significance.  If God wants to redeem 
history, and not just individuals; if the gospel impacts corporate life, not just the interior life 
of certain people, then “a single happening in a particular time and place can be of decisive 
significance to all.”45  Newbigin believes that God’s purposes touch human culture, and that 
his purposes go beyond the salvation of individual souls.  The events of a particular time and 
place in the Bible reveal his plan for the world in its entirety.  God’s revelation thus touches 
his total purpose for his creation.46  This is in contrast to science which describes what 
happens, but can make no assertions about purpose.  A whole area of knowledge is excluded 
when science is the only arena of truth.  Scripture answers the question of purpose that is not 
answered by science.   Because God is faithful, his character never changes.  What he has 
done offers an interpretive key to what he is doing and will do.  Scripture answers the 
question of why the world is as it is and offers the only clue to make sense of life.  It offers to 
humanity a new starting point for thought, centered in “God’s revelation of his being and 
purpose” which focuses on the events surrounding Jesus Christ.47  God’s purpose, revealed in 
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Scripture, is preserved and interpreted by the recipients.  This revelation can be understood 
rationally and makes sense in relation to the overall framework of reality because its 
significance has been recognized in relation to some “tradition of rational discourse.”48  
Whereas scientific thought begins with the phenomena of the world and with a set of 
presuppositions about it, Christian thought begins “by attending to what God has done” in 
Christ.49 
Newbigin is aware that the affirmation of the historical veracity of Scripture involves 
certain difficulties.  The “modern scientific worldview” creates problems with such an 
affirmation being received.  The idea of cause and effect as explanation for every event 
leaves out the supernatural element which Scripture often invokes to explain events.  In 
addition, the scientific attempt to see reality from “outside” in a Cartesian sense presupposes 
that the universe is a closed system which can be understood without recourse to anything 
outside, in much the way that a scientist looks at a frog or a tree from outside of it and seeks 
to explain it only in terms of itself.50  Both the presuppositions and the method of science 
work against taking the testimony of Scripture seriously.  Newbigin’s epistemic step 
backwards allows for both scientific and historical propositions to be accepted, he believes, 
because both science and history involve the knowing subject investigating the real world 
and making assertions about what is observed.  In addition, scientific presuppositions are not 
absolute, but are part of a culturally conditioned worldview which cannot explain everything 
despite its universal claims.  The difficulties which science raises are not an absolute 
argument against Scripture’s testimony but point to the inadequacies of science as the final 
arbiter of truth.  Historical accounts can be authoritative, even if they invoke possibilities 
foreign to science.  The limitation is epistemic and leaves science in a position where it is 
unable to see the total range of truth. 
                                                 
48Newbigin, Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 76. 
49Ibid., 171. 
50Ibid., 69-70 
 
 
Scripture provides an account of what happened, Newbigin believes, that can be 
accepted as credible as any other history.  Like other histories, it has been selected and 
interpreted according to a particular worldview.  That worldview and its source in God’s 
activity is what gives the Bible’s account of history a unique level of authority.  This leads 
then to the assertion that the Bible’s historicity is more than incidental.  It is a necessary part 
of the Bible’s claim to authority in the world. 
Newbigin’s Defense of The Bible as 
Necessarily Historically Situated 
Newbigin’s argument goes beyond merely contending that the biblical revelation is 
historical to defend the idea that its historicity is a necessary part of its claim to authority 
over life.  As an account of God’s activity, the historical account given in the Bible has a 
claim to universal significance which no other history can match.  Newbigin’s epistemic step 
backwards allows for historical truth to be admitted along with scientific truth, and like 
science, the Bible’s truthfulness stands with its historical veracity.  Just as a scientist puts 
faith in the world as a place wherein natural laws operate, so the reader of the Bible must put 
faith in the account of history given therein.51  This is closely associated with Newbigin’s 
claim that the gospel is “public truth.”52  The gospel is not fiction but claims to be something 
which actually happened and which has universal significance.  Such a claim, Newbigin 
believes, should not be lightly dismissed. 
The concept that Scripture is true in this public sense is tied to the nature of the 
biblical documents themselves.  Scripture must “speak for itself.”  It is something akin to a 
genre error to insist that the Bible be treated as something which it is not.53  One cannot just 
ignore the text itself.  There is no “truth” in the Bible apart from the narrative in which it is 
embedded.54  The Bible is not a philosophical treatise; nor is it a collection of sayings like 
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unto those of Confuscious.  The Bible presents itself to the world in narrative form, telling a 
story about things that have happened.  It must be dealt with on the level of story or 
narrative. 
The human cultural situatedness of the writers, their supernatural worldview, does not 
work against the Bible’s historicity.  Newbigin admits the Bible is a record of human 
religious experiences which are embedded in a particular culture and a particular situation.  
He asks, however,  “what other kind of human experience could there be?”55  Of course, the 
Bible comes out of a particular setting.  How else could it have been produced?  The Bible 
exists as a product of real processes in the real world.56  Those who say the Bible’s cultural 
setting and the obvious bias of the writers mitigates against its historicity fail to see that they 
are judging Scripture from within a particular perspective, as well and that this conditions 
their view of the text.57 
As a historical document, the Bible provides the hermeneutical window “to the 
meaning and purpose of history.”58  The two hermeneutical focal points in Scripture, the 
Exodus and the events surrounding Christ, are both narratives.  The cultural conditioning of 
narrative documents does not, in itself, demonstrate that what is recorded is not truth.  To 
contend that what is recorded in Scripture cannot be a record of what God has done merely 
because of the situatedness of the authors is baseless.  Newbigin asserts that a revelation not 
embedded within a particular culture “would not be part of human history and could have no 
impact on human history.”59 
In addition, the Bible is necessarily historical because of the nature of the human 
readers.  The reader approaches a text with an understanding of the language and of how 
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things work in the world that is necessarily historical.60  Reality is understood through human 
language which embodies the ways a community sees the world.61  The Bible, as narrative, 
speaks historically to the reader who lives “within existing structures of life and thought,” in 
much the way the same reader will read a science book and receive what it says from within 
a framework that accepts it.62  Newbigin therefore rejects the claim that Scripture is less true 
than a science book because Scripture speaks to a certain cultural situation while the science 
book is objective.  Both are accounts of how things are, and both must be evaluated by the 
reader on their merits and insofar as they square with the actual situation of the world. 
Cultural relativity does not destroy the truthfulness and significance of the account 
because objective reality serves as a check on both reader and writer.  Changes in the rational 
structures a society accepts happen because of “an effort to make sense of the real world.”63  
A society will evaluate new paradigms in light of its experience and awareness of reality. 
While this does not always move in the direction of greater accuracy, it does point to the fact 
that there is only one real world “out there,” and a society’s understanding of it is controlled 
by that reality as much as by subjective factors. 
The Bible is also seen as necessarily historical because it contains testimony.  
Scripture records what someone has seen and experienced.  The account is necessarily 
personal and is necessarily an account of what someone believes happened and the 
significance of that event to that person.64  A witness offers testimony believing it to be true. 
 This distinguishes the testimony from mere story or legend.  Jesus’ parables are told as 
stories to illustrate a point, not as an account of events, but the Gospel writers’ record of 
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Jesus telling the parables recounts something that someone saw and heard and which made 
an impact.  It is a part of the real world, and must be considered as a reliable account of facts. 
 The same is true of the other events in the life of Christ.  Newbigin recognizes that, as 
testimony, the truth of Scripture cannot be “proven” in the sense that a mathematical or 
logical point may be.  A testimony may be disputed, its certainty being based on the 
character of the one giving it. The ultimate proof of Scripture’s truth lies at the end of time 
when the Judge will render the verdict.65 
The kind of events recorded in Scripture attests as well to its unique authority.  The 
Bible is “that body of literature which . . . renders accessible to us the character and actions 
and purposes of God.”66  The events recorded in the Bible, while they are events of history, 
reveal “in a unique sense” the reality of God and his working in the world.67  As such the 
testimony given in Scripture is unlike any other and therefore must be given consideration by 
anyone who seeks to make sense of the world.  God necessarily reveals himself in historical 
acts because he is as much “the God of nature and of history as he is of the human soul.”68  
He is “the author and sustainer of all things,” and as such he must act in the real world if he 
is to be known by his creation.69  In the events of history, God “meets us and summons us.”70 
 For example, at the burning bush, Moses met a real being, not merely a concept or abstract 
entity.  Moses encountered the God who acts in history and who was preparing to act in a 
significant way, with Moses’ cooperation.71 
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Since God has acted in history, in ways that make significant statements about the 
meaning and goal of history, then what he has done “has to be the thing that controls 
everything else.”72  Since God’s purposes will be worked out, his activity in the world 
provides the key to what will happen.  The Bible’s interpretation of events and their 
significance must be accepted as true over against secular interpretations of history.73  This 
does not mean that God and his purposes are revealed exhaustively in Scripture.  What is 
found there are “traces” of God’s presence, since God cannot be encompassed in any 
statement.74 
Newbigin points out areas of experience which “can only come to us through created 
things and contingent happenings.”  Examples include such experiences as beauty and love.  
These things cannot be really understood abstractly.  Since the Bible reveals God’s presence 
and reality and offers an understanding of history from his perspective, it provides a 
testimony of his love that draws the reader to himself.  Newbigin contends that only in 
response to that testimony can people experience the love of God.75  Scripture is the means 
of establishing, not merely truth, but a “personal relation” with the one revealed in it.76 
Biblical Authority Demonstrated in Scripture’s 
Effect on the Interpretive Community 
While historicity is essential to Scripture’s authority, it is not the only factor involved 
according to Newbigin.  The Bible is more than just an ancient document that tells a true 
story.  It is “the book of a community,” the church.77  Scripture’s ability to act as authority 
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can only be actualized “within a community that is committed to faith and obedience.”78  The 
church’s responsibility is to interpret and understand the story told in  Scripture and to 
interpret the world in which it lives in light of that story.  Scripture’s authority is shown in 
how the encounter between the church and the world is affected by the encounter between 
the church and the Bible and between the Bible and the world. 
The Bible Challenges Other Worldviews 
The Bible functions as authority because it tells a story that is significant for more 
than any one culture or for the interpretive community itself.  It offers a view of the nature 
and purpose of reality which challenges other worldviews and which interprets reality in 
ways that the reader must consider.  The story told in the Bible “is to be understood as the 
clue to history, to universal history, and therefore to the history of each person.”79  This story 
“claims to be the story, the true story both of the cosmos and of human life within the 
cosmos.”80  It cannot be dismissed as merely the cultural record of one people, interesting for 
its historical significance only.  The Bible claims a certain universality for the story it tells 
and issues a call to people everywhere to come to terms with what it says.  It cannot be fit 
into any other worldview without being distorted. 
While the story told in the Bible has universal significance, it is not just a general 
story told to illustrate a broad and unfocused view of reality.  As historical fact, it couches its 
worldview in “the story of a particular people and of a particular man among that people.”81  
The center of the story is Jesus Christ and the events which surround his life, death and 
resurrection.  Because God sent his Son to die for the sins of humanity, “and did it on the 
public stage of world history,” this fact must be “the master clue” to reality and to God’s 
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purposes in it.82  One can begin no where else once the gospel story has been understood.  It 
cannot be one more story among other equally significant stories.  Christ died “for the sins of 
the world,” not just for the sins of Israel, or for the sins of the people of his own time and 
place. 
As a story which challenges other worldviews, it shapes the mission of the church.  
Since the Bible tells the meaning of life and of history, the purposes of God in this world, 
and since it tells the truth about these matters, it must be told everywhere to everyone.  It 
cannot be the perspective of a single sect, of a religious social club which finds it pleasing.  
When it is shared with other people, it brings them to a place where they can know what is 
really true about themselves and their world.  The church preaches the gospel story as those 
who know the meaning of life, the real answers to the ultimate existential problems of 
humanity.83  The “gospel worldview” therefore must be “confidently published and 
commended with a view to dialogue in the marketplace of ideas.”84  Preaching must do more 
than offer helpful tips for getting along in the world.  The story must challenge people’s 
understanding of the basic nature of life and reality.85  The Bible is able to do this because of 
its universal scope, and its claim to universal significance for the story it tells.  The church 
cannot be content to mine the Bible for moral or theological illustrations.  The church’s 
mission must be to challenge, from Scripture, the way any and every human culture views 
reality. 
This does not happen automatically.  Just because the Bible has the ability to 
challenge other worldviews does not mean that it will inevitably do so.  The Bible must be 
proclaimed and lived out within a community which has “continuity with the biblical actors 
and witnesses” and which “indwells the story the Bible tells.”86  Indwelling the story means 
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to see the world in terms of the story told in the text of Scripture.  Newbigin uses the 
example from John’s Gospel where Jesus told his disciples to “abide” in him.  The church is 
to look at the world through Christ and to live out of the version of reality which has him as 
its center.87  The community of believers thereby becomes a living challenge to other 
worldviews.  In addition, as the community does this, its own worldview will be shaped by 
the Bible. 
The Bible Shapes the Worldview 
of the Interpretive Community 
The Bible has an impact on the community which accepts its picture of reality 
directly as well as giving it a basis for challenging other worldviews.  People are “shaped” by 
the things they contemplate and experience.  The Bible story will thus “shape” the minds of 
those in the church,88 because Scripture “speaks to us in its own terms with a challenge to our 
very selves.”89  This challenge moves the community, the church, to interpret the world in 
line with what Scripture says.  Scripture can do this because it offers a comprehensive 
worldview within its pages.  Newbigin uses the example of someone who comes into the 
church from the larger culture which surrounds it.  In the church the Bible is read, preached, 
and lived out.  The new Christian experiences the Bible from the perspective of the host 
culture at first, but finds previous cultural assumptions challenged by the Bible and by the 
church which is formed by its assumptions.90  A new understanding of reality gradually 
emerges for the new Christian as for all who have found in the Scriptures a new place for 
grounding their understanding of reality. 
Historically, Scripture has functioned this way and especially so at times of crisis.  
The church fathers found “a new starting point” for understanding the world “because God 
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had acted and spoken in the events which form the substance of the Scriptures.”91  Using the 
Bible as their interpretive key to reality, the early Christians were able to develop “a vision 
of the human story . . . which was vivid and powerful enough to sustain the Church through 
the horrors of the Dark Ages.”92 
Newbigin believes that the way the Bible does this is best understood in terms of 
George Lindbeck’s “cultural linguistic model” of the way Scripture functions.93  Lindbeck 
defines religion as “a kind of cultural and/or linguistic framework or medium that shapes the 
entirety of life and thought.”94  Lindbeck’s concern is to define how doctrines function in the 
life of the church, especially as they are reformulated over time.  He discusses several ways 
this can be perceived.  The first emphasizes the “cognitive aspects” of doctrine, wherein 
doctrines consist of “propositions or truth claims about objective realities.”95  While 
Lindbeck does not deny the propositional aspect of doctrine, he does not believe that it 
adequately explains the vitality of doctrinal formulation in a living religion.  This approach, 
he believes, has “discredited” doctrine in the eyes of many.  In addition it ignores the matter 
of historical development and hinders reinterpretation of doctrine in new situations.96  
Another possibility Lindbeck considers focuses on the “experiential-expressive” 
aspects of religious faith.  This approach views doctrine as arising out of reflection on 
religious experience.97  Lindbeck rejects this on the ground that one cannot really have an 
experience or articulate it, especially a religious experience, without a set of grammatical and 
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symbolic parameters.98  Language and the interpretive framework precede the experience, 
although Lindbeck recognizes that the reciprocal relationship here.99  Lindbeck also 
examines and rejects an effort to combine these two in a rather complex manner.100 
Lindbeck proposes that doctrine should be seen in terms of a “cultural-linguistic” 
model of the formulation and development of doctrine.  This model emphasizes the fact that 
experience is “shaped, molded, and in a sense constituted by cultural and linguistic forms.”101 
The linguistic aspect involves how language is used and the possibilities for an idea or 
experience being shaped by linguistic parameters.  By “grammar” he means more than just 
rules of word usage.  He has in mind a grammar of conceptual possibilities shaped by a 
religion.  He uses, however, grammatical terms to describe his model.102  Members of a 
religious group learn the “language of a religion, it ‘symbol system’ in order to experience 
reality in terms of that religion.”103  Lindbeck believes, therefore, that cognitive truth claims 
are not primary.  They are shaped by the “conceptual vocabulary and the syntax or inner 
logic which determine the kinds of truth claims a religion can make.”104  The cultural source 
of doctrine lies in narrative.  The story that is told in a religion and the way that story is used 
is the permanent matter, not the propositional truth that arises from it.105  For Christians “the 
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‘framework’ within which Christian affirmations are made and in which Christian 
experiences happen” is supplied by the biblical narratives.106 
Following Lindbeck, Newbigin calls Scripture the “cultural linguistic framework” for 
the church as it seeks to live out the gospel and make sense of the world around it.107  The 
story told in the Bible “structures human experience and understanding,”108 because the 
reader’s ability to know is tailored by language and by an existing “framework of 
understanding.”109  The Bible reshapes this framework and even the reader’s understanding 
of the language by giving new content to the meaning of words.  In addition, the Bible 
defines the parameters of meaning by which one’s life experiences may be understood.  The 
believer is able to understand his own experience and interpret events in the world around 
him because they share features with the story told in the Bible, and because the Bible leads 
the believer to see life in terms of God’s overall purpose. 
Closely related to this is Polanyi’s concept of the “fiduciary framework,” which is 
“the starting point for all exploration and questioning.”110  Polanyi has shown that all 
knowing takes place from the perspective of the knower who indwells the fiduciary 
framework and understands truth from within it.111  Without some kind of framework for 
reality that the knower trusts in apart from demonstration or evidence, knowing would not be 
possible.  One must have faith in something to know anything.  The knower makes sense of 
the surrounding world because of the existence of this fiduciary framework, this set of 
assumptions about how reality is structured.  The “knowing subject” is involved in the act of 
knowing in that the subject brings this framework to the enterprise of knowing. 
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The church, as it functions properly, knows the world through the fiduciary 
framework given to it in the Bible.112  It sees the world, its needs, and its purpose in light of 
how Scripture treats reality.  Each member of the church makes sense of what is happening 
in light of what God has done in the past as revealed in Scripture, and in faith that God will 
be faithful to his purposes in the world today.  Scripture “functions as the true story of which 
our story is a part, and therefore we do not so much look at it as through it in order to 
understand and deal with the real world.”113  This happens in much the same as the way that 
language functions generally.  When one gives attention to a matter of communication one 
does not “attend to the words” so much as one “attend[s] through the words to the matter at 
hand.”114 
Newbigin recognizes that he is thinking in ideal terms.  The Bible functions in the 
church ideally as Newbigin has stated, but reality often falls short of this.  Newbigin’s major 
concern is that the church too often allows the “cultural-linguistic framework” of the 
Enlightenment rather than Scripture to provide its grammar and interpretational model for 
understanding reality.115  Newbigin therefore exhorts Christians to change their way of 
thinking and attend to the world through the Scriptures.  The church must “interpret . . . what 
God is doing in the secular world and in the world of religions” in light of the word of 
God.116  The Bible should be the “lens” the church uses to understand the world.117  
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Christians “should not so much look at it as through it” to interpret the world.118   Only as the 
Bible serves as this “lens” can people interpret their world in terms of God’s purposes.  Then 
the church can fulfill its function in the world by truly living out and proclaiming the gospel. 
Indwelling the text, seeing the world from its interpretive perspective, will preserve 
Christians from two problems.  The first problem is closed mindedness.  The Bible leaves 
much unsaid about reality.  It leaves room for much truth seeking in the world.  It is, after all, 
a framework for understanding reality, not an expression of all there is of reality.  The second 
problem is being too open to any idea that comes along.  Scripture protects the believer from 
this by offering sufficient structure to the meaning and purpose of reality to warn believers of 
false paths.  The Bible offers enough structure so that it is impossible to regard every truth 
claim as carrying equal weight.119  The reader will stay on the right path using the Bible but 
will not find so much structure that there is no need to look at the real world at all. 
Ultimately, Scripture reveals God’s purpose for the world.120  Since God has created 
the world, he is the one who should reveal the purpose for it.121  This is not done statically 
and propositionally.  The Bible brings the reader into a narrative encounter with real events 
in which people acted upon real assumptions about reality, and in which God plays a 
significant role in bringing about his purposes.  Scripture, read in this way by the church, 
functions to shape the practice and activity of the church which then “struggles to live out its 
meaning in the public world.”122 
The Bible Functions Dynamically 
for the Interpretive Community 
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The Bible not only shapes the worldview of the church, it also functions dynamically 
in the life of the church.  Scripture has the effect of leading the church into truth, and helping 
the church to see truth dynamically rather than statically.  This is where the hermeneutical 
circle becomes applicable for Newbigin.123  He recognizes that no one begins reading the 
Bible from a purely neutral perspective.  Everyone comes with an existing worldview.124  
Problems occur, Newbigin believes, when the reader insists on the worldview of the larger 
culture as a hermeneutical key to Scripture.  His example of this is Rudoph Bultmann, who 
accepted “uncritically the so-called scientific account of nature and history that claims to 
provide secure knowledge of objective facts.”125  Such uncritical acceptance of a worldview, 
which is foreign to that contained in Scripture, does not allow Scripture to function as 
authority.  The reader must “allow the text to speak in its own way, and accept the possibility 
that the pre-understanding will be changed into a new understanding.”126 
Believers read the Bible and this shapes their worldview.  They approach both the  
Scripture and the world from that new perspective.  That perspective is again shaped by  
Scripture and the circle continues.127  A dialogue occurs between the church, the Bible, and 
the world outside.  This dialogue has two dimensions: one chronological and the other 
horizontal. 
The chronological dimension involves tradition, the church’s own past.  The church 
reads the Bible as a story in which it plays a continuing part.  As it reads, it interacts with the 
story out of a tradition of understanding handed down by those in the past who have read it 
as their story and who made sense of the world through it.  This “continuing conversation 
between the present and the past” helps shape the church’s understanding of itself and of the 
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world.128  The past gives the church its language, its tradition of rational discourse, its 
hermeneutical compass.  It brings to the Scriptures “an ever continuing exegesis of the story 
which is the gospel.”129 
The horizontal dimension consists of the dialogue between different contemporary 
ways of reading Scripture.  Newbigin believes that the western church should listen seriously 
to the voices of Latin American readers of Scripture, to other third world perspectives, and to 
feminist readings.  A dialectic develops out of all of this; as each of the various cultures 
which encounter Scripture read it and are shaped by it, they are able to inform other areas of 
the church of levels of meaning which would otherwise be missed.  Together, it is possible 
for the church, as it puts faith in “the promise that the Holy Spirit will lead us into the 
fullness of the truth,” to come to a richer and deeper understanding of God’s purposes in the 
world.130 
The center of the Bible’s history is Jesus Christ.  The story contained in the Bible is 
the key to the true story of human existence, and “the hinge of the story on which all its 
meaning turns is the incarnation, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.”131  His crucifixion 
“was an event in history” like any other132  and stands in continuity with all of history.  It 
must be regarded, Newbigin believes, as objectively true.  His epistemic step backwards 
gives room for the story to be so regarded.  As such, it is the most significant event in all of 
history.  All of the story contained in the Bible supports the story contained in the four 
Gospels.  The Bible, for Newbigin, contains “the written record of the total fact of Christ.”  
The Old Testament shows what will be fulfilled in Christ, and the New Testament records 
                                                 
128Newbigin, Truth to Tell, 12. 
129Ibid. 
130Newbigin, Truth and Authority in Modernity, 49. 
131Lesslie Newbigin, “The Enduring Validity of Cross Cultural Mission,” 
International Bulletin of Missionary Research 12, no. 2 (April 1958): 52. 
132Newbigin, "Religious Pluralism: A Missiological Approach,” 237. 
 
 
and interprets the fulfilment of God’s purpose in Christ.133  Thus, an understanding of 
Newbigin’s view of biblical authority leads logically to the question of Newbigin’s 
understanding of who Christ is and the significance of his work for the world. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
NEWBIGIN’S UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
 
UNIQUENESS OF JESUS CHRIST 
 
The uniqueness of Jesus Christ, in his person and work, is a key element in Christian 
faith.  No defense of Christianity would be complete without some concept of how Jesus is 
unique, being both God and man, and of how his role as Savior is essential for the world. 
Evangelicals have traditionally placed a major emphasis on Christ as unique both in his 
person and in his work on the cross.  Evangelicals, therefore, should take an interest in 
Newbigin’s understanding of these issues. 
Newbigin’s Understanding of the Person of Christ 
As God Incarnate 
Newbigin holds to a traditional orthodox christology concerning the person of Christ. 
 He affirms that Jesus is God1 and holds to the full humanity of Christ as “the presence of 
God in the midst of human history.”2  Jesus is “the Son of God,”3 fully God, related to the 
Father and the Spirit as a member of the Trinity; yet he is God who “has become Man.”4 
Newbigin affirms the preexistence of Christ, an essential part of any orthodox 
christology.5  Christ thus had a role in creation, being “the Word by whom all things came to 
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be.”6  This is not a major theme in Newbigin’s thought, since he seeks to focus on the 
relevance of Christ in the world today, but it is important to note it as an example of his 
orthodoxy. 
Newbigin’s epistemic step backwards leads him to affirm the historicity of the 
crucifixion and resurrection of Christ.7  The biblical material relates these events in a 
generally factual manner.8  While Newbigin recognizes differences in the gospel accounts of 
the resurrection, he focuses on the similarities to support his claim.  For example, “the four 
Gospels are unanimous in affirming . . . that women came to the tomb early on Sunday 
morning and found it empty.”9  This and other similarities override any differences in the 
accounts, according to Newbigin.  The gospel accounts provide no basis in themselves for 
denying the factual nature of the event itself.  The resurrection can only be denied by 
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redefining historical possibilities “in such a way as to exclude it,” that is, by approaching the 
material with naturalistic presuppositions.10 
Newbigin affirms the significance of the resurrection of Christ as more than just an 
event or a demonstration of God’s power.  It may be seen as the “starting point” for an 
“explosion of hope.”11  Christ overcame death and, at the same time, affirmed his love for 
humanity.  God offered to a world that rebelled against him the opportunity to live with him 
in a loving relationship of service and obedience.12  It also points to a future hope.  Newbigin 
affirms belief in the ascension of Christ13 and looks ahead to a literal physical second 
coming.14 
As Revealer of the Father 
Newbigin believes that Jesus fully reveals the nature of God the Father.  He describes 
Jesus as “the one in whom God has made himself fully known.” 15  This is inevitable because 
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 Jesus, as God, cannot but reveal God.16  He has “taken our flesh in such a way that he who 
has seen Jesus has seen the Father.”17  In addition, Jesus reveals the Father because he is 
completely obedient to the Father’s will.18  What the Father does, Jesus does; what the Father 
wills, Jesus wills.  They are one in purpose and to know one is to know the other.  Jesus then 
is the “transparent bearer of the glory of the Father.”19  Jesus accomplishes this because his 
only purpose is to glorify the Father.  Jesus has no agenda of his own, no plans other than 
those of his Father.20 
As Teacher of Truth 
Newbigin asserts that one of Jesus’ roles was to be a teacher of truth.  Jesus exceeds 
all other teachers since in him is revealed the truth of the nature and purposes of God.21   
Jesus’ teaching pointed the world to a new understanding of reality.  Jesus challenged 
Nicodemus with the new birth in John 3.22  He presented himself to the Samaritan woman as 
“the one who would speak truly the things of God.”23  He always sought to challenge the 
worldview of his hearers.  In every situation, Jesus confronted the erroneous understanding 
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of his hearers and pointed them to God’s purposes for the world, which would be realized in 
the kingdom of heaven which was at hand.24 
Newbigin insists on the historical accuracy of the record of Jesus’ teaching in the 
Gospels.  He rejects the view that the early church reshaped the teaching of Jesus to fit the 
needs of the moment.25  He believes that what Jesus taught has come down in different forms 
in the gospels, but these differences “are not such as to leave us in the dark about their 
substance.”26  Jesus’ sayings are similar enough from one gospel to another to guarantee the 
clarity of what he meant to teach.  Their accuracy is demonstrated also in their effects.  
Newbigin points out that the teachings of Christ have “been sharp and clear enough to 
challenge, disturb, and sustain men and women” down to this day.27 
Newbigin disagrees with those who contend that Jesus mistakenly taught that the 
kingdom of God would erupt into history very soon.  Jesus taught as much about being 
patient in waiting for the kingdom as he did about expecting it at any moment.  To assume 
that Jesus expected the kingdom soon comes from a selective reading of what he had to say 
on the matter.28 
Newbigin emphasized the Trinity and believed that the role of each person of the 
Godhead should not be minimized.  For example, he points out the role of the Spirit in the 
teaching of Jesus.  The Spirit indwelling the Son reveals the will of the Father to him, and 
thus Jesus teaches what is true.29  The Spirit also has a confirming role in leading believers to 
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see the truth of what Jesus teaches.30  The Spirit guaranteed that the disciples would be led 
into all truth and that the teaching mediated through them would be preserved.  Therefore, 
Jesus did not write his teachings down on scrolls, but entrusted them instead to the 
community as they were led by the Spirit.31 
Newbigin’s Understanding of the Uniqueness 
of Christ in Salvation 
Newbigin’s christological position leads him to emphasize the uniqueness of Christ in 
salvation.  What God has done in Christ cannot be replaced.  It is decisive for the world.32  
Jesus is not just the example of faith for the Christian, nor does he merely point believers in 
the right direction.  Jesus himself is the object of the Christian’s faith because of his deity.33  
He is “the Word made flesh,” and Newbigin asserts “there is no other basis from which we 
can work, except the recognition of Jesus as Lord.”34 
The destiny of the human race is dependent on Jesus Christ, Newbigin believes.35  
Through him alone “the human situation is decisively changed.”36  As the source of hope, 
everyone must look to Jesus not only for making sense of life, but as the one in whom human 
destiny will be realized.  It is imperative, therefore, that the church proclaim Christ to the 
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world.  Newbigin was pleading for this as early as the 1960s, when much of the world 
mission effort was consumed with development projects for the Third World.37 
The Basis of Salvation 
Newbigin views Christ’s death on the cross as essential to the salvation of the world.  
 Jesus came primarily to die for the sins of the world and to demonstrate “atoning love.”38  
One seeks in vain, however, for a clear “theory of the atonement” in Newbigin’s work.  He 
believes that the crucifixion, as an event or act of God, is a “mystery” which cannot be 
“translated into a theory or doctrine.”39  This does not mean that the cross was an event 
without significance.  It was God’s way of releasing his “life giving and cleansing power . . . 
into the life of the world.”40  Just how this happened involves two factors. 
Judgment, together with grace, make up the first factor.  In the cross, God judges the 
world, exposing its sin, and at the same time, manifests his love for the world to see.41  All of 
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attitude toward humanity.  It does not make a payment, to God or to Satan, for anything.  It 
does demonstrate God’s judgment on sin, and his mercy toward sinners.  This demonstration 
of God’s judgment and mercy leans more toward moral influence than to other theories, but 
Newbigin never makes this explicit preferring to leave the matter ambiguous.  This is in line 
with his emphasis on the narrative rather than the propositional character of God’s revelation. 
Newbigin does believe that the cross disarmed “the powers” (see note 48 below), 
which goes beyond moral influence, but even here, the disarming of natural, material powers 
is accomplished more by Christ’s demonstration of superiority over them than by any actual 
change in the way things work in the world. 
40Newbigin, Light Has Come, 258. 
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humanity is shown to be the “murderer of God,” and all “are accepted as beloved of God.”42  
No one can claim to be “an innocent party” in light of the cross.43  The religious authorities, 
the political system, and even the masses turned against Christ, and all are judged for their 
participation in the event, and, consequently, all political and religious systems and indeed 
all of humanity are judged.  All of humanity participates in the guilt of having condemned 
Christ, since each of these groups is represented at the crucifixion of Christ. 
Judgment, however, is not the final word.  The cross was God’s message of 
reconciliation to the world.  The cross exposed the world’s hostility to God, but also showed 
beyond doubt God’s active desire to reconcile the world to himself.44  At the cross, Jesus 
“was made completely one with the sin of the world,” completing the process that had begun 
at his baptism where he first identified with sinful humanity.45  At the cross, Jesus submitted 
to the sinful judgment of those who had put him there so that he might show grace and mercy 
to them and reveal the universal love of God.46 
The second factor of Christ’s work on the cross is that it had the effect of “disarming 
the principalities and powers.”47  Newbigin accepts Hendrikus Berkhof’s understanding of 
Paul’s use of the term “powers” to mean “the given structures within which human life is 
lived.”48  These are the “political, economic, ethical, religious, and intellectual” forces that 
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shape culture and human life.49  They are anything outside of Christ which claim to control 
human destiny.  These “powers” seek to exercise “masterful control” over history.50   They 
seek control over the destinies of nations by their own power.  The truth, however, is that 
God is sovereign.  He is in actual control.  The powers “have been created in Christ and for 
Christ,” but when they see themselves as autonomous they become “agents of the ‘ruler of 
this world’.”51  Jesus disarmed them passively by submitting to them, a mystery seen through 
                                                                                                                                                       
21).  Elsewhere he calls these “the ‘powers’ (of religion and state, of law and tradition)” 
(Hendrikus Berkhof, Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Study of the Faith, rev. ed., 
trans. Sierd Woudstra [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986], 214).  Berkhof’s study of Paul’s use 
of the term admits that the source was Jewish apocalyptic in which “the Powers” designated 
spiritual beings which control, through nature, events on earth (Berkhof, Christ and the 
Powers, 17).   Paul, Berkhof believes, took the terminology but infused it with different 
meaning for his own purposes, making them “structures of earthly existence (Berkhof, Christ 
and the Powers, 23). 
Newbigin also credits Walter Wink as a source of his understanding of Paul’s use of 
the term “powers” (Newbigin, Truth to Tell, 74.).  While Wink considers Berkhof to be one 
of “the pioneers in this field” (Walter Wink, Naming the Powers: The Language of Power in 
the New Testament, vol. 1, The Powers [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984], 35.), Wink himself has 
done the most thorough work in this area, and he has strongly influenced Newbigin.  Wink 
believes that “the powers” have an inner hidden aspect and an outer visible one.  The outer 
includes “political systems, appointed officials . . . laws--in short all the tangible 
manifestations which power takes” (Wink, Naming the Powers, 5.).  The inner is the “driving 
spirit of the institutions” (Ibid.).  The outer include “buildings, portfolios, personnel, trucks, 
fax machines” while the inner is the “corporate culture or collective personality” of the 
institutions (Walter Wink, Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of 
Domination [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1992], 3.).  Wink totally rejects any concept of the 
powers as “angelic beings or as demons flapping about in the sky” (Wink, Engaging the 
Powers, 3.). 
49Newbigin, “Politics and the Covenant,” 358. 
50Newbigin, Gospel and a Pluralist Society, 118. 
51Newbigin, “Politics and the Covenant,” 358.  Newbigin echoes Wink’s 
understanding of the powers as created by God for his purposes.  Wink says that “when a 
particular Power becomes idolatrous, placing itself above God’s purposes for the good of the 
whole, then that Power becomes demonic” (Wink, Naming the Powers, 5). 
 
 
 
the eyes of faith.  They have been “‘disarmed’ though not ‘destroyed’.”52  Destruction will 
come when at the end God reconciles all things to himself through Christ, ushering in his 
kingdom. 
Salvation is founded on the eternal purposes of God, according to Newbigin.  Jesus’ 
death was not merely for the benefit of certain individuals but points to “the sovereign work 
of God.”53  The Bible is not so concerned with the destiny of individuals as with God’s 
design for all of reality.54  God wants to bring life and light not just to a privileged few but to 
every part of his creation.55  Christ’s work in salvation was not just for the benefit of the 
church, or to disarm the powers that would destroy it, but was universal in scope.  Newbigin 
finds this principle at work in the Old Testament in the call given to Abraham.  God 
purposed not just to bless Abraham but to bless, through him, all the nations of the world.56  
God’s purpose is never to bless just a portion of his creation.  It is to bring all areas of his 
creation into conformity to his will. 
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The church, Newbigin believes, needs to see the work of Christ in broader terms.  
God has sent the church into the world to proclaim and to actualize in the world “the true 
meaning and goal of this world’s history.”57  The church, in its life and mission, should seek 
“the completion of all that God has begun to do in the creation of the world and of man.”58  
At the same time, it is not the church’s program, but God’s.  God is in charge and, in fact, 
“the content of the gospel is God’s reign.”  The church cannot program it, plan it, own it, or 
control it.  The church must embrace it by believing it, proclaiming it, and living it out.59  
God’s purposes, centered on Christ, are larger than the church, or any privileged elite. 
The Nature of Salvation 
The nature of salvation in Newbigin’s thought may be understood in three parts.  
First, Newbigin has no doctrine of regeneration.  He gives little attention to such matters as 
passing from death to life, being renewed in the inner man, or being “born again.”  This 
follows from his emphasis on the work of Christ relating to God’s larger purposes rather than 
to the individual.  Even in places where one might expect Newbigin to discuss regeneration, 
he does not.  For example, his explanation of being “born again” focuses on its being “a 
radical shift of perspective” and “a fresh understanding of the whole of experience.”60  In his 
commentary on the Gospel of John, in the section on John 3, he does mention regeneration in 
terms of “new being,” but here he focuses on the ability of the believer to experience the 
“kingship of God as a present reality” and to see reality in a different way.61  In Foolishness 
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to the Greeks, he calls conversion a “paradigm shift,”62 a change in the way one sees reality.  
Newbigin focuses on the results of salvation, not the inward dimension.  He treats salvation 
as a phenomena of the outward life, not as a numinous inner spiritual experience. 
The second element follows from this.  Salvation for Newbigin is a conversion of the 
mind and will.63  The cognitive element stands out in Newbigin’s understanding of salvation. 
 He sees in Jesus’ call to repent in his announcement of the kingdom of God as “a call to a 
radical reversal of normal attitudes.”64  Repentance is a “U-turn of the mind” which makes 
one able to see the kingdom of God at work in Christ.65 
This conversion may take different forms under different circumstances.  For 
example, a Hindu will have to make one kind of shift, and a Marxist will have to make quite 
another.66   Each must make a different kind of change in the way they understand reality.  
The Hindu must revise his whole understanding of history and of the oneness of all reality, 
while the Marxist will have to transfer the basis of his utopian hopes from confidence in 
human will and effort to confidence in God.  In each case the locus of conversion is the 
mind.  The nature of conversion is a change of mind, of how one sees reality, not a matter of 
receiving new life, a quickening of the spirit. 
Newbigin does not, however, see salvation as merely mental assent.  Human will is 
also involved.  It is, after all, “the conversion of human mind and will.”67  Both are always in 
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view for Newbigin.  In fact, he insists that any real conversion must be lived out if it is 
indeed real.  For him, how one thinks and what one does are inseparable.  The church lives 
from within its understanding of reality, and that should be shaped by the facts of the cross.  
Again, though, the basis is the understanding of reality, what one thinks, not a regeneration 
of the inner soul, the impartation of spiritual life. 
A third factor in salvation involves the conversion of the culture in which the church 
finds itself.  The larger culture is, in Newbigin’s understanding, only comprehended properly 
from within the Christian faith.  He uses an analogy from physics to illustrate this.  
Newtonian physics cannot comprehend Einsteinian physics.  In the same way, secular culture 
cannot understand the Christian worldview.  Einsteinian physics can comprehend Newtonian 
physics and absorb it.  In the same way, the Christian worldview can take in the larger 
culture, comprehend it, and reshape it according to God’s kingdom.68  
Christian faith “embraces the human community,” speaking a word to the larger 
corporate concerns of life.69  Newbigin believes that since Christianity is rooted in historical 
events, the real world, it has significance for what is happening in this world.  A gospel that 
is good only for heaven, that only affects the destiny of souls after this life, is no gospel at 
all.70 Since Christ disarmed the powers, the agents of culture, the cross confronts the culture 
and disarms it as well, bringing it captive to God’s purposes. 
                                                 
68Newbigin, “Centrality of Jesus,” 209. 
69Paul F. Knitter, No Other Name?: A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes toward 
the World Religions (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1985), 110.  Knitter is citing Newbigin, 
“Centrality of Jesus,” 203, 205 and idem, The Open Secret 76-80. 
70Newbigin’s concern that the Gospel confront western culture is part of this.  For 
him, a gospel that results only in churches as “social clubs” where like-minded people gather, 
churches that in no way affect the communities they are a part of, is no gospel at all.  Jesus 
died in history, disarming powers that work in the real world, and the gospel that tells the 
story of that death is one which must affect that real history (Lesslie Newbigin, “Mission in 
the 1980s,” Occasional Bulletin of Missionary Research 4, no. 4 [October 1980], 154-55). 
 
 
 
Newbigin defines culture as “simply human behaviour [sic] in its corporate, public 
aspect.”71  Culture is how people interact with one another and organize their business and 
social lives.  It is the way families interact, the ways friendships and economic relationships 
are worked out.  Every dimension of ethics relates to culture.  The church has a responsibility 
in every place, in light of the gospel, to call “in question the lifestyle of that place.”72  Its 
message must impact the ethics that operate within a culture. 
For Newbigin history is nearly synonymous with culture.  “History” does not mean 
only the past, but the future as well.  God in Christ made it possible for humanity to “know 
where history is going,” that is, where human culture is going.73  History is linear and has a 
purpose, a destiny.  Jesus died in history and for history, and a big part of a decision for 
Christ is to decide “for Christ as the clue to history.”74  Salvation, for Newbigin, is a 
revelation of the goal and end of history.  It is the breaking in of the kingdom of God, being 
shown forth in the church, which points the world to its proper end.75   Newbigin takes 
literally the words of Paul in Colossians when he speaks of God’s desire to reconcile “all 
things” to himself in Christ.  All things then “find their true reconciliation” in Christ.  The 
church “in each place is to be a sign of the true end for which everything in the secular 
reality of that place exists.”76 
The goal of salvation is to produce a morally positive impact on the larger culture, to 
see God’s will accomplished there.  It is part of God’s larger plan.  God is involved in all of 
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the positive and life-affirming activities of humanity.77  Whatever is good is of God and has 
his blessing.78  Mission work, for example, is not a failure if it does not result in personal 
conversions, for any activity that produces an improvement of humanity is of God.  
Newbigin’s example of this is a Christian college which shapes the worldview of the 
students, giving them a moral standard for life.79  God is more than just passively pleased in 
this for “whatever of good and truth and beauty they learn is of God and will somehow find 
its place in his new creation.”80  Clearly, for Newbigin, the role of salvation in the culture is 
broader than just amassing personal conversions.  This leads naturally to a consideration of 
the scope of salvation in Newbigin’s thought. 
The Scope of Salvation 
Newbigin’s understanding of who is and is not saved arises out of his understanding 
of the nature of salvation and of God’s purposes for the world.   Newbigin does not fit into 
any simple category.  He upholds “the uniqueness of Christ for all men and the need for 
evangelism,”81 but he is not exclusivist in his approach.  He holds to a form of inclusivism in 
that he believes that “those who die without faith in Christ are not necessarily lost,”82 but he 
is not, in the traditional sense, inclusivist.  He recognizes that the question of what happens 
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to those who die without putting faith in Christ as Savior “goes to the very heart of the 
Christian faith.”83 
Newbigin’s understanding of the scope of salvation may be seen in four aspects.  
First, salvation is not limited to the church.  Since God’s purposes extend to all parts of 
human life and culture, it is little wonder that “grace operates outside the church.”84  Christ is 
at work, salvifically, Newbigin believes, “far beyond the visible limits of the ecclesiastical 
institution.”85   God’s concerns include the church but are not limited to the church,86 
including his purpose to save.87  One cannot properly understand the Bible to be saying that 
all who do not make a specific personal commitment to Christ are lost forever.88 
Newbigin believes that every person has within them “some whisper of God’s 
word.”89 All truth comes from God, and to the extent that anyone functions on the basis of 
truth, that person is in touch with God.  Newbigin makes no distinction between truth that 
God has given to the world in general and his salvific revelation.  The church then must 
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accept “all that is of God in the world outside the wall of the church and beyond the sound of 
the gospel,”90 or it will be rejecting what God is doing there. 
Newbigin justifies this perspective on the basis of Scripture.  John 1:9 calls Jesus “the 
true light which enlightens every man.”91  Whatever “light” a person may have must come 
from Jesus, and be in line with God’s ultimate purposes for the world.  The Old Testament 
also provides Newbigin a basis for his view.  For Newbigin, “the covenant faithfulness of 
God” is the main point of Scripture.92  The covenant which God made with Noah covers all 
nations and is, Newbigin believes, the “background” for the rest of Scripture.  No nation is 
singled out here.  Every nation shares in this covenant, and at the end of the Bible “the 
nations” come “into the City of God.”93 
Newbigin rejects a “totally negative, Barthian approach to other religions,”94 
preferring to see the grace of God at work in them in some sense.  Exclusivism, the idea that 
“all those who have not made an explicit commitment of faith in Christ are eternally lost,”95 
is not an option for Newbigin.  His rejection of this is partially ethical in nature.  He believes 
that if exclusivism were true, it would be obligatory for the church to use every means 
possible, “including brainwashing,” to bring people to faith in Christ.96  He also believes that 
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it would require Christians to attempt to discover who does and who does not have saving 
faith so that the latter might be warned.  Scripture, he believes, forbids making such 
judgments.97 
In addition, Newbigin rejects exclusivism because of how religious truth is 
understood and integrated into an individual’s consciousness.  He finds a continuity between 
people’s pre-Christian experience and their experience with Christ.  For example, most 
cultures already have a word for God before the gospel enters.  That word must be used by 
the missionary in translating the gospel into the new language.  Inevitably, there is some 
continuity between previous understandings of who God is and the new one in Christ.98 
Finally, Newbigin rejects exclusivism because he finds evidence of God at work in 
the lives of adherents to other faiths and insists that it is “impossible to believe that the 
experience of God of which [these people speak] is simply illusion or fraud.”99  Newbigin in 
fact finds evidence of a genuine experience of God in the ethical and moral behavior and 
commitments of people everywhere.100  This includes not only Buddhists, Hindus, and 
Muslims, but also “secularist, humanist,” and “Marxist” thinkers as well.101  He believes that 
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since Christ is at work everywhere in the world and “in all of human life,”102 to find him at 
work in adherents of these other faiths should not be surprising.  
A second aspect of the scope of salvation for Newbigin is that while it is not limited 
to the church it is not automatic for every human being.  Newbigin is not a universalist.  He 
recognizes that the element of judgment found in the New Testament is real.103  Jesus came 
to bring both grace and judgment.104  If Jesus came to offer life to all who would receive it, 
this must include “the terrible possibility of refusing the gift and choosing death.”105  God’s 
love, Newbigin believes, is really universal, not reserved for only the church.  This 
universality, however, leads to judgment.  If one refuses love that is “universal,” then there is 
no alternative but death.106 
While Newbigin believes that some are saved outside the church, he does not see this 
occurring as a result of their religious commitment.  At this point, his form of inclusivism is 
really unique.  He has “stoutly rejected” the concept “that all religions should be seen as in 
some way ‘salvific’.”107  The various religions of the world are not reflections of an 
underlying reality, a collection of differing interpretations of a common core.108  Adherents 
of these religions are not, in upholding and practicing their faith, responding to God as he has 
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revealed himself though these faiths.  God has revealed himself in Christ, and other religions 
do not point to Christ in some mysterious way.  Newbigin offers the example of the Jewish 
leaders in the New Testament to support his point.   These men were steeped in the Jewish 
faith and Scriptures.  Their actions against Christ were an outgrowth of their understanding 
of their faith.  The fact that even the Jewish faith did not lead its most zealous adherents to 
embrace Christ points to a lack of continuity between God’s revelation in Christ and all other 
forms of religious understanding of the world.109 
Newbigin also rejects any approach to other religions that would make them salvific  
because this would affirm either one of two propositions which Newbigin cannot embrace.  
Either the world religions point to a reality that is unknowable, or the adherent of pluralism 
has a privileged position to know the true reality to which all religions point.110  Christians 
must affirm that ultimate reality can be knowable, for it has been revealed in Jesus Christ.  
To say that ultimate truth about God and reality is unknowable contradicts the basic Christian 
affirmation that “God was in Christ.”  Since reality has been revealed particularly in Christ, 
other religions cannot be revealing it also.  Those who claim that reality is found equally in 
all religions are placing themselves in a special position to know ultimate reality.  This 
usurps the place of Christ as revealer of the Father and teacher of truth.   Newbigin is 
unwilling to affirm these consequences, and thus pluralism is impossible for him. 
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Newbigin, not surprisingly, rejects Karl Rahner’s proposal for a viable pluralism.111  
Rahner developed the concept of  “anonymous Christians” who are “given the possibility of 
eternal salvation” even though they have not trusted Christ.112  Such persons “stand outside 
the social unity of the Church . . . who have not been reached by the Christian message.”113  
An anonymous Christian must be a “faithful adherent of a non-Christian religion.”  They 
may be saved through that religion, not because the religion itself is true, but because that 
person, through their faithful adherence to truth as they understand it, is in reality a 
“Christian” without being aware of it.114  Such people are “justified through the grace of 
Christ and through the faith, hope and love for God and mankind which are to be qualified as 
specifically Christian in a special sense.”115 
Newbigin dismisses this on two grounds.  First, it minimizes the significance of the 
other person’s sincere religious commitment.  To tell people that they are really adherents of 
a religion other than the one they practice and believe is to treat their faith in a patronizing 
manner.116  It treats the most ultimate commitments of someone’s life as if they were 
meaningless.  Second, Newbigin questions Rahner’s emphasis on the “fate of the individual 
soul” for the same reason he questions the validity of such a concern on the part of those who 
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believe in exclusivism.  God’s concern is for all of reality and for people in their social 
relationships, not individual destinies.117 
A third aspect of the scope of salvation deals with the element of surprise in God’s 
judgment.  While some outside the church will have a place in God’s kingdom, there are 
some in the church who will not.  Newbigin believes that some will be surprised to find 
themselves left out who thought they would be included; just as some will be surprised to 
find they are not left out.118  Jesus’ statements related to some being lost are “primarily 
addressed to those who think they are saved.”119  Those who see themselves as righteous, 
who believe that they are God’s special people, are often the ones rejected in favor of the 
outcasts of society.  It is the “scoundrel” who is “having a party in his father’s house (Luke 
15)” while his righteous brother is outside.  Matt. 25:31-46 indicates that people on both 
sides will be surprised at their position in the last judgment.120   
In a peculiar contrast to all of this, Newbigin occasionally refers to those in Christ as 
having a basis for assurance.  Newbigin sees assurance in John 6:35-40 where Jesus pledges 
not to “cast out” any who come to him.  Past sin is taken away and present fellowship with 
Jesus is established, and the believer’s future in the kingdom of God cannot be 
circumvented.121  He never seeks to reconcile this contradiction. 
                                                 
117Ibid., 326. 
118Ibid., 333. 
119Newbigin, “Confessing Christ,” 129-30. 
120Lesslie Newbigin, “The Gospel among the Religions,” in Faith Meets Faith: Lively 
Opinions from Four Continents about Christian Witness in the Encounter of People of Other 
Faiths, ed. Gerald H. Anderson and Thomas F. Stansky, Mission Trends No. 5 (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1981; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981),  9.  This is the passage where Jesus 
says to those who think they are saved, “Depart from me . . . I never knew you.” 
121Newbigin, Light Has Come, 82. 
 
 
 
The fourth aspect of the scope of salvation relates to the sovereignty of God.   
Newbigin wants uphold God’s sovereignty in matters of individual salvation.  Christians who 
assert that only those who put faith in Christ are saved, as well as those who assert that 
sincere adherents of other faiths are saved, are taking for themselves a place of judgment that 
belongs only to God.122  God’s judgment on who is and is not saved is his own, and “it 
therefore behooves us to make no final judgment until the Judge himself comes.”123  This is 
consistent with Newbigin’s insistence that the mission of the church is God’s mission and 
cannot be engineered by the church.  The church does not save, it only bears witness.  
Salvation is God’s work, not the church’s.  It is the work of the Spirit who is “central.”124  
Bringing people to Christ is always “the mysterious work of the Holy Spirit who is beyond 
our understanding or control.”125  The work of Christ is best seen in terms of God’s purpose 
at work in every aspect of the world.126  As God is sovereign in all matters, this must include 
the final decision on who is and who is not “saved.” 
Newbigin arrives at a christology that allows him to defend the mission of the church 
in a manner which includes a place for proclamation and for social ministry, for telling the 
story and for living out this story’s ethical implications.  His understanding of the person of 
                                                 
122Newbigin, “The Gospel among the Religions,” 9; idem, “Integration,” 251.  This is 
the reason Newbigin rejects assertions by those such as Rahner that sincere believers in other 
religions are saved.  This matter “is not for Christians to decide, but God alone” (Lesslie 
Newbigin, “He that Sitteth in the Heavens Shall Laugh,” in Imagination and the Future: 
Essays on Christian Thought and Practice Presented to J. Davis McCaughey, ed. John A. 
Henley [Melbourne, Australia: Hawthorne Press, 1980], 6). 
123Newbigin, “Evangelism in the City,” 7 
124Newbigin, Open Secret, 65.  See also idem, Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 117, and 
idem, “Evangelism in the City,” 7. 
125Newbigin, “Evangelism in the City,” 5. 
126Newbigin, Unfinished Agenda, 198. 
 
 
 
Christ is fully orthodox, and such as has been held by Christians historically.  His 
understanding of the work of Christ is less orthodox.  He sees it as a part of all that God does 
in the world, and for him that includes all that is positive and life affirming in the world.  He 
keeps Christ at the center, however, refusing to allow any other understanding of truth to 
intervene with God’s ultimate revelation of himself and his purposes in Christ. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
EVANGELICALISM AND LESSLIE NEWBIGIN 
Lesslie Newbigin has sought to defend the gospel as he understands it and to 
encourage Christians to join him in a bold and vigorous defense of the truth contained in the 
Bible.  His arguments often seem compelling and attractive to evangelical Christians because 
of his defense of the resurrection of Christ, the miracles, and the general historicity of 
Scripture.  However appealing Newbigin’s apologetic seems, it cannot be embraced 
uncritically.  Evangelicals must understand both the underlying epistemology that supports 
Newbigin’s apologetic and its expression in his understanding of key doctrines. 
On both epistemic grounds and with regard to the gospel as presented in Scripture, 
Newbigin’s defense falls short on matters that Evangelicals consider crucial, including 
upholding a biblical worldview, emphasizing the authority of Scripture, and maintaining the 
need for faith in Jesus Christ as essential for a relationship with God.  Newbigin’s epistemic 
step backwards fails to give him a foundation which would lead to a fully orthodox defense 
of Christian faith. 
Evangelicalism and Newbigin’s Analysis 
of Western Culture and the Gospel 
Common Ground 
Evangelicals agree with Newbigin that there is a cultural crisis in the west.  In 1968, 
Francis Schaeffer described moral and epistemic relativism as “the most crucial problem 
facing Christianity today.”1  This concern parallels Newbigin’s concern for the “fact/values 
distinction.”  Carl F. H. Henry, at about the same time as Schaeffer, pointed out the growing 
secularism which is the background for relativizing religious truth claims.2 
                                                 
1Schaeffer, God, 13. 
2Carl F. H Henry, God Revelation and Authority, vol. I, God Who Speaks and Shows: 
Preliminary Considerations (Waco, TX: Word, 1976), 138-39.  Henry focuses on the loss of 
 
 
 
Recent evangelical thinkers have also focused on the problem.  Millard Erickson has 
called for an emphasis on the differences between Evangelicals and the larger culture, fearing 
that if evangelical Christianity does not distinguish itself it will eventually be absorbed into 
that culture and lose any hope of effective witness.3 
Most Evangelicals agree with Newbigin that the Enlightenment is the source of the 
problem, and that the church has failed because it has followed the Enlightenment’s lead  
concerning truth and verification.4  Evangelicals agree that this was a mistake because of the 
inherent differences between Enlightenment rationalism and Christian truth claims.5  The 
                                                                                                                                                       
“truth” in the modern world (Ibid., 28) and agrees with Newbigin that the cultural malaise 
may be traced back to scientific empiricism (Ibid., 38-43).  Henry sees the problem as having 
come into its fruition in the modern era largely due to the influence of mass media.  
Television, especially the news, has bombarded people with “vivid coverage” of events that 
seem for the moment to be world shaking.  Religious appeals, Henry points out, no longer 
make as much impact in such an environment (Ibid., 23).  Henry does recognize that the 
media are not the whole problem and that the foundations of secularism and relativism go 
much deeper (Ibid., 24). 
3Millard Erickson, The Evangelical Mind and Heart: Perspectives on Theological 
and Practical Issues (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1993), 40.  This is precisely Newbigin’s fear for 
the church if it does not recognize that the thought forms of the larger culture are antipathetic 
to the gospel. 
4Newbigin, “Way Out West,” 22. 
5A sampling of evangelical critiques of the relationship between Christianity and the 
Enlightenment may be found across the spectrum of evangelical thought.  Bernard Ramm has 
pointed out that Christian truth claims were refuted or denounced on rational grounds by 
Enlightenment thinkers (Bernard Ramm, After Fundamentalism: The Future of Evangelical 
Theology [New York: Harper & Row, 1983], 57-88); Francis Schaeffer recognized that the 
deep roots of the problem go back to Aquinas (Francis A. Schaeffer, Escape from Reason 
[Leicester, England: InterVarsity, 1968], 9-16), but traces the real problem to “four men--
Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard--and their thinking in the area of epistemology” 
(idem, He is There and He Is Not Silent [Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House, 1972], 46).  Others 
who have recognized that the Enlightenment is inherently contrary to Christian faith include 
David Wells (No Place for Truth or Whatever Happened to Evangelical Theology [Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993], 143); Middleton and Walsh, 43; and Grenz and Olson, 17-23. 
 
 
 
Enlightenment based its claim to certainty on rationalism and empiricism, not on God’s 
revelation, staking all on “the experimentally based pronouncements of science as the one 
and only avenue to truth and life.”6  The failure of modernity lies in the fact that, having 
failed to find truth in empiricism and rationalism, the west gave up on the possibility of 
discovering truth at all, rather than turning to faith in Christ.7 
Many Evangelicals agree that the source of the Enlightenment paradigm for truth is 
Descartes, the originator of “modern philosophy.”8 Cartesian methodology led to the 
emphasis on reason over revelation in biblical studies,9 which led to the destructive higher 
criticism of the nineteenth century.  Descartes taught the west to look at every matter from a 
perspective of doubt and to examine every question under the cold light of reason.  This 
method, applied to the Bible, led critics to see it as no more than the natural product of 
human minds describing their religious experiences.  Since Enlightenment thought could 
admit nothing in the way of revelation or of the supernatural, it was inevitable that the Bible 
would come to be seen this way.  Descartes’ method led to a change in the way the Bible was 
viewed and studied that the church as not completely recovered from to this day.10 
                                                 
6Henry, God, vol. I, 22. 
7Schaeffer, God, 18. 
8Henry, God, vol. I, 36. 
9Alan F. Johnson and Robert E. Webber, What Christians Believe: A Biblical and 
Historical Summary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1989), 47. 
10Some Evangelicals focus on others than Descartes.  The real crisis in values, what 
Newbigin calls the “fact/values distinction” begins, Francis Schaeffer believes, with the 
Hegelian dialectic.  The first thinker to give up, though, on finding a unified field of thought 
in which both “facts” and “values” could be unified, was Kierkegaard (Schaefer, God, 20-
21).  Schaeffer actually defends Descartes, as belonging to the pre-modern tradition.  He 
says, “Descartes had an important part in preparing for what was to follow; but in my opinion 
the shift came in the next century, the eighteenth” (idem, How Should We Then Live? [Old 
Tappan, NJ: Fleming H. Revell, 1976], 152).  Schaeffer, while not including Descartes, is 
 
 
 
Descartes’ method inevitably led to a dead end.  His method is limited to descriptions 
of immediate sensations or events.  Descartes affirmed the reality of physical sensations11 
and determined that he could accept the truth of things which he could “conceive very clearly 
and very distinctly.”12  This, by its nature, limits the realm of truth to mathematical matters13 
or to empirical ones.  It is little wonder then that Descartes devoted so much time and space 
to consideration of scientific matters.14  This allows one only to develop truths based on what 
may be apprehended rationally or empirically, through observation and experiment.  The 
method itself limits what may be regarded as truth, inevitably placing metaphysical, moral 
and religious assertions outside this realm.  This is in fact what happened in the decades 
following Descartes’ work, as Newbigin and so many others have pointed out.  The wonder 
is that it took as long as it did for this realization to filter into the larger culture. 
Evangelicals can affirm the way Newbigin clarifies the nature of the fact/values 
distinction.  This distinction has been noted by Evangelicals, though sometimes without 
using Newbigin’s terminology.15  Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okholm agree with 
                                                                                                                                                       
rightly regarded as being influential in leading Evangelicals to be critical of the culture in 
which they live. 
11Descartes, Meditations, 53. 
12Descartes, Discourse, 21. 
13Descartes, even before he had formulated his method began studying mathematical 
matters as being the source of certain laws and good reasoning (Ibid., 13). 
14Descartes said that he “resolved to seek no other knowledge than that which I might 
find within myself or perhaps in the great book of nature” (Ibid., 6); he went about the matter 
of scientific investigation this “great book” systematically, beginning with astronomy, then 
to physical phenomena on earth, and finally to biological matters, including human anatomy 
(Ibid., 27-38). 
15Carl F. H. Henry recognizes that religion has become “a matter of personal 
preference rather than a truth-commitment universally valid for one and all” (Henry, God, 
vol. I, 13).  This echoes Newbigin’s analysis of western culture which makes religious truth 
 
 
 
Newbigin that the fact/values distinction in western culture threatens the possibility that 
Christian truth claims can be heard.16  The terminology Newbigin uses here is helpful in 
understanding why western culture behaves as it does.  Evangelicals struggle to counter such 
trends as the marginalization of religion and moral relativism.  Newbigin’s analysis provides 
a larger picture in which these things may be seen as part of an overall cultural mind set.17 
Evangelicals agree with Newbigin that it is imperative that the gospel be heard in the 
west.  Like Newbigin, Carl F. H. Henry recognizes that “either the religion of Jesus Christ is 
true religion or it is not worth bothering about.”18  The gospel cannot be preached as merely 
the opinion of some, or as something that some religious groups find useful for other ends.  It 
cannot be presented as optional and still be the gospel. 
                                                                                                                                                       
claims personal and optional.  Other Evangelicals have used the same or similar terminology. 
 Norman Geisler has spoken of the fact that Kierkegaard separated faith and destructive 
higher criticism of the Bible.  This was a “bifurcation of fact and value” (Norman L. Geisler, 
“Beware of Philosophy: A Warning to Biblical Scholars” Journal of the Evangelical 
Theological Society 42, no. 1 [March 1999], 9).  See also, idem, “Philosophical 
Presuppositions of Biblical Errancy,” in Inerrancy, ed. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 1979), 307-36. 
16Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okholm, Welcome to the Family: An 
Introduction to Evangelical Christianity (Wheaton, IL: Victor Books, 1996), 34. 
17Newbigin’s analysis is not without its problems.  One may say that Newbigin 
oversimplifies the western mind set in accusing westerners of a complete capitulation to 
scientism (Stowe, 149).  Charles West has pointed out that in America, the fact/value 
distinction is not so clear.  American culture is more open to self doubt, and to questioning 
its activities than a thorough-going rationalism would be (West, “Mission,” 154).  Newbigin 
also largely ignores the Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment.  His broad outline is still 
useful however in disclosing the difference between facts and values and where the line is 
drawn for many westerners. 
18Henry, God, vol. I, 14-15. 
 
 
 
Francis Schaeffer encouraged Christians to present the gospel to modern people in 
ways that will challenge the presuppositions of those who have given up on truth.19  Many 
Evangelicals are aware that presenting the gospel honestly to the contemporary world is a 
challenge made more difficult by the way that (post-)modern people think.  Newbigin’s 
analysis of why westerners have trouble hearing the gospel and his exhortations to present it 
boldly as public truth are to be welcomed along with similar exhortations by others. 
Evangelicals also share Newbigin’s rejection of pluralism.20  The idea that there are 
many different ways to God, or that all religions are in touch with the same spiritual reality is 
incompatible with Evangelicalism’s emphasis on Christ as the only hope of anyone who 
seeks to be saved.  Newbigin’s criticism of John Hick, pointing out especially that Hick 
implicitly claims a more ultimate perspective than the religions he seeks to unify, is clear, 
accurate, and helpful.  Newbigin’s desire to keep Christ in the ultimate position with respect 
to all religious claims rings true in the minds of Evangelicals.21 
While Evangelicals share much with Newbigin, he gives them some matters worth 
considering as well.  Evangelicals need to heed Newbigin’s call to live out the gospel.  
Evangelicals must “recognize . . . that there is a profound difference between a community 
which adores God as the great reality and one where it is assumed that God can be 
ignored.”22  Newbigin challenges Evangelicals to see the west as an alien culture, something 
to be challenged, not something to be “regained.”  Here Newbigin’s perspective offers a 
                                                 
19Schaeffer, God, 119-67. 
20Newbigin, “Religious Pluralism,” 51. 
21John W. Montgomery has described “the Evangelical community” as “duly 
horrified” over the christological assertions in Hick’s The Myth of God Incarnate (John W. 
Montgomery, “Why has God Incarnate Suddenly Become Mythical,” in Perspectives on 
Evangelical Theology, ed.  Kenneth S. Kantzer and Stanley N. Gundry [Grand Rapids: 
Baker, 1979], 61). 
22Newbigin, “Evangelism in the City,” 5. 
 
 
 
challenge to those who have followed Francis Schaeffer’s.  Schaeffer believed that the 
cultural crisis in the west was not an inevitable result of modernity, and that Christian truth 
claims formed the best foundation for western values.23 
Newbigin’s critique of John Knitter for seeking to move to a salvation-centered 
approach to world religions should serve as a warning to Evangelicals who too often center 
their spiritual lives on personal psychological well being rather than on God and his glory.  
Evangelicalism has been criticized by some within its ranks for emphasizing the subjective 
and personal too much.  Millard Erickson has noticed “an emphasis upon feelings rather than 
intellect” in evangelical ranks, and a focus on psychological well being on the part of the 
individual.24  David Wells noticed the same problems, pointing out that this is contradictory 
to Scripture and that Evangelicals have failed to notice this.25 
Wells has pointed to the fact that this focus on personal well being has shown up in 
contemporary Christian music.  Where in the past the church sang its theology, and hymns 
served to teach and confirm truth, modern Christian music focuses on experience and the 
feeling of well being.26  In light of Knitter’s work, this is a troubling trend.  To the extent that 
Evangelicalism is willing to focus on personal feelings of personal peace and emotional 
                                                 
23Schaeffer sought to encourage western Christians to take back their culture in such 
books as How Should We Then Live, and A Christian Manifesto (rev. ed. [Westchester, IL: 
Crossway Books, 1982]). 
24Erickson, Mind and Heart, 197, 203. 
25Wells, No Place for Truth, 142.  Wells cites a disturbing 1983 study by James 
Hunter in which he examined the catalogs of the eight largest evangelical publishers.  A large 
percentage of books in their current catalogs were designed to promote individual happiness 
and well-being (Ibid., 175).  See James Hunter, American Evangelicalism: Conservative 
Religion and the Quandary of Modernity (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
1983) 94-99. 
26Wells, No Place for Truth, 173. 
 
 
 
uplift as well as on “what works for me,” rather than what is true, they face the danger of 
trading away the essential core of the gospel. 
Divergence 
Newbigin’s epistemic step backwards, while it seeks to find an adequate basis for 
defending the gospel, fails to do so.  Newbigin never really leaves the epistemic system he 
sought to critique.  He remains broadly within the empiricism which his analysis of the 
Enlightenment shows to be inadequate.  The Enlightenment program was an effort to found 
all truth on a rational description of the real physical world “out there.”  This is why science 
became, for the west, the arena of “facts.”  Newbigin demonstrated that such a commitment 
restricts the arena of truth too greatly. 
One would have expected Newbigin at this point to abandon this method as 
inadequate for verifying religious truth claims.  Instead he merely “steps backwards,” 
broadening the scope of an inductivist and empiricist epistemology to include historical 
matters.  He still seeks to accept only what may be “empirically verified,”27 only the 
empirical verification now includes secondary verification on the basis of the testimony of 
reliable witnesses.  This expands the realm of what may be accepted as true but does not 
change the basic method which is induction applied to objective physical realities.28  This 
allows Newbigin to accept the historical record of the gospels as true, on the basis of a 
number of reliable witnesses.  Unfortunately, it does not allow him to accept as true the area 
of his real concern, which is religious truth claims. 
                                                 
27James Emery White, What is Truth?  A Comparative Study of the Positions of 
Cornelius Van Til, Francis Schaeffer, Carl F. H. Henry, Donald Bloesch, and Millard 
Erickson (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1994), 10. 
28It is a basic principle of logic that inductive methods only achieve a high level of 
probability for the conclusion.  Induction does not lead to certainty and conclusions arrived 
at in this way may only be said to be “rendered plausible” (Michael Cohen, “Induction,” in 
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich [New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995], 405-6). 
 
 
 
Newbigin’s epistemic step backwards also assumes a knowledge of the objective 
world which his critique itself says is difficult if not impossible.  If the level of certainty that 
the Cartesian method achieves is tenuous at best, merely including a broader scope of 
material does not make for greater certainty.  Newbigin admits this29 but does not abandon 
the method in the end.  If  “Descartes’ method has been found to have in itself the seeds of its 
own destruction,” and “the demand for certainty has led directly into total scepticism,”30 then 
the method is flawed and cannot be the foundation for whatever level of certainty one gives 
to the gospel.31  It is difficult then to see how Newbigin can call the church to proclaim the 
gospel boldly as “public truth” before the world, on grounds which Newbigin himself regards 
as discredited.32 
The key weakness in Newbigin’s apologetic is that it is evidentialist.  Newbigin is 
limited to contending for what can be verified historically and no more.33  This is consistent 
                                                 
29Newbigin, “Certain Faith,” 339-50; idem, Proper Confidence, 16-44. 
30Newbigin, “Certain Faith,” 343. 
31Newbigin seems to be aware of this.  His call for a personal faith commitment 
(Ibid., 347-50) as a way of knowing is on the right track as will be seen below. Newbigin 
himself, however, never really does this.  He remains committed to empiricism and to 
objective reality as the foundation for truth. 
32Phillips and Okholm point out that any “attempt to prove Christianity true with 
absolute certainty . . . is inherently contradictory.”  It makes the ground of proof more 
ultimate than Scripture (Phillips and Okholm, 35).  Newbigin would most likely agree with 
this, as his call to begin with the testimony given in Scripture indicates.  Newbigin seems 
unaware that he has not really left the empirical and objective grounds of belief that he 
critiques. 
33As one example, in “Call to Mission: A Call to Unity” Newbigin says, “The content 
of the Gospel is Jesus Christ in the fulness of his life, teaching, death and resurrection” (260). 
 This limits the gospel to the things which can be verified historically based on the 
documents related to his life.  He can defend what Jesus said and did, but not the doctrines 
that give this significance.  He thereby limits the gospel which the church defends to 
historical matters only. 
 
 
 
with his commitment to finding an objective referent for Christian truth claims, but is 
inadequate for defending the whole of Christian faith.  An evidentialist apologetic of this 
type cannot move from history to the doctrines which make the historical narrative 
significant, because purely doctrinal truth claims cannot be verified historically.  Doctrinal 
matters remain on the values side of Newbigin’s fact/values distinction.34  People may agree, 
for example, that the best testimony of history indicates that Jesus rose from the dead,35 but 
they can still disagree over the meaning of the event. 
Newbigin seeks then to unite fact and value, but his method does not allow him to do 
this.  He limits facts to the gospel story, the historical events narrated in Scripture.  The 
meaning of the gospel--its doctrinal significance--is left to the subjective, values side of the 
equation.  The meaning is unique for each person and is discovered by the convert “in that 
person’s experience.”36  This shows up in Newbigin’s understanding of the role of tradition 
and intrafaith dialogue in the church.  Newbigin believes that the truths of the gospel are not 
                                                 
34Like Newbigin, Carl F. H. Henry recognizes that “the fundamental issue remains 
the issue of truth.”  Henry insists, however that this is “the truth of theological assertions” 
(Henry, God, vol. I, 14).  That is, doctrinal truths are primary, and no defense of Christian 
faith can be adequate if it does not include a defense of doctrinal claims. 
35Josh McDowell has compiled much evidence to show that it may be defended on 
good historical grounds that Jesus came out of his grave alive after his crucifixion (Josh 
McDowell, Evidence that Demands a Verdict: Historical Evidences for the Christian Faith  
[San Bernardino, CA: Campus Crusade for Christ, 1973], 192-273).  McDowell assumes that 
he has proven the resurrection, but as Cornelius Van Til has shown, the historical fact of the 
resurrection is nothing more than the fact of an unusual occurrence (Cornelius Van Til, The 
Defense of the Faith [Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1955], 24).  People do not 
come back to life after crucifixion and burial, but clearly Christ did.  The historical 
occurrence does not say anything about the doctrinal significance of the event.  While it may 
be granted that without the resurrection, the doctrine of the atonement is meaningless, the 
resurrection does not in itself establish the doctrine of the atonement.  The doctrine gives the 
event its significance. 
36Newbigin, “Call to Mission,” 260. 
 
 
 
fixed or knowable, but are subjective, at least in this present life.  He asserts that “we have a 
bewildering variety of visions (shaped by our different cultures) of who Jesus is.  We shall 
know truly who he is only at the end when he shall be acknowledged as Lord by every 
tongue. On the way, we need each other for mutual correction as we struggle . . . to embody 
in action our perception of his lordship.”37  Tradition, for Newbigin, plays a role along side 
intrafaith dialogue.  While tradition does not quite share equal place with Scripture for him, it 
is necessary as a witness to the meaning of the story contained in Scripture.38  Just as the 
church must listen to the voices of other contemporary expressions of Christianity, it must 
listen to the voices of the past, including interpretations offered in Scripture itself, but none 
of these are final.  Newbigin wants the church to proclaim as “public truth” a gospel the 
ultimate meaning of which is not clearly known by the church and over which the church 
should engage in never ending debate. 
Newbigin’s method leaves him with only the gospel story itself, which calls the 
church to proclaim the gospel while seeking to make sense of it.  This is unacceptable to 
Evangelicals for whom the doctrinal matters are absolutely necessary alongside the story.  
An evangelical understanding of the gospel involves defending both the historical reliability 
                                                 
37Lesslie Newbigin, “Faith and Faithfulness in the Ecumenical Movement,” in Faith 
and Faithfulness: Essays on Contemporary Ecumenical Themes.  A Tribute to Phillip A. 
Potter, ed. Pauline Webb (Geneva, Switzerland: World Council of Churches, 1984), 5.  
Gabriel Fackre calls this “a ‘Corinthian model of theology’” where truth rises from “the 
contributions of many diverse perspectives (1 Corinthians 12) engaging one another lovingly 
(1 Corinthians 13) and always accountable to Jesus Christ, the head of the body” (Gabriel 
Fackre, Restoring the Center: Essays Evangelical and Ecumenical [Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity, 1998], 23).  This places authority, not in Scripture, but in the dialectical 
method, and human reason. 
38Newbigin, Truth and Authority in Modernity, 46-49.  For Newbigin, the 
interpretation of the story which Scripture provides is a part of the tradition.  It is not final, 
for only the story itself is final (see below), but has a higher level of authority, being 
included in the canon (Ibid., 47).  
 
 
 
of the story and the revealed doctrines which attend it.39  An evidentialist apologetic, while 
certainly valuable, is by itself inadequate for defending the full truth of Scripture. 
Evangelicals recognize that historical assertions are essential but regard doctrinal 
ones as equally essential.  Some truth claims are completely historical.  These are the ones 
that relate to the facts recorded in the biblical narrative.  That Christ was born of a virgin, 
that he taught in parables and did miracles, that he was crucified and rose again are all 
historical claims.  No evangelical Christian is prepared to give these up. Other truth claims, 
equally important, are purely doctrinal in nature.  These claims relate to the attributes and 
existence of God, the atonement, the Trinity and the two natures of Christ.  These doctrinal 
truths serve to give the historical events their significance.  Without the doctrines, the history 
becomes no more than a report of unusual occurrences.40  Doctrinal truths share at least equal 
importance with historical truths, if not more so.41 
                                                 
39It is insufficient to establish the historicity of the New Testament events alone, for 
“the question of the historicity of this record is of little importance for those who on other 
grounds deny the truth of Christianity” (F. F. Bruce, The New Testament Documents: Are 
They Reliable?, 5th rev. ed. [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1960], 8). 
40Carl F. H. Henry pointed out that “on the basis of the Gospels alone as trustworthy 
historical narratives, and without an appeal to divine revelation” [that is without the doctrinal 
significance of the narratives], one cannot establish that Jesus was truly risen to everlasting 
life, and not merely “revivified” after his crucifixion.  The doctrine gives the story its 
meaning and significance, but history alone, even when well established, does not provide a 
basis for the doctrine attached to it (Henry, God, vol. 1, 222). 
41Newbigin should have seen this from his experience with ecumenical work.  Often 
what divides churches is not the historical questions but matters of doctrine and related 
practice.  When Newbigin was involved in the creation of the Church of South India from 
three existing denominations, one major obstacle was the question of accepting the 
ordination of each other’s clergy from within these denominations (Newbigin, Unfinished 
Agenda, 75-77; A. E. J. Rawlinson, The Church of South India, The Lichfield Cathedral 
Divinity Lectures 1950 [London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951], 41).  There was no question 
of the historical facts of the Bible, but of the doctrine of apostolic succession, and what it 
meant for the legitimacy of the previously existing denominations and the new one that was 
created.  A related element of discord was over “lay celebration” of the sacraments 
 
 
 
There is a wide consensus on which doctrines are especially essential to evangelical 
identity.  Alister McGrath has pointed out “biblical beliefs and practices” and the need for 
the individual to experience salvation in some personal way are widely accepted evangelical 
beliefs.42  McGrath also includes scriptural authority, the Lordship of Jesus Christ, and “the 
priority of evangelism” as distinctives of Evangelicalism.43  Similarly, Klaas Runia describes 
four “essentials” which characterize Evangelicalism.  These are “unconditional acceptance of 
Holy Scripture as the authoritative Word of God,” a “personal faith in Jesus Christ and his 
work of Salvation,” and a personal relationship with him by the work of the Holy Spirit, and 
finally an “emphasis on the missionary task of the individual believer and of the 
congregation as a whole.44  While differences exist as to the details, most evangelical 
thinkers would agree with McGrath and Runia. 
Among these distinctives two implications stand out.  Evangelicals hold to a high 
view of biblical authority and see Jesus Christ as the only hope for a lost humanity.45  
                                                                                                                                                       
(Rawlinson, 43).  It was doctrine, not historical facts, that needed to be overcome for the 
merger to work. 
42McGrath, 19.  McGrath points to Barry Collett as asserting that the evangelical 
spirit goes back to certain monastics in Italy in the late fifteenth century.  See Barry Collett, 
Italian Benedictine Scholars and the Reformation, Oxford: Clarendon, 1985.  Collett 
describes the practices of these Benedictine monks as including an emphasis on the study of 
Scripture (29) and development of “a personal relationship with God” (61).  It may be an 
exageration to call this Evangelicalism in the modern sense, but it does demonstrate that 
some evangelical concerns have a long history in the church. 
43McGrath, 55-56. 
44Klaas Runia, “What is Evangelical Theology?” Evangelical Review of Theology 21, 
no. 4 (October 1997): 296.  Emphasis his. 
45For Evangelicals, scriptural authority and a proper understanding of Christ are 
“inextricably linked” because “Scripture alone brings us to a true and saving knowledge of 
Jesus Christ” (McGrath, 65). 
 
 
 
Scripture is often described as inerrant46 or as infallible.  Phillips and Okholm say that 
“evangelicals confess plenary and verbal inspiration.”47  Efforts to defend this from an 
evidentialist perspective have been made,48 demonstrating the historical accuracy of the 
narrative.  As important as this is (and Evangelicals recognize that it is essential), it is not 
sufficient by itself to defend all of Christianity’s truth claims. 
Tied to biblical authority is the idea of Christ as humanity’s only hope for salvation. 
This is essential to evangelical identity.49  The death of Christ “is to be seen as the unique, 
necessary and sufficient basis of salvation.”50  One cannot demonstrate this doctrine 
historically.  It is a purely doctrinal claim, albeit one made in Scripture itself.51 
Newbigin’s epistemic step backwards cannot give warrant for either a view of 
biblical authority beyond its historical veracity or for personal faith in Jesus Christ as 
humanity’s only hope for salvation.  Evangelical Christianity cannot stand on historical 
                                                 
46Carl F. H. Henry, God Revelation and Authority, vol IV, God Who Speaks and 
Shows: Fifteen Theses, Part Three (Waco, TX: Word, 1979), 103-255; Greg L. Bahnsen, 
“The Inerrancy of the Autographa,” in Inerrancy, ed. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 1980), 151-93. 
47Phillips and Okholm, 48. 
48One of the best sources on this is the compilation of others’ research done by Josh 
McDowell in More Evidence that Demands a Verdict. 
49In the surveys done by Christian Smith, 96 percent of self identified Evangelicals 
held that salvation is possible solely through faith in Christ.  Christian Smith et al., American 
Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 
23. 
50McGrath, 66. 
51Among many Scripture passages which explicitly assert that Christ alone is the 
basis of salvation are John 3:16-18, 14:6, 17:3; Acts 4:12; Rom. 3:24, 5:8-10; 1 Cor. 3:11, 
and Gal 1:6-9.  Taken together, they build a case for the doctrine that is acceptable only if 
one begins with faith in the authority of Scripture.  Thus biblical authority and the 
exclusivity of Christ are linked. 
 
 
 
grounds alone, for history by itself cannot provide a basis for making the truth claims that are 
essential to evangelical faith. 
It is necessary then to begin from a different basis if the significant truth claims of the 
Christian faith are to be defended adequately.  Newbigin’s effort has not moved beyond 
classical foundationalism which holds that beliefs are justified only if they are “self evident 
or incorrigible.”  Beliefs must either be evident beyond doubt, or such that the one who 
believes it cannot be mistaken.52  Newbigin admits this is impossible, but accepts the next 
best thing that evidentialism can offer--a high level of probability only for those things which 
can be verified objectively either directly or, as in the case of historical claims, indirectly on 
the testimony of eyewitnesses.53  Since certainty is impossible from an evidentialist 
perspective, one must move to another basis more suited to the types of truth claims 
Christians make.  To attempt to found Christian truth claims on any basis foreign to those 
claims themselves is to make the method more ultimate than the truth one wishes to 
support.54 
A defense of the truth claims of Christianity must be found from within its own 
system of thought.  Traditionally, presuppositionalist apologetics attempted to do this.  Alvin 
Plantinga refined the presuppositionalist approach in what he calls “reformed epistemology.” 
                                                 
52Terrence Penelhum, “Do Religious Beliefs Need Ground?” in Contemporary 
Classics in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Ann Loades and Loyal D. Rue (Peru, IL: Open Court, 
1991), 114.  Descartes’ cogito fits both these criteria. 
53Newbigin has fallen into the ethical trap that obligates evidentialists to hold only 
beliefs that have sufficient evidential support (Alvin Plantinga, “Is Belief in God Properly 
Basic?” in Contemporary Classics in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Ann Loades and Loyal D. 
Rue [Peru, IL: Open Court, 1991], 95).  To his credit, despite his desire to defend Christian 
faith, Newbigin does not go far beyond the obligation imposed by his method as will be seen 
below. 
54As Cornelius Van Til has put it, “no non-Christian position can be made to appear 
more than merely plausible.”  To attempt to establish the truth claims of Christianity on a 
basis outside itself inevitably leads to failure (Van Til, 115). 
 
 
 
  Here, Plantinga justifies epistemic certainty based on the concept of “properly basic 
beliefs.”55  This approach offers a way for the fullness of Christian truth claims to be 
defended rationally.56  This is in line with the nature of Christian truth which rests not on 
empiricism, or on rationalism but on the fact that God has revealed himself and his purposes 
to humanity.57 
A properly basic belief is one which is understood immediately, without being 
grounded in any other belief.  Alvin Plantinga uses the example 2+1=3 as a properly basic 
belief.  It is believed without reference to any other belief.  To see the proposition and 
understand it is to believe that it is true.58  Such beliefs are not grounded in any epistemic 
system, but one “is entirely within his intellectual rights in believing as he does.”59  Plantinga 
wants to argue that ultimate faith commitments, such as the proposition “God exists,” are 
properly basic also.60 
                                                 
55Plantinga, “Belief in God,” 93-105. 
56Reformed epistemology and  presuppositionalism will be used here as for all 
practical purposes as synonymous terms.  Under both, certain ideas may be called either a 
“presupposition” or a “properly basic belief” as these terms are synonymous. 
57Henry, God, vol. I, 223.  Later he says, “human knowledge . . . has its ultimate 
ground in God.”  There is no possibility of knowing apart from God’s revelation in Scripture 
and in nature and in the way the human mind has been structured by God (idem, God 
Revelation and Authority, vol. V, God Who Stands and Stays: Part One [Waco, TX: Word, 
1982], 384). 
58Alvin Plantinga, “The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology,” in Philosophy of 
Religion: Selected Readings, ed. Michael Peterson et al. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 314.  He also regards beliefs related to one’s self awareness as properly basic, 
such as “there is a pain in my right knee” (Ibid.). Again, the one experiencing the pain 
believes it apart from any epistemic foundation, and does not attempt to justify the belief on 
rational grounds. 
59Plantinga, “Belief in God,” 94. 
60Ibid. 
 
 
 
One may object that presuppositions, or properly basic beliefs, can be arbitrary and 
that one should not base ultimate truth claims on a belief such as the one that God exists.  
Plantinga denies this, arguing that while properly basic beliefs are not grounded in an outside 
epistemology, they are not therefore groundless.61  Tradition, for Newbigin, plays a role 
along side intrafaith dialogue.  While tradition does not quite share equal place with 
Scripture for him, it is necessary as a witness to the meaning of the story contained in 
Scripture.62  Just as the church must listen to the voices of other contemporary expressions of 
Christianity, it must listen to the voices of the past, including interpretations offered in 
Scripture itself. roperly basic beliefs arise “only in certain conditions; these conditions are 
the ground of its justification, and by extension, the ground of the belief itself.”63   Plantinga 
believes that in all circumstances of properly basic belief, “there is some circumstance or 
condition that confers justification.”64  Properly basic beliefs do not need universal 
                                                 
61For example, “perceptual beliefs” are properly basic but are not groundless.  His 
example of this is “I see a tree.”  The experience of seeing the tree is “the ground of the 
belief itself” (Plantinga, Belief in God,” 97). 
62Newbigin, Truth and Authority in Modernity, 46-49.  For Newbigin, the 
interpretation of the story which Scripture provides is a part of the tradition.  It is not final, 
for only the story itself is final (see below), but has a higher level of authority, being 
included in the canon (Ibid., 47).  
63Plantinga, “Belief in God,” 99. 
64Ibid., 98.  “A belief is properly basic only in certain conditions; these conditions are 
. . . the ground of its justification and, by extension, the ground of the belief itself.  In this 
sense, basic beliefs are not, or are not necessarily, groundless beliefs” (Ibid., 99) (emphasis 
his). 
Richard Grigg has argued that there are “significant disanalogies” between properly 
basic beliefs and belief in God.  He uses Plantinga’s proposition “(2) I had breakfast this 
morning” and says that the memory may later be confirmed by finding the “dirty dishes” and 
“one less egg in my refrigerator” (Richard Grigg, “The Crucial Disanalogies between 
Properly Basic Belief and Belief in God,” Religious Studies 26, no. 3 [September 1990]: 
390).  Grigg misses the point that while having had breakfast may be empirically verified, 
one’s holding of the belief is epistemically justified apart from verification.  That belief in 
 
 
 
justification, but rise out of personal experience and are “tested by a relevant set of 
examples.”  The Christian believes in God and the fact that the atheist does not take away the 
Christian’s right to this properly basic belief.65  Christian truth claims should not be subject 
to epistemic conditions imposed from the outside.66  Phillips and Okholm concur saying that 
a proper worldview need not be provable to those who do not accept it.  It need only pass the 
test of “empirical fit”--it should fit with experience and be coherent.67  Thus, reformed 
epistemology is not “non-foundationalism” but is a form of “weak foundationalism” of the 
sort that traditional reformed thinkers have accepted.68  
Traditional reformed thinkers have argued similarly, and Plantinga sees his proposal 
as part of that whole mindset.  Abraham Kuyper, for example, believed that faith 
                                                                                                                                                       
God cannot be empirically verified does not count against belief in God in any way.   
Grigg’s objection fails, by the way, at one other point.  The dirty dishes and missing 
egg can only establish the plausibility that he had breakfast.  Others may have left the dishes 
in the sink and the eggs may have been miscounted.  Empiricism does not establish certainty. 
 Grigg’s memory of having breakfast is more certain than the dishes or the missing egg.  
These may only give grounds for the belief that he ate breakfast; they do not establish it any 
more than the classical arguments establish the existence of God. 
65C. Stephen Evans has pointed out that a reasonable, critically examined faith is 
possible even if one begins fideistically with certain commitments, and is willing to test these 
commitments (C. Stephen Evans, Philosophy of Religion: Thinking about Faith [Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1985], 25). 
66Plantinga, “Belief in God,” 104. 
67Phillips and Okholm, 35.  They state that “Scripture does not promise” that 
Christian truth claims are provable (Ibid.).  At the same time, it may be argued that John 
Hick’s pluralism does not pass the test of properly basic belief.  He grounds it in the 
universal experience of the numinous which he finds in different places of worship.  Even if 
it does pass the experiential test (a dubious possibility itself) it does not pass the test of 
coherence.  Contradictory truth claims cannot be reconciled, and pluralism, attractive as it 
may be to a certain mindset, is neither provable on hard foundationalist grounds nor does it 
pass the test of a “properly basic belief.” 
68Plantinga, “Reformed Objection,” 317. 
 
 
 
commitments are bound up in the way that God has structured the mind.  He argued that 
everyone has a faith structure which is “fundamental to every facet in our human 
consciousness.”69  “Axioms,” he contended, “cannot be demonstrated” for the forming of 
them is a faith based activity.70  Cornelius Van Til emphasizes the self-authenticating nature 
of revelation in his presuppositional approach to defending Christian truth.71  The individual 
believer discovers the truth in the encounter with revelation, apart from grounding in any 
epistemological commitments.  This is similar to the concept of “properly basic belief” in 
that it depends on one’s experience and is grounded in itself, not in some more foundational 
idea. 
Presuppostional apologetics holds that certain beliefs are necessary as a starting point 
for thought, and that these are not externally grounded.  The entire presuppositionalist 
approach to apologetics depends on properly basic beliefs as foundational.  
Presuppositionalism takes certain truth claims as basic and builds from them in the manner 
that Plantinga lays out.  Presuppositions are not grounded in any epistemology, and yet these 
truth claims are not arbitrary.  Christian presuppositions “must relate to the reality of what is, 
in a way that can be seen to be true.”72 
Since evidentialism cannot provide a full defense of Christian faith, it is necessary to 
turn to some form of presuppositionalism, a system which starts with certain properly basic 
beliefs, if the Christian faith is to be defended adequately.  Cornelius Van Til held that it was 
                                                 
69Abraham Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), 
125-26. 
70Bernard Ramm, Varieties of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1961), 
182, describing Kuyper. 
71White, 39. 
72Guiness, 335.  Guiness says, “It is not enough to look into the blackness of 
twentieth century thinking and affirm faith as an answer; this too would be a leap of faith” 
(Ibid.). 
 
 
 
impossible to defend Christianity apart from a presuppositional approach.73  Francis 
Schaeffer believed that due to moral and religious relativism in western culture a 
presuppositional apologetic is imperative.74  Presuppositionalism, what Plantinga calls 
“reformed epistemology,” believes that all of life must be understood from within the 
perspective of Christianity as it is revealed in the Scriptures.  It takes the character of God 
seriously as one who has created humanity with the capacity to know him and to know the 
real world.  It takes the fall seriously, believing that the noetic structures of the human mind 
have been compromised by that event.  It supports Christian beliefs without asking them to 
be subject to an impossible standard of verification. When Christian truth claims are made 
subject to verification under any other system of thought, the ability to defend them is 
compromised.75 
What beliefs then may be regarded as properly basic for a defense of Christian faith?  
First, belief in God is properly basic.76  Plantinga says that “a person is entirely within his 
epistemic rights, entirely rational, in believing in God even if he has no argument for this 
belief, and does not believe it on the basis of any other beliefs he holds.”77  Believers in God 
have an immeditate awareness of the truth of the proposition apart from any justification for 
it.78  Such faith may arise from a sense of God’s presence, or from an awareness of the 
created universe, or from a liberating sense of being forgiven for one’s sins.79  This faith is 
                                                 
73White, 41. 
74Schaeffer, God, 15. 
75Van Til, 113-14. 
76Plantinga, “Belief in God,” 93-105. 
77Plantinga, “Reformed Objection,” 313. 
78Plantinga, “Reformed Epistemology,” 332. 
79Plantinga, “Belief in God,” 99-100.  Plantinga admits that one may argue that these 
 
 
 
entirely biblical since the Bible itself never attempts to prove or argue for the existence of 
God.80 
Plantinga has shown that Calvin held that Christians should include belief in God 
among their foundational beliefs.81  Calvin believed that some sense of realization that God 
exists was pretty much universal.82  Van Til, following Calvin, believes that knowledge of 
God is innate, a result of who God is, “a being who exists necessarily” and of humanity’s 
contingent relationship of dependence on God.83 
This faith is more than just the idea that some being called “God” exists.  To some 
extent, belief in God entails, for the Christian, belief in the attributes of God revealed in 
Scripture.  To believe in God is to believe that he has the attributes including holiness, justice 
and mercy that are revealed in Scripture.  God, in a sense, is equal to the sum of his 
attributes.  To believe in God, but not in the God who has revealed himself, is to believe in 
another god all together.  Carl F. H. Henry has pointed out that God’s revelation of himself in 
Scripture is “the only objective intelligible basis for statements about his nature.”84 
                                                                                                                                                       
beliefs are properly basic and that one grounds belief in God on them.  In each case, though, 
each of these beliefs entails the belief that God exists.  He stands by the existence of God, 
then, as properly basic. 
80Plantinga, “Reformed Objection,” 311. 
81Ibid., 317.  Plantinga, citing Calvin, says this: “God has created us with a tendency 
or disposition to see his hand in nature, and to recognize that he is both the creator of the 
world and the person to whom we owe ultimate allegiance” (Alvin Plantinga, “On Reformed 
Epistemology,” in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, ed. Michael Peterson et al. 
[New York: Oxford University Press, 1996], 335). 
82John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, vol. I, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. 
and indexed by Ford Lewis Battles, vol. XX, The Library of Christian Classics 
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), I, iii, 1; I, iii, 3. 
83Van Til, 57. 
84Henry, God, vol. V, 99. 
 
 
 
This leads naturally to the question of Scripture.  That God has revealed himself in 
the Bible may be seen as properly basic for Christians.  Van Til has pointed out that Scripture 
must be a part of one’s defense of Christian faith.85  It cannot be subjected to reason or to any 
other foundation.86 
This has been recognized by modern defenders of the faith.  Carl F. H. Henry calls 
“divine revelation . . . the basic epistemological axiom.”87  Henry recognizes that attempts to 
reason one’s way to God are bound to fail and that only divine self disclosure provides a 
basis for certainty regarding God’s nature and purposes.88  Os Guiness agreed saying that if 
one believes in God and that God has revealed himself, then this self revelation may be 
accepted as true, even apart from outside verification.89  Francis Schaeffer has observed that 
the search for an all encompassing rational system has failed.  Centuries of philosophical 
effort did not establish successfully any such system beginning from human reason.  The 
human mind is too limited.  Without revelation, one cannot know the truth.90 
The reformers saw belief in the authority of Scripture in terms that may be described 
as “properly basic.”  Calvin affirmed that the Bible is inspired of God and saw this as a basic 
axiom.  He said that “they who strive to build up firm faith in Scripture through disputation 
are doing things backwards.”91  One begins with Scripture, one does not work towards it for 
God is capable of giving testimony to himself and needs no outside defense.92  
                                                 
85Van Til, 123. 
86Ibid., 125. 
87Henry, God, vol. I, 216, 226. 
88Ibid., 218. 
89Guiness, 336. 
90Schaeffer, God, 17. 
91Calvin, Institutes, I, vii, 4.  “Above human judgment we affirm with utter certainty  
 
 
 
Many modern Evangelicals also believe Scripture should be accepted in this way.  
Alister McGrath has said that “the Evangelical testimony is that Scripture comes to us as the 
self authenticating Word of God.”93  Building on this, a host of doctrines found in the Bible 
may be defended.  One does not need to add other properly basic beliefs since belief in 
scriptural authority entails them.  Among these are belief in the Trinity,94 in the virgin birth 
of Christ, and Christ’s death on the cross as the only hope of those who would be justified 
before God.  Of course there are certain concepts not so clearly taught in Scripture.  Belief in 
scriptural authority does not entail only one view of church government, of eschatology, or 
of the nature of the Colossian heresy.  Much of Christian teaching, however, and certainly 
everything that is essential is clearly revealed in Scripture. 
While Newbigin’s effort to defend the gospel only on the basis of the objective truth 
of the historical record is inadequate, the presuppositionalist approach offers a greater level 
of certainty and is broad enough to defend the totality of Christian truth claims.  It does so by 
showing that these claims are coherent.  This is not to say that evidential approaches, such as 
Newbigin’s, have no value.  The historical evidences for Christianity do establish that its 
truth claims are plausible.  One cannot well defend a view of the atonement if the 
resurrection could be shown to have been a hoax.   However, evidentialism cannot stand 
alone, and must always be secondary to presuppositionalism. 
                                                                                                                                                       
  . . . that it (scripture) has flowed to us from the very mouth of God by the ministry of men” 
(Ibid., I, vii, 5). 
92Ibid.  
93McGrath, 61. 
94The term Trinity does not itself appear in Scripture, but the phrase “in the name of 
the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit” does (Matt. 28:19), and all three are spoken 
of as deity at various points in Scripture. 
 
 
 
It is surprising that Newbigin does not abandon evidentialism in light of his own 
statements regarding the relationship of modernity to Christian faith.  He recognizes that 
what Plantinga calls “hard foundationalism” does not lead to certainty related to the things of 
God.95  Natural theology, against which Plantinga argues, is also rejected by Newbigin.96  He 
understands that such doctrines as the incarnation and the Trinity cannot be justified on hard 
foundationalist grounds. 
To his credit, Newbigin resists total subjectivism and in fact argues against it 
vigorously.97  In arguing against the “modern scientific worldview,”98 however, he never 
ultimately abandons it.  Having established that it cannot verify religious truth clains, he 
never moves to an epistemic method which can. 
This is also surprising in light of the way in which Newbigin uses Polanyi to 
undergird his critique of modernism.  Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge bears 
startling resemblances to certain aspects of presuppositionalism, especially as refined by 
Plantinga. 
Both Polanyi and the presuppositionalists give the knower an essential place in the 
process of knowing.  Polanyi emphasizes the place of “personal participation in the search 
for and conquest of our knowledge.”99  He means that one perceives the world and makes 
elementary interpretive decisions about it, which one then believes as true, and finds 
confirmed in one’s experience.100  This finds an obvious parallel with Plantinga’s examples 
                                                 
95Newbigin, Truth and Authority in Modernity, 18-19. 
96Ibid. 
97Newbigin, Foolishness, 44-45, 48-50. 
98Ibid., 50. 
99Polanyi, 96. 
100Ibid., 96-97. 
 
 
 
of perceptual beliefs as “properly basic.”101  Neither Plantinga nor Polanyi would consider 
perceptual beliefs groundless.  The knower, in both cases, is intentional in the act of knowing 
that one perceives a real world and that one can trust one’s perceptions. 
Polanyi points out “that the logical antecedents of science are internal to science.”102  
Science rests on epistemic principles which cannot be verified outside of the practice of 
science itself for “nobody has ever affirmed the presuppositions of science by themselves.”103 
 “Science,” Polanyi points out, “is a system of beliefs to which we are committed.  Such a 
system cannot be accounted for either from experience as seen within a different system, or 
by reason without any experience.”104  Polanyi might as well be saying that science is a 
presuppositional system that cannot be justified epistemically, but which is not therefore 
discredited as a way to gain knowledge.  He even calls it “a system of beliefs to which we are 
committed.”  The parallel to the presuppositional apologetic method advocated by Plantinga 
and practiced by Calvin and modern reformed thinkers is apparent. 
Newbigin comes close to seeing this.  He writes that the Christian community has a 
“tradition which claims authority”105 and which “carries forward certain ways of looking at 
things, certain models for interpreting experience.106  Newbigin sees this as parallel to 
Polanyi’s understanding of science107 and advocates that Christians should “indwell the 
                                                 
101Plantiga, “Belief in God,” 97. 
102Polanyi, 171. 
103Ibid. 
104Ibid. 
105Newbigin, Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 49. 
106Ibid. 
107Ibid., 43-51. 
 
 
 
tradition” as the scientists do their own.108  Newbigin even asserts that “the search for a kind 
of knowledge of God that is not dependent on the grace of God is doomed to fail.”109  The 
connection between “personal knowledge” and a religious worldview was appreciated by 
Polanyi himself.  In an illuminating passage, he asserts that 
We must now go back to St. Augustine to restore the balance of our cognitive 
powers.  In the fourth century A.D., St. Augustine brought the history of Greek 
philosophy to a close by inaugurating for the first time a post-critical philosophy.  He 
taught that all knowledge is a gift of grace, for which we must strive under the guidance 
of antecedent belief . . . .  His doctrine ruled the minds of Christian scholars for a 
thousands years.  Then faith declined and demonstrable knowledge gained superiority 
over it.110 
Newbigin is fond of using the phrase “a new starting place for thought” or similar 
wording.111  Polanyi’s work offered him an open door to locate that starting place in God’s 
revelation of himself in Scripture.  By locating the starting place in the “tradition” embodied 
in the historical record of Scripture rather than in Scripture as revelation, Newbigin never 
really leaves the modernist paradigm of empirical verification.  The tradition embodied in the 
historical record alone is insufficient to allow Newbigin to develop an apologetic which 
embraces all of the significant affirmations of historic Christianity, including the inspiration 
of Scripture and the exclusivity of Christ. 
Evangelicalism and Newbigin’s Understanding 
of Biblical Authority 
                                                 
108Ibid., 49. 
109Newbigin, Truth and Authority in Modernity, 15. 
110Polanyi, 266. 
111Newbigin, Truth to Tell, 17, 23, 37; idem, Proper Confidence, 86. 
 
 
 
Evangelical Christians have always regarded the Bible as the final authority in 
matters of doctrine and practice.112  Derek Tidball has called this “the most characteristic 
feature of evangelicalism.”113  Many have undertaken to write the history of how 
Evangelicalism has emerged from the fundamentalist movement of the 1920s, which was a 
reaction to the erosion of faith in the Scriptures among mainline denominations, and how 
evangelical thought finds its basis in the Reformation concept of sola Scriptura.114  The 
history and general orientation of Evangelicalism have worked to keep Scripture at the center 
of evangelical distinctives. 
Any defense of Christian faith, for Evangelicals, then must include a defense of 
Scripture and of the use of Scripture in defending the faith.  Lesslie Newbigin has defended a 
high view of Scripture, often against the intellectual current of his mainline Christian milieu. 
 He has held up Scripture as the foundation of Christian truth and identity, and has insisted 
that the story told in the Bible is “the true story, both of the cosmos and of human life within 
the cosmos.”115  Evangelicals must therefore consider carefully Newbigin’s understanding of 
Scripture and its role in Christian faith. 
                                                 
112John Gerstner, “The Theological Boundaries of Evangelical Faith,” in The 
Evangelicals: What They Believe, Who They Are, and Where They Are Changing, ed. David 
F. Wells and John D. Woodbridge (Nashville: Abingdon, 1975), 32.  Francis Schaeffer has 
said that “holding to a strong view of Scripture or not holding to it is the watershed of the 
evangelical world” (Francis A. Schaeffer, The Great Evangelical Disaster [Westchester, IL: 
Crossway Books, 1984], 51). 
113Derek Tidball, Who Are the Evangelicals?: Tracing the Roots of the Modern 
Movements (London: Marshall Pickering, 1994), 79. 
114Excellent short histories of Evangelicalism may be found in George Marsden, 
Fundamentalism and American Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism 
1870-1925 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); McGrath, 19-51; and Phillips and 
Okholm, 129-269. 
115Newbigin, Truth and Authority in Modernity, 38. 
 
 
 
Common Ground 
Newbigin has challenged the church to see the world through the Bible rather than the 
other way around.116  He wants the church to explain modern life in biblical terms rather than 
seeking to explain the Bible in terms drawn from the larger culture.117  Evangelicals 
generally agree with Newbigin.  Evangelicals are willing to accept supernatural 
interpretations of reality set forth in Scripture as valid over against Enlightenment based 
naturalism.  Enlightenment naturalism came into biblical studies in the previous century, 
leading to the fundamentalist-modernist conflict.  Evangelicalism has maintained its 
insistence on the supernatural as a reality in the world and never has identified with the 
modernists to any great extent. 
At the same time, Evangelicals should heed Newbigin’s exhortation, because at times 
they have not been consistent with their worldview commitments.  For example, 
Evangelicals are often quick to attempt to justify the gospel on Enlightenment terms 
(evidentialism), or they fail to see the extent to which they have been captured by the larger 
culture.118  For Newbigin, biblical revelation is “an interpretive key to all of experience and 
                                                 
116Newbigin, Word in Season, 83; idem, Foolishness, 22. 
117Here, Newbigin moves toward a presuppostionalist apologetic, but in practice he 
never leaves evidentialism, and rarely goes beyond what can be justified on the basis of 
objective empiricism embodied in the historical record. 
118David Wells has lamented the fact that for too many Evangelicals, a biblical 
worldview does not affect the way they live their daily lives (Wells, 95-136).  Millard 
Erickson has pointed out the extent to which Evangelicals exhibit “willingness and even 
eagerness to accommodate to certain features of contemporary society” (Erickson, Mind and 
Heart, 200).  Evangelicals have at times, Erickson says, accepted current social trends, for 
example, the self absorption of modern life which finds expression in the churches in the way 
small groups and even worship is conducted.  The focus is too much on temporal rather than 
eternal values, more on self esteem than on holiness, more on getting ahead in this world 
than on relating to God (Ibid., 201-3).  This may be only part of the picture of modern 
Evangelicalism, but Newbigin’s challenge certainly needs to be heard. 
 
 
 
to the meaning and purpose of history.”119  Evangelicalism holds to this as an ideal and needs 
to be challenged to follow through on it in every area of life.  In this matter, Newbigin’s 
insists that the church must “indwell” the text.120 
Newbigin’s defense of the historicity of the Gospels is to be welcomed.  While one 
wishes that he were more forceful in defending the details of the historical accounts, what he 
provides is certainly commendable considering that he had the ear of the wider church, not 
just Evangelicals.121  Evangelicals agree with Newbigin that to divorce history of the text 
from its meaning and then to dismiss the history is to destroy an essential part of the biblical 
testimony.  Newbigin is rightly critical of Rudolf Bultmann at this point for dismissing the 
historicity of the accounts as of no importance.122  Newbigin seeks to avoid any kind of faith 
that is rooted only in subjective existential experience such as Bultmann advocated or in 
philosophy and not in historical events.  As far as this goes, Evangelicals agree, knowing that 
an atonement that never happened is not one that can be trusted in for eternity. 
Divergence 
                                                 
119Williams, 16. 
120Newbigin, Truth and Authority in Modernity, 42. 
121Others certainly have provided more detailed defenses of the historicity of 
Scripture, especially of the New Testament.  See for example, Bruce, New Testament 
Documents; Josh McDowell, Evidence that Demands a Verdict, and idem, More Evidence 
that Demands a Verdict, and Frank Morison, Who Moved the Stone?, 2d ed. (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1962). 
122Newbigin, Foolishness, 48-50.  Newbigin’s critique is on target as far as upholding 
the historicity of the New Testament over against Bultmann’s demythologizing.  Newbigin 
signals where he is going, however, when he sees Bultmann as holding on to the subjective 
side, the experiential side evoked by believing in the doctrines.  Newbigin does not put the 
objective truth of the history along side the objective truth of the doctrines, leaving doctrine 
here implicitly on the subjective side of things. 
 
 
 
For all of the effort Newbigin has spent defending the historicity of the biblical 
accounts, he has been unwilling “to endorse the way evangelicals handle the Bible.”123  He 
cannot accept the idea that the text is to be taken as truth given by God since to him this is 
synonymous with the idea that it is dry and wooden.  He believes liberal Christianity 
overemphasizes the subjective side of Scripture as a record of religious experience, and that 
Evangelicalism overemphasizes the objective side of Scripture.124  Evangelical approaches to 
Scripture, he believes, see it as no more than “a collection of factually true statements.”125  
Newbigin’s concern is to unite the fact/values sides of modern culture which he sees 
expressed in evangelical objectivism and liberal subjectivism regarding Scripture.  He 
ignores, however, the pietist strain in Evangelicalism126 which emphasizes devotional 
reading of the Bible, and the cultivation of a dynamic relationship with God.  The view of 
Scripture he associates with conservative Evangelicalism is really more characteristic of 
extreme fundamentalism, which is not the same thing at all.127 
A closer look at Newbigin’s doctrine of Scripture will show some serious flaws.  For 
example, his epistemic step backwards does not allow him to develop a doctrine of 
inspiration, only a doctrine of biblical authority.  Inspiration is a doctrinal matter and cannot 
be demonstrated empirically.  Biblical authority, on the other hand, may be demonstrated by 
showing that the Bible is truthful.  To the extent that one shows the Bible to be true, one 
                                                 
123Glasser, 102. 
124Newbigin, Truth and Authority in Modernity, 34-39. 
125Ibid., 34. 
126McGrath, 25-26. 
127McGrath points out the fact that there is a “necessary distinction between 
evangelicalism and fundamentalism;” one which many have failed to see (Ibid., 42).  
McGrath gives as an example of a misunderstanding of Evangelicalism James Barr’s “deeply 
flawed work” (Ibid., 43), Fundamentalism (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1978). 
 
 
 
shows it to be authoritative.  Inspiration, of course, implies truthfulness, but a document can 
be true without being inspired.  Newbigin’s epistemic step backwards allows him to admit 
only the historical testimony as true, since it relates to objective reality in the “real” world.  
Thus he defends the historical facts only.  He cannot defend the truthfulness of all of 
Scripture. 
This is an example of how Newbigin never really leaves the modernist paradigm for 
truth. While he calls for the church to “indwell” the text, and to see the world through the 
text of Scripture, he never really does this himself.  This shows up in the way he treats 
Scripture’s development.  He freely admits that he finds contradictions in Scripture, and that 
the Old Testament especially is “the result of combining material which in their original form 
represented quite different and even contradictory beliefs.”128  Newbigin has in mind here the 
kinds of conclusions that arose from the destructive higher criticism of the Bible that came 
out of Germany in the nineteenth century.  Such criticism was a result of the Enlightenment 
paradigm that Newbigin critiques.  It sought to examine Scripture “from the outside” and to 
assume that its development was the result of natural processes, not divine revelation.  These 
are the very kinds of ideas that Newbigin believes that the church should abandon.  
Evangelicals have generally opposed these views of the Bible, because they question the 
historical veracity of the text and because they arose from anti-supernatural presuppositions 
foreign to the nature of Christian faith and of the text itself.129  
The problem here is that he begins with epistemology.  He can admit nothing as true 
that does not fit his epistemological paradigm which insists on truth being what may be 
                                                 
128Newbigin, The Other Side of 1984, 44.  Elsewhere, he accepts the higher critical 
idea of a “Second Isaiah” who authored the later chapters of Isaiah some time after the 
original chapters were written (Beeby and Newbigin, 185). 
129J. Barton Payne, “Higher Criticism and Biblical Inerrancy,” in Inerrancy, ed. 
Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1980), 85-115; John D. Woodbridge, Mark A. 
Noll, and Nathan O. Hatch, The Gospel in America: Themes in the Story of America’s 
Evangelicals (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1979), 99-134. 
 
 
 
shown to correspond to the “objective” world of reality.  As science’s truth claims are 
controlled by what actually happens in the laboratory, so historical truth claims are 
controlled by what actually happened in the past, and on the quality of the testimony given 
by those who, like scientists, are eyewitnesses, giving empirical verification to their report. 
The inspiration of the Bible is consistent with the doctrine of its inerrancy which 
many Evangelicals also believe.  Newbigin, beginning from his epistemic step backwards, 
cannot affirm a doctrine of biblical inerrancy.130  Such a doctrine goes beyond historical 
verifiability.  One can falsify the doctrine by demonstrating conclusively that something 
recorded in Scripture never happened (this has never been done successfully), but one cannot 
prove “inerrancy” by proving historical reliability.  There is much more to the Bible than 
history. 
Inerrancy, while not held by all who identify themselves as Evangelical, is certainly a 
major part of evangelical thought.  Donald Bloesch has said that “the infallibility and 
inerrancy of Scripture” is a distinctive view of evangelical theologians.131  The Evangelical 
Theological Society makes this one of its doctrinal requirements for membership.132  James 
Emery White says that inerrancy, as an “understanding [of] the relationship between 
                                                 
130In fact Newbigin calls “The doctrine of verbal inerrancy . . . a direct denial of the 
way God has chosen to make himself known to us as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” 
(Newbigin, Proper Confidence, 89).  Newbigin bases this on the idea that Jesus did not teach 
in eternal truths (by which Newbigin probably means something like metaphysics or 
philosophy) and the fact that Jesus did not write a book himself, but founded a community.  
Newbigin assumes then that doctrinal truths are not eternal and cannot be made normative.  
The community Jesus founded is to be ever changing in its understanding of truth, adhering 
only to the story told in the historical record as absolute and final. 
131Donald G. Bloesch, Essentials of Evangelical Theology, vol. 1, God, Authority, 
and Scripture (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), 64. 
132The doctrinal statement is printed on the inside cover of every issue of the Journal 
of the Evangelical Theological Society: “The Bible alone, and the Bible in its entirety, is the 
Word of God written and is therefore inerrant in the autographs.” 
 
 
 
inspiration and Scripture . . . gives Evangelical theology much of its distinctiveness.”133  
Even those who have sought to modify the doctrine in the form of “limited inerrancy” or 
“infallibility” would generally agree that inerrancy is a major and legitimate aspect of 
evangelical thought. 
Inerrancy may be arrived at presuppositionally, as a properly basic belief.  It cannot 
be proven, on grounds outside of Scripture itself.  It can only be shown to be plausible or 
coherent due to the historical accuracy of the record.  Inerrancy can be defended on the 
character and nature of God, on the grounds that God’s integrity will not permit him to lead 
one into falsehood and his sovereignty is such that he is in control of his own self revelation. 
 In this way, inerrancy is seen as entailed by the properly basic belief that God has revealed 
himself in the Bible.  Either way, inerrancy is arrived at presuppositionally as a properly 
basic belief. 
The source of the text under Newbigin’s system is human perception and 
interpretation, not Divine inspiration.134  Interpretation is a human, not a divine activity.  In 
the end, Newbigin’s approach, while attempting to make the biblical testimony normative, 
places him in the same position as Carl F. H. Henry’s “modernist” who retains only from 
Scripture that which is compatible with “scientific empiricism;”135 only for Newbigin this is 
expanded to include historical empiricism.  While the production of Scripture was, for 
Newbigin, only a human activity, he does recognize that the Holy Spirit was promised by 
Jesus to “lead the disciples into all the truth.”  This, however, is in the context of ever 
changing interpretations and understandings of what the text means.136  The story alone 
remains fixed, the meaning left to be tossed about in the cultural waters. 
                                                 
133White, 35. 
134Ibid., 50; idem, Foolishness, 56. 
135Henry, God, vol. V, 399. 
136Newbigin, Truth and Authority in Modernity, 45, 49.  Idem, Proper Confidence, 
 
 
 
Evangelicals insist on both the authority and the inspiration of Scripture.  These are 
not the same thing.  Inspiration implies authority, but a text may be authoritative without 
being inspired.  The Oxford Shorter Dictionary is authoritative, but no one claims inspiration 
for it.  Many people use the terms as if they are synonymous, but inspiration implies much 
more than authority.  Divine activity is the source of inspiration.  To call Scripture inspired is 
to imply that God is responsible for it.137  Evangelicals believe that God directly inspired the 
text, and this “was a supernatural and thus miraculous process.”138  The authority of Scripture 
lies in the fact of its inspiration.139  Since the source of Scripture is God’s desire to reveal 
himself, and God is sovereign over his creation, his revelation must be authoritative.  It is the 
authority of one who is “in charge” who has the right to establish the conditions and 
parameters within which those in subordinate positions must operate.  As nothing in creation 
in superior to the Creator, what the Creator has revealed must be authoritative for the 
creatures. 
As inspired, the Scriptures must be true.  Christian Smith’s surveys indicate that 
“Evangelicals stand alone in completely rejecting the idea that the Bible is not inspired and 
are by far the least likely to believe that the Bible may contain errors.”140  Evangelicals 
                                                                                                                                                       
90.  Here Newbigin explicitly states that “This gift of the Spirit, however, did not make the 
disciples infallible any more than the same gift given to the prophetic writers of the Old 
Testament made them infallible” (Ibid.). Again, this points to Newbigin’s doctrine of 
Scripture being more a doctrine of biblical authority apart from any doctrine of inspiration. 
137Bruce Milne speaks of the Bible as “God’s word to his creatures” (Bruce Milne, 
Know the Truth: A Handbook of Christian Belief, rev. ed. [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 
1998], 36). 
138Phillips and Okholm, 49. 
139Tidball, 81.  Alister McGrath put it this way: “For evangelicals, the unique 
authority of Scripture rests on the activity of the revealing God” (McGrath, 59). 
140Smith et al., 22.  It is interesting that a larger percentage of self identified 
fundamentalists (7 percent) believe that the Bible is “true but with errors” as opposed to only 
 
 
 
readily admit that Scripture uses the language and thought forms of the day in which it was 
written, “but they deny that divine revelation is essentially conditioned by transitory cultural 
conceptions and patterns.”141  Instead, Scripture is seen as necessarily true because of the 
character of God who has revealed it. 
Evangelicals are sometimes “misrepresented as believing in the dictation theory of 
inspiration.”  Derek Tidball points out that this theory is “certainly not current among today’s 
evangelicals.”142  Efforts to describe and explain the process of inspiration have been 
made,143 the most well known being that of Hodge and Warfield at Princeton in the 
nineteenth century.144 “The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy,” produced by a 
committee of leading evangelical thinkers, was an attempt to lay out clearly the implications 
of what it means and does not mean to say that Scripture is inspired and inerrant.145 
                                                                                                                                                       
3 percent of self identified Evangelicals (Ibid.). 
141Henry, God, vol V, 400. 
142Tidball, 80. 
143An excellent discussion of the inspiration of Scripture and what it does and does 
not imply may be found in Henry, God, vol. IV, 129-61.  Other recent attempts to describe 
and define an evangelical doctrine of inspiration include Geoffrey Bromiley, “The 
Inspiration and Authority of Scripture,” Eternity 21, no. 8 (August 1970): 12-20; John W. 
Montgomery, God’s Inerrant Word (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany Fellowship, 1974); Roger 
Nicole, “The Nature of Inerrancy” in Inerrancy and Common Sense, ed. Roger Nicole and J. 
Ramsey Michaels (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980), 71-95; Edward J. Young, Thy Word is Truth 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957); Norman L. Geisler, ed., Inerrancy (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 1980); and Erickson, Theology, 233-38. 
144See A. A. Hodge and B. B. Warfield, “Inspiration,” Presbyterian Review 6 (April 
1881): 225-60; B. B. Warfield, The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible (Philadelphia: 
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1948); and Warfield’s article in The International Standard 
Bible Encyclopedia, vol. 4, s.v. “Revelation.” 
145International Council on Biblical Inerrancy, “The Chicago Statement on Biblical 
Inerrancy,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 21, no. 4 (December 1978): 289-
96. 
 
 
 
Like Newbigin, Evangelicals believe that the historicity of the account is important.  
Though they base the authority of Scripture on its divine inspiration, Evangelicals regard the 
historicity of the account as evidence for its truthfulness.146  If Scripture could be shown to 
contain historical errors, it would undermine its claim to divine origin.  Evangelicals have 
been adamant therefore in defending the historicity of the text.  Christianity “has its roots in 
history,”147 and cannot stand as merely a system of doctrine apart from the events which 
derive their significance from the doctrines.148  So while the historicity of the Scriptures 
cannot establish its inspiration and divine origin, its inspiration and divine origin entails that 
it be historically accurate. 
Newbigin’s epistemic step backwards makes it necessary that he focus on the 
narrative aspects of Scripture.  He often reminds his readers that God’s revelation is 
“nonpropositional” in nature, and that the story told in Scripture is the important factor.149  
The doctrinal matter in Scripture not being verifiable objectively takes a secondary place in 
Newbigin’s thinking to the story, the testimony given to the events. 
The doctrinal element involves interpretation of the events.  Evangelicals do not 
argue with this, but see the interpretation contained in Scripture as inspired.  Newbigin 
                                                 
146Truth in Scripture, say Johnson and Webber, is bound up with “actual historical 
events” (Johnson and Webber, 53). 
147Bruce, New Testament Documents, 8. 
148As F. F. Bruce has pointed out, “whether our approach is theological or historical 
[that is presuppositionalist or evidentialist], it does matter whether the New Testament 
documents are reliable or not.” (Bruce, New Testament Documents, 9).  Bruce asserts this on 
the grounds that they are the only witness the church has to Christ--if the documents are not 
historically reliable, the faith collapses. 
149Newbigin, Truth and Authority in Modernity, 38, 40-43; idem, Foolishness, 59.  In 
The Other Side of 1984 (47-54), Newbigin emphasises the historical center of the narrative 
and describes the essence of Scripture as “testimony”; in Proper Confidence (4-8), Newbigin 
contends that the story of God acting in the world is at the center of biblical faith. 
 
 
 
accepts the interpreted nature of the narrative, but does not see the interpretation as final.  
The biblical material begins as someone’s interpretation of the events, and before it reaches 
its final form it is “reinterpreted over and over again in terms of another generation and 
another culture.”150  He sees the teachings given in the Gospels as having “come to us in 
varied versions filtered through the varied rememberings and interpretations of different 
groups of believers.”151  Newbigin recognizes that the interpretation given in Scripture is 
primary, having come from eyewitnesses and those near them, he still sees the interpretive 
process as secondary to the narrative given through it.  The narrative is primary, since it can 
be verified if one accepts Newbigin’s epistemic step backwards. 
Evangelicals cannot follow Newbigin this way.  No one denies that Scripture contains 
an interpretation of the events it records and that is itself subject to varying interpretations.  
A minimal doctrine of inspiration should require, however, that the interpretation given in 
Scripture should have more than just a primary place in the interpretive process--it should be 
the determinative.  Newbigin makes the interpretive process involved in the production of 
Scripture continuous with the on-going interpretive process carried on in the church.  Neither 
is final supernatural in nature, leaving only the story as normative.152 
                                                 
150Newbigin, Other Side, 49.  Newbigin sees this as on-going in the life of the church 
but also as a process which took place in the process of producing the Scriptures (Ibid.).  In 
Truth and Authority in Modernity, Newbigin says that the Bible is “a selection of a minute 
fraction of the available records and memories, on the basis of a particular belief about the 
meaning of the story” (Newbigin, Truth and Authority in Modernity, 38).  Here the focus is 
on human activity, not divine inspiration.  While Evangelicals do not deny that there was a 
human element in the production of Scripture, it is inaccurate to see it as solely a human 
enterprise. 
151Newbigin, Open Secret, 57. 
152Scripture is part of the process for Newbigin when it needs to be the objective 
measuring stick for theological study.  Spanner has pointed out that here Newbigin’s effort to 
bring science and theology under the same epistemic umbrella fails, for science looks to an 
objective outside reality that is not itself part of the scientific process. (Spanner, Review of 
Truth to Tell, 363).  Spanner’s analogy fails because Newbigin makes historical fact the 
 
 
 
This does not work, because the story alone is insufficient.  The interpretation, the 
doctrinal significance of the story is essential if the story is to be understood and is to 
communicate truth.  The Bible contains a story, one which is of eternal significance, and no 
one denies that.  This story “properly used . . . can serve as a metanarrative that shapes our 
grasp of the entire Christian faith.”153  When only the story is authoritative, however, “a 
tremendous amount of material will be left out.”154  It is the doctrines which give the story 
significance.155  Newbigin’s view excludes doctrinal, propositional truth from being 
authoritative.  It is replaced by culturally conditioned speculation as to the significance of the 
text.156  The story is absolute, the interpretations and significance of the story changes.  Such 
an approach “undermines evangelical confidence in the comprehensive unity and universal 
validity of Bible doctrine.”157 
                                                                                                                                                       
object of study, but Spanner is correct in insisting that all of Scripture needs to be normative 
for discovering theological truth much the same as all of the created universe is the locus for 
scientific investigation. 
153D. A. Carson, The Gagging of God: Christianity Confronts Pluralism (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 194. 
154Ibid. 
155Newbigin refutes his own case on this point when he discusses the proclamation of 
the word in the Gospels.  Jesus’ teaching, he says, explains the importance of his works.  
When he sends out the apostles to cast out unclean spirits and to heal, he tells them to preach 
as they go.  “[T]he preaching is the explanation of the healings . . . the healings--marvelous 
as they are--do not explain themselves.  The works by themselves did not communicate the 
new fact. That has to be stated in plain words: ‘The Kingdom of God has drawn near.’” 
(Newbigin,  Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 132).  By extension, the story told in the Bible has 
no meaning apart from the underlying doctrinal teaching. 
156Newbigin, Foolishness, 55-56; idem, Other Side, 49-50. 
157Henry, God, vol. V, 402. 
 
 
 
Evangelicals insist that the doctrinal and propositional portions of Scripture are as 
important as the narrative portions.158  As important as the narrative is, large portions of the 
text of the Bible are not narrative at all.  The Law given in Exodus 20 to the end of Leviticus, 
and again in Deuteronomy, much of the Psalms, Proverbs, the Prophets and the Epistles as 
well as the discourse material in the Gospels are not narrative but communicate propositional 
truth.  It does damage to the Bible as it really is to insist that the essence of the biblical 
revelation is narrative.  It is a mistake to minimize the propositional nature of revelation 
when so much of the Bible is propositional in nature. 
The end result of Newbigin’s insistence that revelation is narrative and not 
propositional is to leave doctrine on the values side of his fact/values distinction.  Since the 
church must be about the business of re-interpreting the story again and again, a process that 
began before the text reached its final form, no doctrine can be final.  Christians are left to 
insist on the story, the historically verifiable portion of Scripture, while the spiritual 
significance of it is left to speculation.  He does not overcome the problem.  His view of 
Scripture does not unite the “fact” and “values” sides of perception but rather becomes an 
occasion of the distinction itself. 
Newbigin focuses on how the Bible functions, an important question, but his method 
does not allow him to develop an adequate understanding of its essence.  He insists that the 
Bible should function as the clue to history, and the starting place for thought,159 and he is 
right.  It cannot do this unless its essence is understood.  The Bible functions in these ways 
because in essence it is the Word given by God, designed to reveal both propositional and 
                                                 
158Francis Schaeffer made the necessity of the propositional nature of revelation a 
cornerstone of his thought (Schaeffer, God, 134). 
159Newbigin uses the phrase “the Bible functions” or its equivalent many times 
(Newbigin, Foolishness, 58-59; idem, Other Side, 49; idem, Truth and Authority in 
Modernity, 37, 42, 43; and idem, Word in Season, 84, 85, 86). 
 
 
 
historical truths to his creatures, who cannot understand the world they live in or their 
spiritual need adequately apart from it. 
Newbigin rejects the view that Scripture records a special salvation history, that 
revelation lies in the acts of God which are interpreted by the writers.  He denies this on the 
grounds that such a view replaces a normal understanding of history with an understanding 
of divine acts that may be too specific to have universal application.160  His problem really is 
with a particular understanding of the significance of God’s actions in history, 
Heilsgeschichte, in which the events are “sometimes portrayed as something quite distinct 
form the ordinary history depicted by secular historians.”161  Newbigin’s case depends on the 
history contained in Scripture being “secular” in nature, that is, corresponding with objective 
facts. 
Nevertheless, Newbigin’s approach to Scripture may be understood as one where 
revelation consists in how God has acted in history.  The Bible offers no more than a witness 
to revelation wherein God’s deeds have been recorded by those who were impressed by 
them. The events are recorded as “different human perceptions of things that really 
happened.”162   The deed is the primary revelation, and the interpretation recorded in 
Scripture is secondary to it.  This becomes clear in his use of “testimony” to describe the 
nature of Scripture and in his emphasis on the interpretive nature of the biblical witness.  
Such a view is unacceptable to most Evangelicals who see Scripture as the actual words of 
God.163 
                                                 
160Newbigin, Foolishness, 48. 
161Ibid. 
162Newbigin, Truth and Authority in Modernity, 41. 
163“The Chicago Statement” ends with the affirmation “that what Scripture says, God 
says” (“Chicago Statement,” 296).  Evangelicals often point out that for Jesus, the “words of 
Scripture,” (for him, the Old Testament), are “the words of God” (Johnson and Webber, 23). 
 See also Ronald Nash, Evangelicals in America: Who They Are, What They Believe 
 
 
 
Evangelicals and Newbigin’s Understanding 
of the Uniqueness of Christ 
Newbigin has contended for the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as God’s ultimate 
revelation of himself and the one in whom all things will be consummated.164   He has been 
criticized for this by colleagues in mainline denominations with which he most often worked 
through the auspices of the World Council of Churches.165  His insistence on the ultimacy 
and  universal relevance of Christ makes his defense attractive to evangelical Christians.  
There are, however, weaknesses in his approach.  His epistemic step backward allows him to 
affirm for the most part only those doctrines which arise out of the historical facts related to 
Christ.166  He also affirms those doctrines which arise logically out the incarnation.  The 
doctrinal realities of Christ’s work in salvation, however, are left to the subjective, values 
side of his fact/values distinction.  There his theology moves him away from a historic and 
evangelical understanding of the gospel. 
Common Ground 
Newbigin’s doctrine of the person of Christ is wholly orthodox and easily embraced 
by those in the evangelical tradition.  Like Newbigin, Evangelicals embrace the doctrine of 
the incarnation, that God became a man in Jesus Christ.167  Newbigin affirms this inductively 
                                                                                                                                                       
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1987), 26. 
164Newbigin, “What Is a ‘Local Church Truly United’?,” 17-18. 
165For example Maurice Wiles criticized the “extreme and exclusive insistence on 
Jesus as the source of any true knowledge of God.”  This he believes is “a narrowing and 
distorting perspective . . .” (Maurice Wiles, “Comment on Lesslie Newbigin’s Essay,” in 
Incarnation and Myth: The Debate Continued, ed. Michael Goulder [Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1979], 211). 
166Newbigin, Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 127. 
167Alister McGrath put it this way: It is impossible to “remain faithful to the New 
Testament witness to Jesus Christ” without believing in the incarnation, that Christ is “no 
 
 
 
on the basis of the historical record which records the miracles and the resurrection of 
Christ.168  Since Christ did these miracles, and since he rose from the dead, logically, he must 
be God, and thus his pre-existence and present glory present glory may be affirmed. 
                                                                                                                                                       
ordinary historical figure,” but “God himself” (McGrath, 65). 
168Newbigin believes that Jesus’ miracles were “signs of the presence of the kingdom 
of God in power” (Newbigin, Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 108).  On the resurrection, he 
says, “The resurrection was as much a fact of history as the crucifixion” (Ibid.). 
 
 
 
Divergence 
The central concern of Evangelicalism is expressed in its view of salvation.169  
Evangelicals hold their high view of Scripture and of the person of Christ as the incarnate 
virgin-born Lord of creation because these doctrines undergird the faith that Christ alone 
offers the only hope to a lost humanity.170  Faith in these truths is, in a sense, faith in the God 
who has revealed himself and offered salvation in Christ.  Much of evangelical opposition to 
false doctrine, to questions about the veracity of Scripture, arises from an awareness that 
such things weaken evangelism due to the loss of an effective and vital soteriology.  For 
Evangelicals a proper understanding of salvation is essential if one is to proclaim a gospel 
that is worth defending. 
Newbigin’s epistemic step backwards does not allow him to affirm certain doctrines 
related to the work of Christ that Evangelicals consider essential.  Since most of these 
doctrines cannot be historically verified, Newbigin see them as subjective, matters of opinion 
which the church can discuss in light of Scripture, but which will only be known at the end 
when Christ returns. 
Evangelical concerns regarding Newbigin’s understanding of the work of Christ fall 
under three basic headings.  First, Newbigin’s epistemic step backwards does not allow for 
an adequate understanding of the nature of salvation.  Salvation, as Evangelicals understand 
it, involves regeneration, a quickening of the human spirit or soul which is otherwise dead.171 
Regeneration is to be “born again,” which Evangelicals see as the receiving of new life 
through union with the Spirit of God.172  Newbigin focuses on conversion as a change of 
                                                 
169Erickson, Mind and Heart, 86. 
170An exclusivist approach to the gospel “brings with it certain view of who Jesus is, 
what the Bible is, and how salvation is achieved” (Carson, 27). 
171Eph. 2:1-6. 
172Schrotenboer has pointed out that the importance of redemption, of being born 
 
 
 
mind or direction.173  He overlooks the supernatural aspect of salvation.  This is consistent 
with his desire to defend a gospel that is objectively verifiable, but biblical teaching goes 
beyond this. 
Evangelicals insist that something supernatural happens at conversion, “the creation 
of a new heart within man which entails new goals, new aspiration, new power for 
service.”174  This new birth is a key doctrine in evangelical thought.175  When one becomes a 
Christian, it “brings into being an entirely new creature.”176  Biblical teaching confirms this 
in such passages as John 3:3, where Jesus tells Nicodemus he must be “born again.”  Jesus 
explains that this is a spiritual birth, not a physical birth, implying that it is a supernatural 
event.  Evangelicals often point to II Cor. 5:17 also as biblical justification for seeing the new 
birth as supernatural: “Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation . . . .”177  This is 
implied also in Eph. 2:1, 5 where those who were “dead in . . . transgressions and sins” are 
made alive in Christ. 
                                                                                                                                                       
again seems to be missing in Newbigin’s thought (Paul G. Schrotenboer, “Response to the 
Article by Lesslie Newbigin,” International Bulletin of Missionary Research 6, no. 4 
[October 1982]: 152). 
173George Hunsberger says that “conversion has mental, ethical, and communal 
dimensions for Newbigin” (George Hunsberger, “Developing a Domestic Missiology for 
North America,”Missiology: An International Review XIX, no. 4 [October 1991]: 397).  The 
spiritual dimension is missing.  Newbigin’s doctrine focuses on the visible, verifiable 
aspects.  In contrast, Donald Bloesch points out that “regeneration does not consist in the 
alteration of the old nature, but in the impartation of a new nature” (Donald Bloesch, 
Essentials of Evangelical Theology, vol. 2, Life, Ministry, and Hope: Essentials for 
Evangelical Theology.  [San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978], 8). 
174Bloesch, Essentials, vol. 2, 6. 
175Tidball, 116. 
176Ibid., 119.  
177Unless otherwise indicated, all Scripture quotations are from the New International 
Version. 
 
 
 
In a related matter, Newbigin’s understanding of moral repentance is weaker than it 
could be.  Newbigin focuses instead on intellectual repentance, changing the mind to see 
things from a biblical perspective.178  This, he believes, leads to good works and the 
transformation of society.  Newbigin describes salvation as “a real consummation of 
universal history . . . .”179  Much of his focus is on how a biblical understanding of life and 
reality will transform the culture. 
Evangelicals do not in any way deny that the Bible has significance for the social 
order.  Evangelicals expect the gospel to effect changes in the culture as it spreads and gains 
influence.  Their understanding of Scripture implies that the moral truths presented there are 
universal.  This often translates into actions to improve society.180  Neither do Evangelicals 
minimize the importance of cognitive change in one who has come to Christ.  That the 
concepts of conversion and of faith imply that one changes what one has believed and 
believes something different is implicit in the concepts themselves. 
At the same time, Evangelicals believe that societal transformation and intellectual 
change are not the whole story.  The moral relationship of human beings to God is central to 
evangelical understandings of salvation.181  Salvation is necessary because of the moral 
failure of humanity; it is salvation from sin.  Francis Schaeffer has pointed out that man’s 
                                                 
178In Foolishness to the Greeks Newbigin points to “ a conversion of the will and of 
the feelings,” and of the mind (Newbigin, Foolishness, 64). 
179Newbigin, “Basis, Purpose and Manner of Inter-Faith Dialogue,” 262. 
180Christian Smith’s surveys indicate that 91 percent of self identified Evangelicals 
have “given money to help the poor and needy;” 51 percent have “given money or time to a 
Christian political organization or candidate;” 26 percent had given money to a non-Christian 
political organization or candidate; 79 percent had “volunteered for a church program that 
serves the local community;” 58 percent had “volunteered for a local community 
organization not related to church” (Smith et al., 40-42). 
181McGrath, 67; Erickson, Christian Theology, 562. 
 
 
 
problem is not philosophical or ontological--it is moral.  He insists that one major difference 
between biblical and non-biblical understandings of humanity is that the biblical view sees 
humanity as in an abnormal state, due to the fall, while non-biblical views see humanity as 
normal in its present condition.182  Logically, recognition of one’s moral corruption precedes 
the reception of the moral cure found in God’s gracious regeneration of the sinner. 
The Bible also focuses on the reality of sin and the need for repentance.   The Bible 
rarely focuses on purely speculative philosophical matters but on humanity’s moral failure 
and need for a right relationship with God.  In Psalm 14, when “the Lord looks down from 
heaven” to see if there is anyone who seeks God, he finds moral, not philosophical problems, 
keeping people from God: “There is no one who does good, not even one.”183  Much of the 
prophets’ writings are given to denouncing sin and calling the people to repentance.184 
A second area of concern relates to the atonement.  Evangelism is essentially the 
proclamation of the good news of the atonement.  Newbigin’s understanding of the 
atonement, however, falls short of a biblical perspective.  His need for an objective reference 
                                                 
182Schaeffer, God, 100.  Schaeffer reasons that if what mankind is today is a result of 
evolutionary and historical forces that have been continuous, then humanity is “normal” as it 
is.  If, instead, there was a moral fall, at a time in the past, then humanity began as something 
different and is in a dilemma that must be rectified.  It is not “growth” that humanity needs, 
or a different philosophical or cultural paradigm, but a change of heart and nature (Ibid.). 
183Ps. 14:2, 5b. 
184Selected passages include Isa. 1:16-31; Jer. 8:4-9:25; Hos. 6:1-7:16; Amos 5:1-17. 
In fact, a continuous theme in the Old Testament prophets is sin and repentance.  The sins 
condemned are mostly moral sins along with the sin of idolatry, which might be seen as the 
“intellectual” sin of having the wrong worldview.  In light of the amount of space given to 
moral righteousness in the prophets one would only with difficulty use the prophets to defend 
the idea that the thrust of Scripture is cognitive rather than moral reform.  Newbigin, of 
course, would agree very much with this.  He actually opposes any form of Christianity that 
expresses itself only in terms of “a mere cognitive exercise” (Newbigin, Truth and Authority 
in Modernity, 39).  At the same time, his soteriological emphasis is on transformation of the 
way people think, leading to moral transformation, rather than moral transformation itself. 
 
 
 
point leads him away from a “spiritual” understanding of the atonement.  Newbigin instead 
focuses on the atonement as an overcoming of the evil structures of society.  This is 
consistent with his focus on cultural change as the purpose of the gospel; but it is not the 
biblical focus.  While Evangelicals can affirm with Newbigin that “the gospel offers . . . not 
just hope for individuals, but hope for the world,”185 they believe this hope is realized as 
people come to faith in Christ who accomplished their salvation on the cross. 
Newbigin believes that when Christ died on the cross, somehow this “overcame the 
dark power” at work in society.186  Newbigin understands this to mean primarily the powers 
of government, culture, and economics that seek to dominate life independent of God.187 
Newbigin’s approach here offers another example of the inconsistency between his stated 
desire to see reality from within the perspective of Scripture and his actual practice.188  His 
emphasis regarding the powers is based on a naturalistic paradigm that excludes the activity 
of demonic forces as an explanation of reality.189  Newbigin elsewhere has no trouble 
                                                 
185Newbigin, “Evangelism in the City,” 5. 
186Lesslie Newbigin, “Christian Faith and the World Religions,” in Keeping the 
Faith: Essays to Mark the Centenary of the Lux Mundi, ed. Geoffrey Wainwright 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988), 332. 
187Whether Newbigin believes that a supernatural power is at work here is a little 
ambiguous.  He states that “the ministry of Jesus from beginning to end was a might spiritual 
battle with powers which are not simply human frailties, errors, diseases or sins” (Newbigin, 
Gospel in a Pluralist Society, 210).  The thrust of Newbigin’s treatment, however, focuses on 
the powers as the structures of social life, and the supernatural does not really figure into his 
understanding of this in any significant way.  It is his treatment of the biblical term powers, 
and the source of it, that is being critiqued here. 
188Newbigin’s dependence on Berkhof and Wink for his understanding of “the 
powers” has been discussed above. 
189This is in line with one of his sources, Walter Wink, who believes that it is 
impossible in this modern day to see the powers as supernatural beings (Wink, Naming the 
Powers, 4).  His tone turns negative when he describes it as “unfortunate” that the Powers 
 
 
 
accepting the supernatural at face value, where it relates to what Jesus did historically, such 
as performing miracles.190  His view regarding the powers is consistent with his desire to 
have a gospel that is verifiable and objective and which relates to the realities of the visible 
world.  At the same time, it fails to bring the biblical perspective to bear on that world, 
collapsing instead into that world’s “plausibility structure” which readily accepts political 
and social evils, but not supernatural ones. 
Evangelicals, on the other hand, treat the powers as supernatural in nature.191  Carl F. 
H. Henry has pointed out that “the biblical writers . . . speak of superhuman powers as 
rebellious personal agents hostile to God’s good governance of the world . . . .”192  He 
asserts, however, that they are “under the rule of God.”193  The powers have always been 
under God’s rule.  Richard Melick, commenting on Paul’s use of the term “powers” in Col. 
1:16, says, “there is a general consensus among scholars that the terms used here [thrones, 
powers, rulers, authorities] refer to spiritual beings.”194  This may be slight overstatement, 
                                                                                                                                                       
have been seen as “angelic beings. . . or as demons flapping about in the sky” (Wink, 
Engaging the Powers, 3). The apostle Paul, however, never described the powers as 
“flapping about.”  Wink is setting up a straw man.  No one who understands the references to 
“the powers” in Paul’s writings to be supernatural imagines them “flapping about in the sky.” 
 By holding this view up to mild ridicule in this way, Wink makes it easier for his readers to 
accept his own naturalistic explanation. 
190Newbigin sees the miracles of Jesus as presented in a way that makes them 
“concrete.”  There is an “insistence on the factuality of the story” (Newbigin, Light had 
Come, 25).  He defends the raising of Lazarus as a historical event (Ibid., 139). 
191Berkhof himself admits that “powers” in Jewish apocalyptic thought were spiritual 
beings (Berkhof, Christ and the Powers, 7), but believes that Paul gave the term a different 
meaning, applying it to earthly structures (Ibid., 23). 
192Henry, God, vol. V, 73, 79. 
193Carl F. H. Henry, God Revelation and Authority, vol. VI, God Who Stands and 
Stays: Part Two (Waco, TX: Word, 1983), 21. 
194Richard Melick, Philippians, Colossians, Philemon, vol. 32 in The New American 
 
 
 
but such an understanding is probably the best one.  There is no warrant in Scripture to 
reinterpret Paul’s language to make these powers something other than supernatural.195  
Evangelicals agree that Christ disarmed these powers, and that this was part of his work of 
atonement.  Evangelicals seem at this point more willing to look at the world through the 
lenses of Scripture than Newbigin himself. 
The real problem for Newbigin’s approach to the atonement is that it minimizes what 
Christ accomplished for individuals at the cross.196  Whatever Christ may have accomplished 
on a societal or on a cosmic level, the fact remains that his atonement made it possible for  
individuals to put their faith in him and be added to the church.197  Individual salvation is not 
verifiable objectively.  This may be why Newbigin minimizes it.  Certainly his epistemic step 
backwards would lead him to look for those effects of the gospel which influence the course 
of history, a matter which can be verified and offered as evidence that God is at work. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Commentary (Nashville: Broadman, 1991), 219.  He sees these as most likely “fallen beings” 
(Ibid.). 
195Millard Erickson believes that Paul may have reinterpreted Jewish apocalyptic 
language in a way to make the powers somewhat less personal in nature than angelic beings. 
 At the same time he describes them as evil forces at work in the structures of society.  While 
he does not abandon a supernatural understanding, his position may be seen as somewhat of 
a mediating position between that of Henry and Melick and that of Newbigin (Erickson, 
Christian Theology, 648-52).  He still recognizes a supernatural source of these powers, more 
strongly it appears than Newbigin or Berkhof, though Erickson cites Berkhof’s work.  
Elsewhere Erickson specifically attests to the reality of supernatural evil powers at work in 
the world (Ibid., 445-51). 
196It has become popular to point out the corporate dimension of the Bible.  
Evangelicals, like others, have been guilty of reading the Bible through the perspective of 
Enlightenment individualism.  Seeing the corporate, communitarian aspect of Scripture is 
important, but one must not go from one extreme to the other.  The individual dimension of 
salvation is very real. 
197McGrath, 67. 
 
 
 
Evangelicals, while recognizing the social dimensions of the gospel, emphasize more 
fully the individual dimension.  Salvation must be accepted on faith based on the 
presupposition of the truth of what Scripture teaches.  The atonement was a “propitiation,” a 
“substitution” by which individual believers may be justified before God.198  What happened 
at the cross was “the unique and perfect sacrifice that covers and shields us from the 
righteous anger of God against sin, reconciles us to God” and makes it possible for individual 
believers to become God’s children.199  The call to salvation, to appropriate the benefits of 
the cross, is ultimately a call to individual decision. 
This view is in accord with the preponderance of scriptural teaching.  A survey of key 
passages in the epistle to the Romans will make this clear.  In Rom. 1:16, Paul calls the 
gospel the power of God for the salvation of everyone who believes; righteousness, in Rom. 
3:22, comes “to all who believe; in Rom. 5:6, “Christ died for the ungodly.”  In Rom. 8:1, 
there is “no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus.”  In each case, the focus is on 
the fact that Christ’s death on the cross opens a way for believing individuals to be right with 
God.200 
A third area of concern for Evangelicals relates to Newbigin’s understanding of the 
scope of salvation.  He is inconsistent in his understanding of assurance for the believer.  He 
must affirm with Scripture that believers are saved, but his desire to leave salvation strictly in 
the sovereignty of God leads him to emphasize at times that no one can be sure of their final 
destiny, and that those who think they are “in” will be surprised at the last judgment.201  
                                                 
198Tidball, 105. 
199McGrath, 66. 
200Of course, many other passages from the New Testament could be cited, showing 
that Christ came to save sinners, to give his life for “whosoever believes” and so forth.  
These passages from Romans give the general thrust of the New Testament teaching. 
201Newbigin, “Cross-currents,” 151. 
 
 
 
Assurance for the believer is a major evangelical doctrine.  Those who have put their faith in 
Christ “can rest secure in the assurance that their salvation is permanent.”202  Those in the 
Arminian tradition do recognize the possibility of apostasy, but Newbigin’s focus is on those 
who think they are saved and are not, rather than on those who have rejected the faith. 
Several Scripture passages are often cited in reference to the security of the believer. 
In John 10:27-30, Jesus promises that believers are given “eternal life.”  Jesus asserts here 
that “they shall never perish.”  In this passage, “Jesus is categorically excluding the slightest 
chance of an apostasy by his sheep.”203  The other passage often used is Phil. 1:6 which 
asserts that “he who began a good work in you will carry it on to completion until the day of 
Christ Jesus.” 
A more serious problem is that he opens up the scope of salvation to include some 
who are outside the church.  To limit salvation to only those in the church “places the church 
rather than God at the center of the universe.”204  Newbigin may be arguing against the 
assumption made in some church traditions that to be a member of the visible church is to be 
saved.  If that were so, then membership in the church really would be a more vital issue than 
relationship with God.  Scripture teaches, however, that one’s salvation is based on faith in 
Jesus Christ.  One becomes a member of the body of Christ, by virtue of the Spirit 
“baptizing” the believer into the body.  This is understood by many Evangelicals to happen at 
the moment one is regenerated on the basis of faith in Christ.  The center of concern is still 
Christ, the head of the body, and the church exists as God’s creation.  One does not join the 
church to be saved; one is saved, and thus is placed into the church.  Membership in a local 
congregation is but an outward sign of the inward spiritual reality. 
                                                 
202Erickson, Christian Theology, 996. 
203Ibid., 992. 
204Newbigin, “Integration,” 251. 
 
 
 
Newbigin desires also to avoid putting Christians in the position of “judging” who is 
and who is not saved.205  That judgment belongs to God and not to men.  As far as this goes, 
it shows a genuine desire on Newbigin’s part to cultivate an attitude of humility toward the 
outside world.  When a Christian approaches a non-believer with an attitude that seems to 
say, “I have it, and you don’t,” it will be perceived as arrogant.206  In addition, one really 
cannot ultimately verify empirically who is and who is not saved.  There really will be 
surprises at the judgment.  Nowhere, however, does the Bible indicate that people of genuine 
faith will be left out, nor is there any hope offered for those who do not trust in the Lord. The 
Bible gives every reason to assume that those who profess faith are saved, and that those who 
profess no faith in Christ are not.  As Schrotentboer has pointed out, “to affirm that people 
who don’t know Christ are lost . . . is simply a witness to the exclusive saving power of Jesus 
Christ.207 
Newbigin bases his view of the scope of salvation on the unity of all of humanity.  He 
believes that there is a continuous aspect to one’s religious beliefs prior to faith in Christ and 
afterwards, and that this indicates that faith is not decisive for one’s relationship with God.208 
 In addition, he cites the Noahic covenant as implying a universal desire to save all of 
                                                 
205Newbigin, “Cross-currents,” 151. 
206The real and proper attitude of many Christian evangelists is best summed up in the 
popular saying, “I’m just one beggar showing another beggar where to find bread.”  The 
arrogance of a few overly zealous believers is not a sound basis for saying, contrary to 
Scripture, that there is no criterion for distinguishing the saved.  The application of the 
criteria may be necessarily ambiguous, and one’s judgments tentative, but this is no reason to 
imply that no criteria exists at all. 
207Schrotenboer, 153. 
208Shrotenboer has contended that this “basic unity of humankind” concept is more 
stoic than Christian (Ibid., 153), though Newbigin denies this.  Neither offers evidence. 
 
 
 
humanity because it embraces the whole human family and all of creation.209  This covenant 
is found in Gen. 9: 8-17.  God promises never to destroy all life on the earth with a flood 
again.  It is difficult to see how this applies to eternal destiny.  It certainly points to God’s 
desire to preserve life, but it cannot be said to supercede the warnings of judgment found 
throughout Scripture. 
Newbigin also find an “inclusive” note in Romans 9-11, “which begins with the 
unbelief of the Jews” and ends with the affirmation that “the fulness of the Gentiles will be 
gathered in and all Israel will be saved.”210  He assumes that fulness means “all” rather than 
considering other possibilities such as “the full number of those who will believe,” or “the 
full number of the elect.”  His interpretation of this passage does not take into account the 
context of the passage, nor the context of all of Scripture.  It is a selective reading of a 
selected passage.  On so important a matter as the eternal destiny of human beings, one must 
do more careful work. 
Newbigin also supports his position by referring to the Pauline concept of Christ as 
the “second Adam” in Rom. 5:17-19.  He believes that Paul is suggesting that “the new 
relation to God inaugurated by Jesus is as universal in its scope as the old relation of sin and 
death inaugurated by Adam.”211  Again, he reads more into the passage than is warranted.  At 
best one might argue that it opens up the possibility that everyone might potentially be 
incorporated into the new humanity, but in no way does the passage imply that it is 
automatic.  The passage must be put along side those which regard the old, fallen creation as 
condemned, and which see the church as a sign or forerunner of the new creation, the 
kingdom which is coming.  Newbigin’s reading of this passage is not nearly so clear as he 
would like. 
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210Newbigin, “Confessing Christ,” 130. 
211Newbigin, “Christ and the World of Religions,” 27. 
 
 
 
Newbigin also points to the fact that God is at work every where in the world.  This, 
he believes, provides warrant to see God’s hand at work in every situation where ethical 
behaviour is being encouraged or promoted, or where justice is being advocated or carried 
out.  God’s purposes, Newbigin believes, relate to the “whole creation, a context wider than 
his purpose for the Church.”212  While it certainly is God’s will for justice to be done 
everywhere, one cannot assume that in every case where it happens that it is a part of God’s 
eternal purposes.  To some extent, the image of God in humanity leaves open the possibility 
that people will do things God’s way sometimes without God necessarily being involved 
directly in it.  Newbigin wants to assert that all that is good in the world will have its 
consummation in the purposes of God.213  This does not take into account the indications in 
Scripture that human righteousness is inadequate for God, and that even the best that 
humanity can offer is not sufficient to give them a right standing before God.  Ultimately, 
Newbigin’s understanding of how God works in the world does not take into account the 
extent of the effects of the fall,214 and the biblical promise that God will completely replace 
the current creation with a new one. 
Newbigin’s emphasis on cultural rather than individual conversion is also a factor 
here.   Since Newbigin believes that cultural transformation through the church’s witness is 
                                                 
212Newbigin, “Call to Missions--A Call to Unity,” 256. 
213Newbigin says, “There are liberations and humanisation going on in the world . . . 
quite outside the boundaries of the Church, of which we do right to say that they are signs of 
the presence of Christ in the world” (Newbigin, “Call to Mission--A Call to Unity,” 261).  
See also idem, “Christian Faith and the World Religions,” 331. 
214Milne points out that even though people can do things that are “relatively ‘good’ 
the thrust of Scripture indicates that such goodness ‘can never approach that entire, lifelong 
righteousness by which alone we can stand before God” (Milne, Know the Truth, 131).  
McGrath points out that Evangelicals “fully acknowledge the devastating and destructive 
impact of sin” (McGrath, 67).  Scriptures that focus on this include Isa. 59:1-2 which points 
out that sin separates God from humanity and Rom. 3:9-23 which makes it clear that no one 
will be declared righteous by the keeping of the law. 
 
 
 
primary, it follows logically that whatever of morality and justice is happening in the world 
must be part of God’s plan.  Again, this assumes that the culture is redeemable rather than 
condemned.215 
A danger that many Evangelicals find alarming in the idea that faith in Christ is not 
necessary for salvation is that it may undermine the need for evangelism.216  Evangelicals 
place evangelism at the forefront at least in theory if not always in practice.  Evangelism is 
“an integral element of the evangelical recognition of the identity and significance of Jesus 
Christ.”217  One cannot recognize that Jesus is Lord without wanting to proclaim him as 
such.218  Newbigin, however, contrasts bringing people to Christ with being “an effective 
witness and agent of God’s purpose for society.”219  This implies that God’s purpose is 
primarily cultural transformation, not the regeneration of lost people who come in faith at the 
proclamation of the word.  Paul G. Schrotenboer has responded to Newbigin on this, 
                                                 
215It is true that many Evangelicals hold out hope for a Christianized culture either 
through political action or through social action.  This may be built on a false hope of 
converting the culture, but sometimes it is what Phillips and Okholm call the dualist position 
which assumes that Christians are to be salt and light in the culture, not so much “to advance 
the kingdom but to prevent degeneration and thereby allow Christians a place in which to 
evangelize the world.”  The other position Evangelicals take is a Reformed approach which 
is “conversionist” and is the stance that really expects cultural transformation.  Phillips and 
Okholm cite H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951) 
as the source for these categories (Phillips and Okholm, 277).  Newbigin’s approach is 
actually closer to the conversionist paradigm, but is too optimistic about the culture itself. 
216Newbigin in fact at a 1978 consultation on missions strategy advocated that “no 
specific, collective effort to reach Muslims” be made (Glasser, 112). 
217McGrath, 68. 
218Ibid., 67-68. 
219Newbigin, “The Future of Missions and Missionaries,” 217. 
 
 
 
insisting that “evangelism is primary, because it is foundational to all that the church does in 
the world.”220 
Scripture teaches also that evangelism is of primary importance.  One need cite only 
the Great Commission in Matt. 18:19-20 and the parallel injunction in Acts 1:8.  Paul often 
expressed his desire to present the gospel as in Rom. 1:15 and saw his ministry in terms of 
evangelism.  Newbigin speaks of genuine New Testament witness as usually happening 
without “conscious intention to bring about a conversion.”221  Newbigin cites no examples of 
this.  One wonders, though, how to account for the missionary journeys of Paul if evangelism 
is not intentional. 
                                                 
220Schrotenboer, 152.  Newbigin fails to understand here the motivation for 
evangelism that drives evangelical witnessing and missions.  He sees church growth as 
nothing more than efforts to grow the church for the church’s own benefit, as mere 
proselytism, an illegitimate activity (Newbigin, “Evangelism in the City,” 3-4; idem, 
“Common Witness and Unity,” International Review of Mission 69, no. 274 [April 1980]: 
160.  (He does admit that this may be a caricature.)  He believes that the church’s mission 
should not be primarily “the aggrandizement of the church” (idem, “The Future of Mission 
and Missionaries,” 217). 
This is a mistake on Newbigin’s part.  It rises out of his lack of a doctrine of 
regeneration and his belief that salvation is available apart from explicit faith in Christ.  
Since he sees conversion in terms of intellectual and ethical change, not regeneration, he sees 
efforts to promote conversion as nothing more than persuasion.  This becomes clear when he 
says that “if all non-Christians are in fact destined for eternal fire, then any method, however 
violent, that has the possibility of converting them is not only permitted, but required” (idem, 
“Christian faith and the World Religions,” 315).  At this point, Newbigin parallels Lindbeck 
who says nearly the same thing in The Nature of Doctrine (Lindbeck, 55). 
Obviously no responsible Evangelical believes that human persuasion can bring about 
regeneration, or that a conversion that is in any way coerced could be genuine.  Regeneration 
is a work of the Holy Spirit and cannot be engineered.  Christians are responsible for 
proclaiming Christ in the best way possible, but no Christian can convert another person.  
The impetus to evangelism arises out of seeing who Christ is and what he has done for sinful 
humanity at the cross.  A burden for a lost world is a natural outgrowth of the work of the 
Spirit in the heart of the believer.  Newbigin has failed to understand the nature of 
evangelism. 
221Newbigin, “Common Witness and Unity,” 159. 
 
 
 
Newbigin’s understanding of the scope of salvation leads him to see God’s grace at 
work in some places that are surprising.  He wants to affirm, for example, that God is at work 
in the struggle for political liberation, which he sees as an expression of Christ’s redemptive 
work.222  This is consistent with his understanding of the Christian mission as primarily 
cultural transformation.  It also corresponds with his desire to have a Christianity that is 
empirically verifiable.  These types of actions and their effects may be seen while spiritual 
transformation may not. 
He has also said that he finds evidence of God’s work among adherents of other 
faiths.  He affirms that “many non-Christians . . . have a deep and often radiant sense of the 
presence of God,”223 and speaks positively of the “signs of the grace of God which we see so 
movingly among people of other faiths.”224  Similarly he affirms that “there is no human 
being in whose consciousness there is not some trace of God’s presence and goodness.”225  
The problem here, besides a weak view of the fall, is one of objective criteria.  How does 
Newbigin know that there are “signs of God’s grace” at work in a person?226  Possibly, he 
means that he has met people of other faiths whose lives are well-grounded, and who, as a 
result, have warm, pleasant personalities and high ethical values.  One is often tempted in 
such cases to identify as “signs of God’s grace” or “the presence of God.  These things are 
better seen, however, as manifestations of the image of God within and do not count as 
evidence of the grace of God at work, especially in any salvific sense, outside the church. 
                                                 
222Newbigin, “Call to Mission--A Call to Unity,” 257. 
223Newbigin, “Religious Pluralism and the Uniqueness of Jesus Christ,” in Many 
Other Ways?, 74. 
224Newbigin, “Confessing Christ,” 129. 
225Newbigin, “Christian faith and the World Religions,” 331. 
226This is especially puzzling in light of his insistence that one must not judge who is 
saved and who is not. 
 
 
 
Newbigin’s epistemic step backwards makes it possible for him to affirm many 
essential teachings of Scripture.  Since it is only a step backwards, however, merely a 
broadening of what may be verified, it does not allow him to affirm those doctrines most 
essential to the gospel.  For that, Newbigin would have to abandon the field of empirical 
verification and genuinely embrace the “new starting place for thought” offered in the 
Scriptures.  Evangelicalism, beginning from Scripture, affirms those doctrines, and the 
historical events that form the point of contact between doctrine and the physical world. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Evangelical Christianity has shown itself capable of maintaining its doctrinal 
distinctions and core commitments through decades of change both in the larger culture and 
within the churches.  It has shown an increasing willingness to listen to the various voices 
within its own tradition as well as to those outside, and to engage the larger culture critically 
on matters of ultimate concern. 
In addition, evangelical writers have displayed a genuine passion for helping the 
churches proclaim Christ in a world that desperately needs to hear the message. The desire of 
evangelical leaders to be intentional about effectively communicating the gospel is 
commendable.  These pages have shown that if Evangelicals are to continue to share the 
gospel effectively, they must recognize the nature and coherence of their core commitments 
and be ready to defend these boldly before a world increasingly open to a supernatural 
understanding of reality. 
Newbigin’s apologetic, while it strives to leave the modernist paradigm and ground 
itself in God’s revelation of himself, never really succeeds.  Newbigin’s commitment to 
empiricism shows up in the way he limits his defense to only what may be historically 
verified, or inferred directly from the story given in Scripture.  Many of the great doctrines of 
the faith are not defended in Newbigin’s apologetic. 
Evangelicals seek to defend both the historical truths of the Christian faith and the 
great doctrines to which they point.  While many have argued that one may begin with the 
evidences and infer the doctrines from them,1 at some point one must commit oneself to 
seeing the world from within the Bible’s perspective and to defending the doctrines 
presented there.  Presuppositional apologetics seeks to do exactly this. 
                                                 
1John W. Montgomery, Faith Founded on Fact: Essays in Evidential Apologetics 
(Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1978). 
 
 
 
One must not suppose, however, that presuppositionalism can stand alone.  As Alvin 
Plantinga has pointed out, a properly basic belief is not therefore groundless.2  Evidential 
apologetics plays an essential role in showing how Christian faith corresponds to the facts of 
history and to human experience.  Presuppositionalism demonstrates the coherence of the 
doctrines and worldview that are essential to give meaning to those evidences.  A 
presuppositionalism that is coherent, but completely unrelated to reality, would be as far 
removed from defending historic Christianity as Newbigin’s strictly evidentially based 
defense. An evidentialism that does not take the historic doctrines of the faith as a reference 
point offers the church a gospel that is empirically true, but which is hardly worth defending. 
The latter is what Newbigin offers the church.  If he had heeded his own injunction, 
to see the Bible as “a new starting place for thought,” and had, with Michael Polanyi, 
recognized “the power for the deliberate holding of unproven beliefs”3 inherent in the way 
the human mind is structured for knowing, he might have developed his defense of the faith 
along more comprehensive lines. 
What then are Evangelicals to do as they face the task of defending the gospel in the 
new century ahead?  First, they must recognize that “Evangelicalism is historic Christianity.” 
 It has “every right to claim to be a modern standard bearer of historic orthodox 
Christianity.”4  As such, it stands in the tradition rooted in God’s revelation, the Bible, and 
upheld by Augustine, the reformers, the pietists, and traditional Protestants down to the 
present day.  As such, their faith has stood the test of time.  It has weathered myriad cultural 
changes.  Evangelicals can be confident that whatever changes the next century brings, 
historic orthodox Christianity will survive, and perhaps even thrive. 
Second, Evangelicals must recognize that to defend the gospel, they must remain 
rooted in the Bible as God’s revelation of himself.  As revelation, Scripture is to be 
approached with an attitude of believing acceptance.  Only then can it truly function as a 
                                                 
2Plantinga, “Belief in God,” 97. 
3Polanyi, 268. 
4McGrath, 94. 
 
 
 
“starting point for thought.”  Newbigin’s call for the church to “indwell” the text of Scripture 
and to see the world from within its perspective must be heeded if the church is to defend 
adequately the claims of the gospel.  This means that Christians must believe what Scripture 
says, live lives that demonstrate that the Bible’s doctrinal and moral propositions really make 
a difference, and boldly proclaim the great truths of the faith regardless of the cost. 
Third, Evangelicals must heed Newbigin’s insistence that Christianity is rooted in the 
historical facts.  In an age when temptations abound to seek forms of spirituality that are 
merely experientially satisfying, Newbigin reminds Christians that without the objective 
facts of the gospel, the faith is meaningless.  The gospel makes assertions about what really 
happened in real history.  These facts cannot be divorced from the doctrines to which they 
point.  What Christians defend is a set of assertions about objective reality--assertions which 
are true, not just for one group, but true for the whole world.  How the world and people 
individually respond these truths will have real and genuine consequences both now and for 
eternity.  The question is not whether evidentialism or presuppositionalism is superior, but of 
defending “the whole counsel of God.” 
The century ahead will bring challenges and situations the church today cannot 
imagine.  Evangelical Christians, rooted in God’s inspired word, and empowered by the 
Spirit at work within them, will meet these challenges and continue boldly to “contend 
earnestly for the faith once for all delivered to the saints.” 
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